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This thesis deals with a largely forgotten soldier, writer and administrator of the mid  
 
to late Victorian era. General Sir Henry Brackenbury’s career covered some forty- 
 
eight years. He was either directly involved in or was witness to all the major events  
 
of the British Army during this period, from the Crimean War to the South African  
 
War. His career encompassed an era of reform that saw the army move away from the  
 
military system of the Napoleonic Wars and the gradual establishment of the  
 
system with which the British Army would take the field in 1914.  
 
 
The aim of this thesis is to look at the military career of Sir Henry Brackenbury,  
 
rather than be a biography of the man. However his literary career, personal life and  
 
financial circumstances are intrinsically linked to his life as a soldier. What this shows  
 
is a highly intelligent soldier, perhaps the first of a new bread of so-called ‘Scientific  
 
Soldiers’, men who studied and thought about their profession.  
 
 
Apart from a considerable, and important, amount of active service overseas,  
 
Brackenbury held three key administrative positions, which were the highlight of his  
 
army service and allowed his talents to come to the fore. As Head of the Intelligence  
 
Branch at the War Office, Military Member of the Council of the Governor General  
 
of India, and Director General of the Ordnance, he ended his long career with  
 
powerful and important positions that brought much praise. Indeed his contemporaries  
 







Brackenbury’s career has not received the attention from historians which it deserves,  
 
largely due to the fact that he left no collection of private papers. What follows is the  
 
most detailed exploration of his contribution to the development of the British Army  
 
based on official government sources and documents for the production of which he  
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General Sir Henry Brackenbury: The Thinking Man’s Soldier 
Introduction 
 
Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen told the following story about a meeting with  
 




He (the Duke of Cambridge) very kindly asked me what I was doing, but 
when I had broken to him that I was working in the Intelligence Department 
he looked grave: and, leaning over and putting his hand on my knee, he said, 




                                                                                                                                      
As Gleichen went on to say, this was a curious thing for the Commander-in-Chief to  
 
say to a young subaltern about his chief. More than that, why did the Duke feel it his  
 
duty to warn a young officer serving under this „dangerous‟ man? This has become an  
 
often-quoted remark about Brackenbury. It is interesting to compare this with Sir  
 
Garnet, later Lord, Wolseley‟s comment that Brackenbury was “not one of the  
 
cleverest, but the cleverest man in the British Army”.
2
 It could be argued that this was  
 
part of the reason why the Commander-in-Chief considered him dangerous.
3
 Yet there  
 
must have been far more to it than that. Gleichen himself could be called a man of  
 
„brains‟, yet he seemed acceptable to the Commander-in Chief. The difference was  
 
that Brackenbury was not only a thinker but also a reformer, and a radical one at that.  
 
Some of the reforms that Brackenbury supported would have destroyed the „order‟  
 
that the Duke of Cambridge championed. There was also a more personal point in that  
 
one of Brackenbury‟s key reforms was to abolish the office of Commander-in-Chief  
 
and replace him with a Chief of Staff. Brackenbury saw this as a key move in  
 
„professionalising‟ the army. Many of his other reforms to this end would also have  
 
been unacceptable to the Commander-in-Chief. Indeed in some respects he could be  
 
called the most radical of Britain‟s military reformers in the late Victorian era.
4
 The  
 
problem was that to a large extent many of his reforms remained in the realm of  
 2 
 
theory as he was never in a position to put them into practice. As a consequence the  
 
merit and effectiveness of these proposed reforms, which will be discussed in more  
 
detail later, is largely supposition.  
 
 
The intention of this thesis is to examine the military career of a largely forgotten  
 




Whereas the majority of his contemporaries made their reputations on the battlefields  
 
of the empire, Brackenbury made his in military administration and his literary career.  
 
The work that he did in the organisation of the various campaigns in the field and at  
 
the War Office has never truly been recognised, and rarely recorded. A brief synopsis  
 
of his career makes this hard to understand. He served in many of the key colonial  
 
wars of that period: the Indian Mutiny, the Ashanti Campaign, the Zulu War and the  
 
Gordon Relief expedition. He had two key War Office appointments, as Head of the  
 
Intelligence Branch and Director General of the Ordnance, and was generally  
 
accepted to have left both in a far better state than when first appointed. Indeed in  
 
both instances he entered departments in a state of some disarray. He also had two  
 
major semi-military appointments as Under Secretary for Police and Crime in Ireland  
 
and as the Military Member of the Council of the Viceroy of India.  Added to this he  
 
also witnessed the Franco-Prussian War at close quarters when working for the  
 
National Aid Society providing medicine and stores to the sick and wounded of both  
 
sides. As a consequence he had probably the best view of the Franco-Prussian War of  
 
any Englishman. He saw both armies in operation, and because of the capacity in  
 
which he was serving was treated in a friendly and cordial manner and given full  
 
access to the military hierarchies of both combatant nations.
6
 In addition to this he had  
 
also developed a considerable reputation as a writer, largely, but interestingly not  
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exclusively, on military matters.  His literary work was vital to his career  
 
advancement. It was a two-part article written for „The Standard‟ that brought him to  
 
the attention of the founders of the National Aid Society. It was also his writing on  
 
army reform that introduced him to the leading military reformers of the day, both  
 
civilian and military, and in particular Garnet Wolseley. Given his lack of  
 
personal means his literary work also gave him some financial security.  However,  
 
more importantly, it provided an importance and recognition beyond his military rank.  
 
His writing on military reform gave him a public profile that brought him to the  
 
attention of leading politicians, despite his being only a captain. It could well be said  
 
that for many of them he was probably the only officer of such rank who they could  
 
name, others than those they were either related to or knew personally. The  
 
significance of his writing is often lost. His series of articles on Army reform were  
 
written before, and in many cases anticipated, the Cardwell reforms. It was here that  
 
he advocated the creation of a General Staff nearly forty years before it was ultimately  
 
introduced. As we will see, many of his suggested changes would have been  
 
perceived as extremely radical at the time.    
 
 
Yet despite these achievements he remains largely unknown, save for a select group  
 
of military historians. There are several reasons for this. First, he was largely a  
 
behind- the-scenes figure, and his most significant achievements were in the War  
 
Office rather than the battlefield. Second, the importance of the work he undertook  
 
has been overlooked, mostly because of the lack of importance attached to  
 
administration by generations of soldiers and civilians alike. His work, although vital,  
 
was unappreciated by the majority of his contemporaries. Such administrative work  
 




note that many of the Secretaries of State under whom he served were far more  
 
appreciative of his skills than his military contemporaries. However, gradually the  
 
importance of the behind the scenes work, which enables an army to take the field,  
 
started to be understood. To a large extent this happened after he had retired in 1904,  
 
but there were a few, both soldiers and civilians, who appreciated the vital and  
 
demanding work he had done from the War Office during the South African War, a  
 
conflict that perhaps started an appreciation of such work.  
 
 
Perhaps the most important reason he is largely forgotten, however, is that unlike the  
 
majority of his contemporaries he left no cache of private papers that could be used by  
 
historians. What remains of his papers is a mixture of letters and official documents  
 
scattered amongst the archives of those with whom he had contact during his life. The  
 
reason for this lies partly with Brackenbury himself. When he retired he went to live  
 
in the south of France, but did not take any of his papers with him. Before his  
 
departure he donated those papers that were relevant to the India Office, and they  
 
survive today in the British Library‟s India and Oriental Studies section, and to the  
 
Royal Artillery Library. One period of his life that is covered extensively in what  
 
remains of his personal archive is the period between 1891 and 1896 when he was  
 
military member of the Council of the Viceroy of India. The British Library holds  
 
official documents and letters from this period, whilst the Royal Artillery Museum at  
 
Woolwich has his letter books. Added to this, and for obvious reasons, much of his  
 
correspondence with Lord Roberts, concerns his time in India and survives in the  
 
Roberts papers at the National Army Museum.   
 
 
Unfortunately the majority of the surviving material concerns mostly official matters.  
 
It is very difficult to build a picture of the man rather than simply his work. The  
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material that helps the most in the personal respect are the letters to T.H.S Escott and  
 
to Wolseley. Especially in his letters to Wolseley we get an insight into his views on  
 
his work and his career. We can see some of the insecurity that he had, most  
 
significantly when it came to how others viewed him as a soldier. He felt that he was  
 
treated with suspicion, and this added to his insecurity and as a result he did not feel  
 
his skills were appreciate. He also tells Wolseley that he prefers promotion to  
 
honours, as a reward for serving in various campaigns. We see elements of his  
 
hypochondria, but also the way in which his practice of working would exhaust him  
 
to the point of breakdown.  
 
 
This happened periodically, most notably on his return from the Franco-Prussian  
 
War, the Ashanti campaign, and the Gordon Relief expedition and during the South  
 
African War. Indeed the latter was the most significant. The severe strain that was  
 
placed upon him and the Ordnance Department led to a complete breakdown of his  
 
health, to the extent that he offered his resignation, but was persuaded to take a  
 




 The problem was that by the time of the South African War he was in his  
 
early sixties, the years of such hard work were taking their toll, and he became very  
 
anxious about his ability to carry on. Consequently he was finding that what little  
 
sleep he had was fitful and brief. Brackenbury was not alone in this respect, as there  
 
were a number of officers who experienced nervous breakdowns within the  
 
department during the conflict, due to the fact that the demands on it were entirely  
 
unexpected. Yet on the head of the department the pressure and responsibility was  
 
obviously greater.     
 
 
One has to be careful when examining the letters of Wolseley. They have their value,  
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but often have to be examined for deeper motives. Most of these letters were to  
 
Lady Wolseley. She appears to have enjoyed gossip and her husband seems to have  
 
indulged her by keeping her fully informed. As a consequence it is sometimes  
 
difficult to differentiate between gossip and fact. Also, Wolseley was very much a  
 
man of moods. Even a brief look at Wolseley‟s campaign journals illustrates that his  
 
opinion of his staff changed from day to day. His praise could quickly turn to vitriolic  
 
condemnation. His Sudan journal best illustrates this. By this time the decline in  
 
Wolseley‟s physical and mental health was starting to manifest itself. He was also  
 
troubled in this campaign by the fact that his staff were now senior officers and he  
 
was no longer able to control them as he had in the past. On one page he describes  
 
Brackenbury as being hated throughout the army in the Sudan and generally  
 
condemns his leadership, but in the next entry an attack on the character of Buller  
 
leads Wolseley to say that on his next campaign he will have Brackenbury as his  
 
Chief of Staff, praising his leadership quality, and saying that Brackenbury is one of  
 
only two men worth employing again. On one occasion Wolseley criticises  
 
Brackenbury for complaining about being forced to serve under officers junior to him  
 
during the Gordon relief expedition. Wolseley continued: “If in my career I had  
 
refused to serve under a junior, I wonder where I should have been?”, conveniently  
 
forgetting that he had never been in that position. The Wolseley papers and journals  
 
are useful and interesting but their limitations should always be remembered. Again in  
 
this instance it is unfortunate that Brackenbury‟s personal recollection of events has  
 
not survived. It would have been very interesting to have compared them with  
 
Wolseley‟s. To a similar extent the correspondence with T.H. Escott has a similar  
 
bias. Escott and Brackenbury were close friends and this obviously influenced his  
 
judgement. This is illustrated in Escott‟s article „Henry Brackenbury and his school‟.  
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 Here we get a good picture of his mind and administrative skills at work. We  
 
see the formulation of his plans to deal with the Fenian threat, and how he  
 
recommends the creation of a sophisticated intelligence network. We also see in these  
 
letters the incredulity he felt when his plans were not adopted. Here we also see his  
 
lack of ability to play the political game and to realise that he was in a highly  
 
politicised position and environment. This is one of the best archives that shows how  
 
he worked, rather than simply the product of his work. 
 
 
Another archive that gives some valuable insights into Brackenbury‟s thinking can be  
 
found in his letters to Edward Stanhope, when the latter was Secretary of State for  
 
War between January 1887 and August 1892. Stanhope and Brackenbury knew each  
 
other before their time together at the War Office. The full extent of this relationship  
 
is unclear, but we do knew that Stanhope had been sufficiently impressed by  
 
Brackenbury to ask him to become the chief political and election agent for the  
 
Conservative party. Their friendship meant that Brackenbury was extremely open in  
 
his letters to Stanhope. In them we get a picture of Brackenbury‟s insecurity and  
 
concern about his future. He seems to have had a real fear that once his time as Head  
 
of the Intelligence Branch was over he would simply not be given another  
 
appointment. This is extremely interesting given that to the outside observer it would  
 
have appeared that Brackenbury‟s star was in the ascendance. Perhaps partly a  
 
recognition that he had lost Wolseley‟s patronage, and also that he had made many  
 




The relationship between Lord Roberts and Brackenbury will be looked at in more  
 
detail later, but their friendship and work together have left an interesting account of  
 
Brackenbury‟s career. Despite being in many ways the protégé of Roberts‟ great rival  
 
Wolseley, Brackenbury does seem to have been deeply respected by Roberts. There is  
 
a warmth and friendliness in the letters that is missing in the Wolseley papers.  
 
Perhaps key in this was the fact that Roberts would ask for Brackenbury‟s advice,  
 
something that Wolseley never did. Roberts correspondence with Brackenbury starts  
 
when the latter was at the Intelligence Branch. Obviously it is a its greatest during the  
 
time they served together in India, but it continues after Roberts is replaced by White,  
 





Perhaps this highlights a key problem with the historiography regarding Brackenbury.  
 
Due to his close links with Wolseley the large majority of references to Brackenbury  
 
come straight from the former. As has already been explained this in itself is  
 
something of a problem, given the nature of Wolseley‟s account. However it misses  
 
the point that Brackenbury was far more than just one of the „ring‟. His career brought  
 
him into a close working relationship with Roberts and many leading politicians of  
 
the day. Indeed he was closer, and worked closer, with Roberts, Stanhope and  
 
Lansdowne in particular, than he ever did with Wolseley. One of the key aims of this  
 
thesis is to illustrate his career away from Wolseley. Although Brackenbury was  
 
dependent upon Wolseley‟s patronage in the early days his later career owed little to  
 
his influence. His three key administrative appointments towards the end of his career  
 
owed much more to political intervention and Brackenbury‟s persistence than  
 
Wolseley‟s influence. Certainly whenever historians have written about Wolseley and  
 
his exploits the name of Brackenbury has not been far away, but to get a fuller picture  
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of Brackenbury it is necessary to move beyond his association with Wolseley and the  
 
ring. The problem is the lack of Brackenbury‟s own papers. As a consequence this  
 
study has tried to cover all the other available sources. Looking at the papers of  
 
people such as Roberts, Campbell-Bannerman, Arnold-Forster, Escott, Stanhope,  
 
Buller and others has allowed for a much wider view than the tradition Wolseley  
 
centric view of Brackenbury to be reached.  
 
 
However this has caused some problems, as many of his contemporaries archives  
 
have not survived either. One of the closest people to Brackenbury was the future  
 
Lieutenant General Sir James Grierson, but unfortunately his papers have not  
 
survived. The Grierson diaries would have been extremely useful, as he was probably  
 
closer to him than any other officer. Unfortunately those who were closest to  
 
Brackenbury were the officers who served under him at the Intelligence Branch, and  
 
given the nature of their work they obviously recorded little at the time. Much more  
 
useful in this respect are their autobiographies. Many other accounts of his  
 
contemporaries have only brief mention of Brackenbury. Yet they all help to create a  
 
more complete account of his career. The aim is to move beyond the narrow view of  
 
Brackenbury that exists in what little has been written about him, and put his whole  
 
career in its wider context rather than merely his association with Wolseley and the  
 
„ring‟.            
 
 




September 1837. The family had played an important part in Lincolnshire society, and  
 
contributed many members to the church and the legal profession within the county.  
 
As he was the youngest son of a youngest son it was reasonable to expect that he  
 
would probably have been sent into the army as a career. The likelihood was  
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increased by the fact that both his father and an uncle were Peninsular War veterans,  
 
and two of his three brothers joined the army, so that something of a military tradition  
 
seems to have been established  in the family. Yet Brackenbury himself seems not to  
 




  It is likely that these years in a business atmosphere did something to  
 
influence his professional approach to his later military life. It also gave him  
 
experience of another world that many officers did not have. His exact reasons for  
 
joining the army are uncertain. However, what is known is that he had already had a  
 
brief military experience whilst in Canada where he had served as an ensign in the  
 
Seventh Battalion of the Quebec Militia.   
 
 
Added to which he had a lifelong friendly rivalry with his brother Charles, who was  
 
already serving in the Royal Artillery. It may well have been a desire to emulate his  
 
brother, particularly as the latter was currently seeing active service in the Crimean  
 
War, which clinched the decision. It seems to be generally agreed that it was only at  
 
this point that Brackenbury really settled down to work and started to appreciate the  
 
skills he had towards administration. Brackenbury entered the Royal Military  
 
Academy at Woolwich as a „gentleman cadet‟ in 1855 and on the strength of his  
 
previous commission in Quebec was appointed Senior Under Officer, although  
 
Brackenbury admitted that at that point, “…my only military knowledge was what I  
 
had gained on the strength of one muster parade”.
12
 His commissioning was rushed  
 
through, and it has been said that he had not completed all the necessary courses, but  
 




 In April 1856 he was commissioned as a Lieutenant in the  
 
Royal Artillery. In late June his company were ordered to Plymouth to take up  
 
garrison artillery duties. He was soon acting as Adjutant for the Royal Artillery in the  
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western district, and it was from here that he obtained service in the forces being  
 
prepared to go to India to quell the mutiny. In India the young subaltern learnt  
 
an early lesson in the perils of not having the correct equipment. The men of his  
 
company, like other artillery companies, had not been issued with helmets, to keep the  
 
sun off. Their only head gear was forage caps with white cap covers. As a result his  
 
battery lost 20% of their officers and men “from solar apoplexy”.
14
 This led him to  
 
think about the importance of planning and preparation and had a lasting impact on  
 
him. It may also explain why during the South African War, when he was Director  
 
General of Ordnance, he insisted, to the point of obsession, that all equipment was to  
 
a standard that would withstand the climatic conditions.  
 
 
A curious event happened in 1860 when Brackenbury was offered the post of  
 
Adjutant of the Brigade on the condition that he give up cricket. Brackenbury had  
 
represented the Royal Artillery on several occasions and had developed a good  
 
reputation as a wicketkeeper-batsman. However, the previous adjutant had also been a  
 
cricketer and had as a consequence not performed his duties to the required level.  
 
Brackenbury, in his own words, “elected for work in preference to play” and for the  
 
next two years played no cricket.
15
 This was an important event and shows the level to  
 
which Brackenbury had grown up and intended to make the army his career, and that  
 




 The majority of officers of the day would more likely have elected  
 
for play over work. Although much has been written about the social attitudes of the  
 





For most British officers the acquisition of a commission represented a stage 
in the life of a „gentleman‟, not a long-term commitment, and its main 





Although it could be argued that Brackenbury‟s social status meant he had little  
 
choice other than to make the army his career, this would be to ignore the fact that he  
 
did have other job offers both in politics and the city. His decision was an early  
 
indication that Brackenbury was a different style of officer and in many ways  
 
bucked the trend of the officer corps at that time. From 1862-1864 he was Lieutenant  
 
of a company of gentleman cadets at the Royal Military Academy Woolwich. At the  
 
end of this appointment he became Assistant-Instructor in Artillery, also at Woolwich.  
 
It was at this time that he commenced his literary career. This undoubtedly helped his  
 
case when in the summer of 1868 he applied for the newly created appointment of  
 
Professor of Military History at Woolwich. Within this position his literary work  
 
expanded as he found that material gathered for his lectures could be revised and  
 
published. Battlefield tours during the vacations, mostly on the continent and  
 
occasionally accompanied by students, led to several articles being published. His  
 
literary career will be looked at in more detail later.               
 
 




 This is a very pertinent comment that raises several points. In  
 
some respects he could be said to be „before his time‟. Had he been born twenty years  
 
later he would have been more in tune with prevailing military attitudes and would  
 
most likely have been the Chief of Staff that he had so long campaigned for, although,  
 
questioning of this style ignores the fact that his advancement was due to the  
 
circumstances of the time, because there was a wider movement for army reform,  
 
with which he could associate. He also benefited from the patronage of Lord  
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Wolseley. Also because in some ways he was the first of a new breed or at least style  
 
of officer he became, and indeed made himself, a focal point for like-minded young  
 
officers when he was Head of the Intelligence Branch. It could be said that the  
 
Intelligence Branch during this era was the closest thing the British Army had to a  
 
General Staff. This was not simply because of the duties that it undertook. Under  
 
Brackenbury in particular it attracted, and indeed sought out, the capable young  
 
officers of the Army who in European nations would have formed the General Staff.  
 
In many respects the Intelligence Branch under Brackenbury was a training ground  
 
for such officers.  
 
 
Indeed it was here that many of the senior figures of the War Office during the First  
 
World War gained that initial training. Amongst the junior officers he chose for  
 
the department were two future field marshals, a future Chief of the Imperial  
 
General Staff, and five major-generals. Not only does this show the quality of men he  
 
selected but it perhaps lends weight to the argument that the quality of such types of  
 
officer was starting to be understood. Brackenbury was also in a way a champion of  
 
the graduates of the Staff College, despite his never having attended it. Although there  
 
were obvious exceptions, such as Edward Gleichen, who had proved his worth when  
 
serving under Brackenbury in the River Campaign in the Sudan, within a year of  
 
Brackenbury‟s appointment at the Intelligence Branch there were thirteen officers  
 
either attached or permanent who were Staff College graduates.
19
 All those who  
 
served under him during this period had great respect for him. The relationship  
 
worked both ways. If Brackenbury were ever to be Chief of Staff these were the men  
 
who would serve under him. On the other hand they saw him as a patron who would  
 
assist their military advancement, and also one of the few senior officers with whom  
 
their particular administrative talents were recognised for their importance. In their  
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many autobiographies all of them commented upon his devotion, hard work, and  
 
professional manner. The work this department did will be looked at in more detail  
 
later, but suffice it to say that Brackenbury‟s achievements there were significant. Not  
 
least because he, supported by Wolseley as Adjutant-General and Stanhope as  
 
Secretary of State for War, managed to create the political and military will to gather  
 
such a group of like-minded intellectual officers together and make it into a key hub  
 
of the War Office. However, the practice of appointing people to the War Office on  
 







The one thing all those who worked under him commented upon was his hard work  
 
and highly professional manner. He turned all the offices he worked in, whether in the  
 
War Office or throughout the empire, into professional well run going concerns. The  
 
words „professional‟ and „businesslike‟ were still something of an insult in the army  
 
of this period. The future Lord Kitchener was once called a „professional soldier‟,  
 
and this was clearly intended as an insult; if you were professional you were probably  
 
not a gentleman. This is part of a much wider discussion about the professionalisation  
 
of late Victorian society, which is largely beyond the scope of this thesis, which in  
 
turn forms part of a wider debate about the army and the merits of „brains‟ versus  
 
„breeding‟, to use the words of the Duke of Cambridge. Cambridge was sometimes  
 
seen as holding back the professional development of the army. Often called a „bow  
 
and arrow‟ general, his time as Commander-in-Chief was a period of several  
 
contradictions. He was a keen advocate of social status as the method of officer  
 
selection and generally opposed many of the Cardwell reforms which aimed to alter  
 
the conditions and mentality of the army. On the other hand he was also an advocate  
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of the Staff College and had worked to overcome opposition to its reestablishment. He  
 
also advocated many of the developments in military technology that happened during  
 
his time in office. Although one of the Cardwell reforms had been the abolition of the  
 
system of purchasing commissions in the army, thus removing one of the major  
 
financial limitations on a military career, the fact remained that the social composition  
 
of the officer corps changed little until after the First World War. The social position  
 
and the high cost of being an officer meant that an officer‟s pay was never enough and  
 
that the majority of officers were dependent upon a private income. It was in such an  
 
atmosphere that Brackenbury found himself trying to advance professional ideas and  
 
ideals. Brackenbury had no private income of any substance and it was his writing  
 
that was the key to his ability to maintain a military career. Although joining the army  
 
before the abolition of purchase, Brackenbury never had to purchase a commission as  
 




  Still he had to maintain the „lifestyle‟ of an officer and with no real private  
 
income his situation was difficult. This was someone who came from a minor  
 
landowning family so the problem for the middle classes is self-evident.  
 
 
His problem of finance was partly solved by his writing, which was almost a full-time  
 
occupation on occasions. He also made a financially motivated marriage. Whilst his  
 
private life is not entirely relevant to his military career a few comments are  
 
necessary. His first wife Emilia was ten years his senior and a widow. If there ever  
 
had been a motivation other than money any such feelings soon disappeared, and  
 
much of their marriage was spent separated, although they never divorced, as a  
 
divorcee could not hold a Queen‟s Commission. The majority of the detail about  
 
Brackenbury‟s private life comes from the papers of Lord and Lady Wolseley and the  
 
problem here is to differentiate between the gossip and fact. Brackenbury does appear  
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to have had several affairs.
22
 Only two are known for sure. Firstly, whilst in South  
 
Africa, he had an affair, which was to say the least dangerous. The lady in question  
 
was not only married but to the son of the chief political agent in Natal, a man who  
 
had proved himself in action and was according to Wolseley a „crack shot‟. Wolseley  
 
took measures to get Brackenbury out of the way as quickly as possible. However, it  
 
is interesting to note from his correspondence with Lady Wolseley that whilst he did  
 




 Wolseley also comments on a relationship Brackenbury had with a  
 
woman in France. Although not entirely clear, this is likely to have been Edith  
 
Desanges who in 1905 became the second Mrs Brackenbury shortly after the death of  
 
Emilia. There was no issue from ether marriage, and consequently there are no direct  
 
descendants of Henry Brackenbury. This in itself has caused a problem as it is  
 
commonly the descendants who keep the memory alive, and this is another factor in  
 
understanding why so little has been written about Henry Brackenbury. Having said  
 
that, it is interesting to note that no account of the life of Charles Brackenbury exists,  
 
despite the fact that he had nine children. Although Charles did not reach the heights  
 
that his brother did it is surprising that nothing has been written about him given that  
 
he had vast experience of witnessing European wars. Perhaps this points to a wider  
 
reason for the failure to record the lives of the brothers, that is not immediately clear. 
 
 
Although he could be considered a consummate professional Brackenbury‟s ideas  
 
about soldiering have been called into question. Ian Hamilton, who was a friend of  
 
Brackenbury‟s, criticised him for “hating” soldiers. “On paper he appreciated them  
 
well; that is to say he wrote what military instructors barbarously call „appreciations‟  
 
about them, but Brackenbury, the real Brackenbury, hated them in practice”.
24
 Not  
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only is this an unusual criticism but also it is hard to understand what point Hamilton  
 
was trying to make. His motivation here, as in the rest of the same chapter, was to  
 
criticise Wolseley for his selection of officers and his conduct of the Gordon Relief  
 
expedition. If Hamilton was trying to say that Brackenbury did not care for them that  
 
is hard to support in the light of his writing on military reform, much of which, if  
 
carried out, would dramatically improve the life of the average soldier. It must be  
 
added that Brackenbury‟s primary motivation was to improve efficiency and aid  
 
recruitment. However, Brackenbury did not have much experience in dealing with  
 
ordinary soldiers. His career was largely based around dealing with officers and in the  
 
brief times in his early career that he had commanded soldiers they were artillerymen  
 
rather than infantry. The artillery was a very different organisation to the rest of the  
 
army as a degree of specialism was required, and if as a result Brackenbury was  
 
unsure of how to deal with ordinary soldiers then that is to a large extent  
 
understandable. Another key phrase is Hamilton‟s reference to military instructors  
 
and it is no coincidence that this was Brackenbury‟s background. If, however,  
 
Hamilton is suggesting he did not care about the welfare of his men then the point is  
 
harder to support. Brackenbury‟s very nature would have meant that he did not show  
 
much concern, but that did not mean that he did not care.  His lack of experience of  
 
dealing with other ranks probably meant that he did not always understand how best  
 
to handle them. Yet this was not the type of soldier Brackenbury was. He had  
 
ambitions to be a field commander and had shown he was more than capable but this  
 
was not where his talents lay. Indeed perhaps his most useful position was not to be at  
 
the seat of war but at the War Office where, as an administrator, he could organise  
 
and plan campaigns. The fact that this was not appreciated says a lot about the army  
 
of that time. Ideals about soldiering centred on romantic notions of the battlefield.  
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Thomas Pakenham gives a good example of how this worked.  
 
If help didn‟t come, Jameson and his officers well knew what England 
expected of them. This was the moment they had been trained for ever since 
boyhood. It was a picture of the last stand above the fireplace in the 
schoolroom and the mess and the rectory. The Gatling has jammed: the 
Colonel, eyes uplifted, grasps his sword; the little band sings „God Save the 
Queen‟; and, one, by one, they fall.
25
              
 
Although an exaggeration of a stereotype, this illustrates the perceived „glamour‟ of  
 
the battlefield. In the „small wars‟ of Empire with which the British Army found 
 
itself preoccupied during this period, the brave heroic stand was a powerful  
 
image. In almost every campaign the British forces would be outnumbered, although  
 
they would almost always have technical and material superiority over their  
 
adversaries. This was the place to be for career advancement, and perhaps explains a  
 
great deal about why Brackenbury has been largely forgotten. There was, and to an  
 
extent still is, a lack of „glamour‟ about staff work even though it is vital to allow an  
 
army to take the field.  
 
 
The folly of this attitude was partly realised during the South African War when the  
 
ad hoc staff arrangements were wholly inadequate for the demands of the conflict.  
 
Most of the staff was selected purely because of their availability and few had met  
 
before let alone served together. This arrangement led the author of „The Times  
 
History of the South African War‟ to comment:  
 
Englishmen, who would not dream of sending a crew to Henley Regatta 
whose members had never rowed together before, were quite content that a 
general‟s staff should be hastily improvised at the last moment from officers 




The fact that this situation existed was largely the fault of the army itself. It was the  
 
army that had really scuppered the creation of a General Staff, which the Hartington  
 
Commission of 1890 had recommended.
27
 Partly this was due to traditional attitudes  
 
amongst the army hierarchy, but also because the main advocate of professional staff  
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work, Lord Wolseley, opposed the idea for purely selfish reasons.  
  
 
An interesting view on his career was given by Brackenbury in February 1883 when  
 
he wrote to Wolseley:  
 
Never yet have I been offered even the humblest employment on the staff in 
England – never once have I been asked to serve on a committee or 
commission, or in any way whatever to help in the work of organisation and 




It seems rather ironic that a man who wanted such work and had proved he could do  
 
it was overlooked for men who would much rather have seen service in the field. His  
 
liking for management was largely due to his professional background to work, but  
 
also because of his educational background. The years he had spent teaching at the  
 
Royal Military Academy, Woolwich as Professor of Military History had set his mind  
 
to studying his profession more seriously than most, and it was at this time that his  
 
literary output was at its most prestigious. Wolseley praised him for administrative  
 
work on many occasions. Perhaps more significant was the praise he received from  
 
several Secretaries of State for War. Indeed the individual who seemed the most  
 
aggrieved by Brackenbury‟s omission from the honours list for the South African War  
 
was the Secretary of State for War, H.O Arnold-Forster. His position is  
 
understandable. Brackenbury was one of the few men to come out of the South  
 
African War with any credit, yet it was never officially recognised.  
 
 
Henry Brackenbury seems to have been a slightly unusually character in some ways.  
 
That he often appeared aloof, superior, condescending and arrogant is probably true  
 
but these were hardly unique characteristics for a Victorian army officer. Indeed this  
 
might have been part of the „disguise‟ he used to make himself seem acceptable to his  
 
fellow officers. Yet his supposed arrogance might often have been self-confidence.  
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However he was certainly able to realise his own limitations. There had been some  
 
suggestions that Brackenbury might be the man to succeed Roberts as Commander-in- 
 
Chief in India. In a very frank and honest letter to Lord Lansdowne Brackenbury  
 
rejected the idea in self-deprecating terms. Speaking of himself he said,  
 
Lieutenant-General Brackenbury does not possess in a high degree the 
qualities required in a Commander-in-Chief. He is unknown to the Indian 
Army. He has not the gift of attaching soldiers to him, which is possessed by 
Lord Roberts and Sir George White. He has no practical knowledge of the 
Indian Army. He is an indifferent horseman. He has been for the last seven 
years dissociated from the command of troops. His appointment could 
therefore only be considered as affording a possible, though by no means 
satisfactory solution of a very difficult problem.
29
   
 
 
Although a highly intelligent and professional man Brackenbury adopted what has  
 
been called a „silly ass‟ manner. He developed a „haw haw‟ laugh, much to  
 
Wolseley‟s annoyance. Perhaps most incomprehensible was his affectation of a lisp, a  
 




 All of this can be seen as part of his attempt to be  
 
accepted and was almost a disguise for the unacceptable nature of his professionalism.  
 
Given that he joined the Crimean era army the use of such mannerisms is perhaps  
 
more understandable. Clinging to the fashions of the day would have given him a  
 
certain security and acceptability that his professionalism would not have secured  
 
alone. It might also have made people believe that he was of slightly higher social  
 
status than he indeed was.  
 
 
For whatever reason he appears to have been difficult to like personally, but even  
 
those who disliked him would admit admiration for his work. He had an ability to rub  
 
people up the wrong way. Sir George White, for instance, claimed that Brackenbury  
 
was an “intriguer” who tried “…to turn everything to his own credit”.
31
 In a sense it  
 
was inevitable that Brackenbury would gain some credit for all things done in the  
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Indian Army, as he was ultimately the senior man, and in theory White‟s „boss‟. It  
 
would be interesting to know if White realised that Brackenbury had championed his  
 
claim to be Commander-in-Chief in India, despite his juniority, and had written to  
 
both Stanhope, as Secretary of State for War, and Lord Lansdowne as Viceroy, in his  
 
favour. Indeed in both letters he said White was the only option. So whatever view  
 
White had of Brackenbury it did not affect Brackenbury‟s view of White. Whilst there  
 
are other examples of this ability to rub people up the wrong way, including his  
 
actions towards the government during his time in Ireland, there is however no record  
 
of anyone criticising or denigrating his work or professionalism.
32
        
 
 
The idea that he was hard to get to know and generally disliked is contradicted by his  
 
time in the Intelligence Branch where the officers serving under him were full of  
 
praise and genuinely liked him. It can be argued that this was because he had  
 
surrounded himself with likeminded officers and for perhaps the first time in his  
 
military career could genuinely be himself. It is clear that Brackenbury felt a  
 
pressure on himself to prove that he was more than a teacher or thinker. In the same  
 
way he felt himself pressured to prove that he was „an officer and a gentleman‟ rather  
 
than a „professional‟. He had an uneasy relationship with politicians, although he got  
 
on well with a good many. The problem was Brackenbury‟s lack of tact and  
 
unwillingness to play the political game. His view was simple, if not arrogant. He was  
 
the expert, and if he said something needed to be done then it was their duty to make  
 
sure that he was able to carry it out. This was certainly the case with Ireland and his  
 
time as Director General of the Ordnance. He was slightly more tactful when Head of  
 
the Intelligence Branch. This was perhaps due to the fact that the conflict he had in  
 
Ireland with his political masters was still fresh in his memory. The other reason  
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might be that in this latter case he had the full support of Wolseley and Stanhope who  
 
would play the political game for him.  
 
 
Brackenbury entered the army at an important time. The army had been called upon to  
 
undertake two major operations, the war in the Crimea and the mutiny in India, within  
 
a short space of time. In particular the Crimean War showed up the inadequacies and  
 
inefficiencies of the military machine in all its aspects. Indeed, the situation was such  
 
that a major overhaul of the military system was undertaken whilst the war was still  
 
being fought. Whilst these reforms simplified the situation they were only part of  
 
what was needed. Thus there was a continuing interest in reforming the army. At the  
 
time Brackenbury started writing in the mid-1860s parliamentary interest in army  
 
reform was growing though never could it be said that it was considered to be a high  
 
priority. The Cardwell reforms did not come out of nowhere and the previous  
 
Conservative government, who had never had time before the election of 1868 to  
 
carry them through, had proposed several of them. As can be seen as Brackenbury‟s  
 
career advanced he was often in the right place at the right time. His entry to the army  
 
and commencement of his literary career coincided with moves in the direction of  
 
reform. An interesting question would be whether the events of the time turned  
 
Brackenbury into a reformer or whether he helped to set the agenda of reform. The  
 
lack of private papers is a problem in this regard as we do not know what  
 
Brackenbury‟s thinking and motivations were at the time.  
 
 
As has already been said, the intention of this thesis is to explore, in a detail never  
 
attempted before, the military career of Sir Henry Brackenbury. The work begins with  
 
a brief look at the late Victorian army in order to provide essential background for  
 
the study and to explain the nature of the organisation of which Brackenbury was a  
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member. It is not intended to be a detailed look at this period in the British Army‟s  
 
history. A vital part of his life was his literary work, and a chapter has been included  
 
that looks at the nature of this work, the type of publications he wrote for and the  
 
significance of his writing. An examination will also be made of his work for the  
 
National Aid Society during the Franco-Prussian War. Whilst this might not be  
 
considered to be part of his military career it was undoubtedly a very significant  
 
event and would have considerable impact on his own later military career. It also  
 
gave him a degree of public attention which would further both his literary and  
 
military career. The aim here is to examine a unique perspective on the conflict  
 
rather than the conflict itself.  We then move on to look at his active service career.  
 
This covers the years from 1873-1886 which Brackenbury spent largely overseas in a  
 
number of short-term positions. Whilst the term “service in the field” is used for this  
 
chapter there are perhaps some appointments which do not quite fall into this  
 
category but are included here because, though significant, they do not warrant a  
 
chapter in their own right. In Ireland it could be argued that although his appointment  
 
was a civilian one it warrants inclusion, as he was convinced to take up the  
 
appointment by being told by the government that it was “war in Ireland”. Although  
 
his work in Cyprus was largely civilian orientated he was serving as part of a military  
 
administration of the island. It is only really his appointment as military attaché in  
 
Paris and the various home appointments that he had which cannot be truly called  
 
service in the field. They are, however, important parts of his career but the sources  
 
do not exist to enable individual chapters to be written. He had a very significant  
 
active service career which would have been the envy of many of his contemporaries.  
 
It was on such expeditions that fame, glory and more importantly promotion could be  
 
found. It is worth noting that despite many years of good administrative work he  
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received his first War Office appointment on the back of his service in the field in the  
 
Sudan in 1885. So by the time he finally entered the War Office he was in fact a  
 
Major General. There was another important factor to his active service career. It  
 
meant that he could not be called „an armchair general‟ or be seen as purely a teacher  
 
or theorist. It undoubtedly helped in his later administrative appointments that he had  
 
experience of service in the field.  The remainder of the thesis focuses on the three  
 
key appointments he undertook towards the end of his career; the Head of the  
 
Intelligence Branch, the Military Member of the Council of the Viceroy of India, and  
 
Director General of the Ordnance. This moved him into the hierarchy of the army and  
 
allowed him the opportunity to put into practice some of the „theories‟ he had  
 
expounded in his literary career. 
 
 
The thesis intends to look at the military career of a forgotten but extremely  
 
significant Victorian soldier. Through examining his career we see the way in which  
 
the late Victorian army reacted to change and was changed during a period of  
 
continual reform. We also see the rise in professionalism within the army officer  
 
corps. Although it is not the aim of this thesis to enter into the debate over when the  
 
British Army became truly professional, we can see through the life of Brackenbury  
 
that things were beginning to change. Although other generals of the period such as  
 




 Brackenbury could be called an intellectual soldier. His literary  
 
career demonstrates the amount of time and thought he put into so many areas of his  
 
profession as well as his concern about the fighting efficiency of the army.  
 
Brackenbury was unique in combining a significant literary career with active service  
 
and key administrative appointments at the highest level of the British Army. No  
 
other soldier compared in this respect and through looking at his career we gain a  
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different perspective on the British Army than that provided by other scholars. There  
 
is also the matter of the sheer length of his career, spanning some forty-eight years,  
 
encompassed the large majority of the Victorian era, which means that he is a key  
 
witness to the period.
34
 However, what is more important than the length of his career  
 
is what he was able to achieve during it. From a subaltern in the Royal Artillery he  
 
moved on to a significant active service career before ending his military service with  
 
three major administrative appointments. Through using a much broader set of  
 
archives than has ever been used before we are able to place Henry Brackenbury in  
 
his correct context, and illustrates his importance within the army and the state during  
 
this period. The aim is to move away from the narrow view of his association with  
 
Wolseley to illustrate the career of a significant officer of the late Victorian army  
 
and to place his career in its correct context.                
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In military terms the dates for the late Victorian period are unclear. Some take the end  
 
of the Crimean war as the start, but Edward Spiers, in his book the „Late Victorian  
 
Army‟, covers the period between 1868 and 1902. The key reason for this is that it  
 
starts with the appointment of Edward Cardwell as Secretary of State for War in  
 
December 1868. For many, Cardwell‟s appointment is seen as the beginning of the  
 
modern army. The series of reforms that he instituted commenced the change away  
 
from the army that had fought the Napoleonic Wars, and had recently failed to deal  
 
with the rigours of the Crimea War. However the Cardwell reforms were just part of a  
 
period of almost constant reform.  
 
 
This chapter will look at the nature of the army and its position in society at that time  
 
along with the constant debate about control of the army. It will also examine two of  
 
the most significant Secretaries of State for War, namely Cardwell and Stanhope.  
 
Whilst there were other reformers during this period, both men had the advantage of  
 
serving long periods at the War Office. The main aim of this chapter, however, is to  
 
place in its proper context the career of Sir Henry Brackenbury and give a brief  
 
account of the organisation of which he was for so long an important member.  
 
 
The standing of the British Army  
 
The British Army was in a unique position because unlike its European rivals it had  
 
no land borders to protect at home. This, along with the presumed supremacy of the  
 
Royal Navy, was the basic reason why Britain could afford to have such a small army  
 
recruited by means of voluntary enlistment. The average size of the British Army  
 
during this period was around 150,000 men, excluding the British garrison in India  
 
 29 
which was maintained at a fixed level.
1
 This compared poorly with the peacetime  
 
standing of the French Army, which averaged 544,450, the German Army, which  
 
numbered 545,000 and the Russian Army, which averaged 896,000.
2
 Yet the real  
 
picture was far worse as all these nations had compulsory military service of one form  
 
or another and could quickly double their strength. Indeed, much interest was caused  
 
in Britain by the German system of short service which meant that a soldier spent  
 
three years with the colours and then four years in the first rank of reserves. The  
 
British system compared badly, with a soldier spending twenty-one years with the  
 
colours. This had the effect that even the youngest soldiers were nearing their forties  
 
by the time they joined any sort of reserve. As a result there was little practical  
 
backup for the standing army.  
 
 
The reasons for this were varied. There were the obvious economic reasons. The first  
 
line of defence was always going to be the Royal Navy, which itself cost a great deal  
 
to maintain. The argument ran that with the supremacy of the Royal Navy there was  
 
no need to worry too much about the army. This is a point borne out by the fact that  
 
many of the improvements in the army came during the periods of invasions scares  
 
when the supremacy of the Royal Navy was questioned. There was however a wider  
 
question concerning the status of the Army. The idea of a large standing army was not  
 
just unpopular as regards expense. There was a wider concern, which dated back to  
 
the times of the Commonwealth when Cromwell‟s large standing army had supported  
 
his „dictatorship‟. This was also supported by recent history, especially in France, and  
 
as a result the perception existed in Britain that a large standing army was  
 
synonymous with dictatorship. There were also wider social issues involving loss of  
 
liberty. A soldier‟s life was not particularly pleasant. They were subject to brutal and  
 
humiliating punishment, often for quite minor offences even by Victorian standards,  
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and living conditions were poor, as was pay and life expectancy. There was also a  
 
very real chance of death, or perhaps worse being crippled and confined, more often  
 
than not, to life as a beggar. A stigma arose around being a soldier, and many stories  
 
exist of families saying that members were dead rather than admit to the humiliation  
 
of having a soldier in the family.
3
 All this resulted in the army only being able to  
 
recruit from the lowest section of society, and joining the army for many was an act of  
 
desperation. The obvious consequence was that recruitment became harder. It has  
 
been said that:  
 
Recruiting a Regular Army by voluntary enlistment in an industrial and 
profoundly anti-militarist country like Britain has so far proved an insoluble 
problem. In Victoria‟s reign even the harsh incentives of insecurity, a high 
level of unemployment, and a low standard of living failed to supply a steady 





Whilst the public enjoyed the sight of the army in grand parades and took pride in its  
 
exploits in the ever-expanding empire, what it did not want was to see soldiers in their  
 
towns or cities or have to pay any more in taxes to support them. As a consequence  
 
the only time that reform of the army was taken seriously was during times of threat.  
 
When the Prussian, and later German, army was crushing all before it the case for  
 
reform grew. When invasion scares, which came and went throughout the Victorian  
 
period, arose so did the clamour for action to reform the army, but governments began  
 
to realise that if they were perceived to be doing something, normally by establishing  
 
a commission or committee, the clamour would soon subside. Even the briefest  
 
look at the invasion scares of the late Victorian era highlights this.    
 
 
Control of the Army    
 
The Crimean War perhaps did more than anything to highlight the need for reform in  
 
the army. The war was little short of a disaster. The army nearly collapsed under the  
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strain of the operation. When war broke out in 1854 nearly forty years of neglect were  
 
illustrated by the state of the army. Perhaps an equally significant problem was the  
 
presence of the Duke of Wellington as Commander-in-Chief for much of the  
 
intervening period. Deeply conservative in many ways, he refused to alter the military  
 
system that he had so bitterly complained about during his period as a commander in  
 
the field. The Duke did his best to keep the army out of view both physically and  
 
economically, fearing demands for economy. As a consequence the army had been  
 
largely ignored since the end of the Napoleonic Wars; little had been changed. What  
 
caused the greatest problems was a divided system of command and control at home.  
 




 It was in fact during the war that this system was changed, such were its  
 
obvious flaws, and in 1855 the army was reorganised, to be controlled by the  
 
Secretary of State for War and the Commander-in-Chief. Control of the army was in  
 
many ways a constant battle. Parliamentary control was assured by financial control  
 
but the army remained very much a royal body. Queen Victoria in particular viewed  
 
the army very much as hers, and in this she was assisted by the fact that from 1856- 
 
1895 her cousin, the Duke of Cambridge, was Commander-in-Chief. A succession of  
 
Secretaries of State for War found their attempts at reform halted by this royal  
 
combination. They had even tried to halt Cardwell in his reforms by attempting to  
 
have him appointed Speaker of the House of Commons, a prestigious appointment but  
 
not one that interested Cardwell.
6
 It was in ways like this and through such influence  
 
that royal control remained important within the army.   
 
 
Whilst parliamentary control was said to be stronger because of the changes made  
 
immediately after the Crimean war, an alternative argument can be made. Indeed  
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Brackenbury himself argued that the change had actually weakened parliamentary  
 
control as the whole burden for the army, within parliament, rested on one man: the  
 
Secretary of State for War. He acknowledged that the Commander-in Chief sat in the  
 
House of Lords but in the case of the Duke of Cambridge there was little parliament  
 
could do to exercise power over, “a Prince of the blood Royal”.
7
 In fact trying to  
 
control the Duke of Cambridge was a constant problem. If he could not stop a  
 
minister himself he felt no compunction about appealing directly to the Queen. Whilst  
 
ultimately control of the army rested with parliament, many schemes for the  
 
improvement of the army, most notably the replacement of the Commander-in-Chief  
 
with a Chief of Staff, were abandoned because whilst politicians saw the merits of the  
 
schemes they knew that royal opposition would make the process more trouble than  
 
it was worth. Not only was this a period in which groups of soldiers, whether  
 
reformers or conservatives, „Africans‟ or „Indians‟, supporters of Wolseley or  
 
Roberts, would battle to influence and control the army, there remained the battle  
 
between monarch and parliament over whom the army „belonged‟ to. It was to take  
 
the First World War to ultimately decide this issue, although the legacy of this dispute  
 
can still be seen today in the oath of allegiance that every soldier takes. It refers to  
 
the monarch and officers of the army but makes no reference to Her Majesty‟s  
 
Government, either implicitly or explicitly.      
      
 
Colonial Warfare: The Era of Small Wars 
 
Between 1815 and 1914 Britain only once fought a European power, during the  
 
Crimean War of 1854-5. Although at times it faced enemies with modern weapons  
 
and European training, most notably Egypt in 1882 and the Boers in 1881 and from  
 
1899-1902, and although in the case of the latter the conflict saw the despatch of the  
 
largest army ever to leave Britain, it did to all intents and purposes remain a colonial  
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campaign. The possibility of war with a European power did occur from time to time  
 
during this period, but Britain‟s ability to contribute to such a conflict was limited.  
 
The greatest benefit that Britain could bring to a potential continental ally was control  
 
of the seas through the presumed supremacy of the Royal Navy. Yet in terms of a land  
 
force Britain‟s ability to contribute was negligible. It was supposed that the largest  
 
force that could be placed in the field, given the imperial commitments of the army,  
 
was 40,000 men, although in actual fact it was probably closer to 20,000.
8
 In an era  
 
when European armies were being measured in millions of men it showed the  
 
weakness of the position. It was during the period that Brackenbury was in the army  
 
that ideas started to change so that by 1916 Britain did place armies of a million men  
 
or more in the field.  
 
 
The weakness of the British position and the fact that things would ultimately have to  
 
change had been made clear when in 1864 Prussia threatened to invade Denmark. The  
 
Prime Minister of the day, Lord Palmerston, threatened to intervene on behalf of  
 
Denmark, but the Prussians called his bluff and invaded. Palmerston was helpless  
 
and the weakness of Britain‟s position in Europe was highlighted. It will be  
 
appreciated that for a long time the idea that Britain could maintain and influence the  
 
„balance of power‟ in Europe was the mainstay of British policy. This was not always  
 
to be done by military power, and indeed both Pitt the Elder and Pitt the Younger  
 
when Prime Minister had followed policies which called for British maritime and  
 
financial power rather than military. Circumstances were now altering so that military  
 
power was becoming more important, especially given the rise of Prussian, later  
 
German, military power, but equally the perennial threat posed by France created  
 
many of the invasion scares. During the latter half of the nineteenth Century the  
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German Army, at full wartime establishment, could call on over 6 million trained  
 
men, the French approximately 4 and a half million men, Austria-Hungary 3 million  
 
men and Russia 4 million men.
9
 In such a context should Britain‟s difficulties to place  
 
even 40,000 men on the continent be viewed.  
 
 
At the same time Britain‟s Empire was still expanding. So whilst no European war  
 
was fought during this period the army found itself almost constantly engaged in one  
 
conflict or another somewhere in the world. The opponents and conditions they faced  
 
varied dramatically. They came up against the highly disciplined and well trained  
 
Zulus and Maoris, the „fanatical‟ charges of the warriors of the Sudan but also the  
 
more conventional armies of Egypt and the Boers. The Boers were in fact the closest  
 
that Britain ever came to facing a European power during this period, and not simply  
 
because of their ancestry. They were armed with modern artillery, rifles and machine  
 
guns, and were supported by a small but prosperous economy. Such a variety of  
 
opponents led to a belief that the British army faced a unique set of circumstances  
 




More often than not, more important than tactics was the ability to cope with the  
 
climate and conditions of the area. Two examples of this are the Abyssinian campaign  
 
of  1868 and the Ashanti War of 1873-74 both of which succeeded in difficult  
 
conditions and terrain because the campaign had been thought out and well organised.  
 
 
This period, however, was not without its dramatic and embarrassing defeats. They  
 
were, and still are, perhaps given more attention than they deserve. This is perhaps not  
 
surprising as the „professional‟ and technologically advanced British Army should not  
 
have suffered defeats at the hands of colonial enemies no matter how well trained they  
 
were. Yet military history is full of such incidences, where victory is gained against  
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the odds. More often than not British defeats could justifiably be put down to poor  
 
decision making on the part of the officers in command, such as Lord Chelmsford  
 
before Isandlwana or George Colley at Majuba Hill. In both cases there was also a  
 
degree of arrogance and underestimation of the enemy. The importance of these  
 
defeats has caused debate. Brian Bond, in „The Late Victorian Army‟, declares that  
 




 He points to the lack of clear-cut victories. This is true as many of the  
 
„crushing defeats‟ that were inflicted by the British came after either embarrassing  
 
defeats or inauspicious starts. He therefore takes the view that such clear-cut victories  
 
as occurred had exaggerated praise heaped upon them. Perhaps the key example of  
 
this is the Red River Expedition in Canada, which made the reputation of Garnet  
 
Wolseley. The campaign was against a small band of rebels who fled before the  
 
advancing British force of 1,200 troops. The campaign was noted for its organisation  
 
and efficiency with which the force moved over 1,118 miles between the 14
th




 August 1870. To say this success is taken out of proportion is perhaps unfair  
 
as the campaign was a logistical triumph in extreme conditions. Perhaps more  
 
accurate was the defence of Rorkes Drift, which although unquestionably heroic, took  
 
on legendary status because of the way it was handled by a government desperate to  
 
find good news in the wake of Isandlwana. Edward Spiers and Denis Judd have  
 
separately expressed a slightly different view to Bond.
12
 Both are of the opinion that  
 
the positives outweighed the negatives, and Judd wrote that:  
 
The fumblings and failings of Victorian military history do not, of course, 
outweigh the success, since for every Majuba Hill there were any number of 
Omdurmans and Ulundis.
13
   
 
Whilst true it does still leave the question as to whether such defeats as Majuba  
 
should ever have happened on the scale that they did and whether they occurred  
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because of shortcomings in army command and organisation.  
 
 
Despite the failures it can be argued that the British Army became quite proficient at  
 
fighting such wars. Edward Spiers, when writing about colonial campaigns, suggests  
 




 The record of the British in colonial campaigns was superior to that of  
 
any other European power. The Royal Navy and the size of Britain‟s merchant marine  
 
clearly gave it a great advantage. As a result the army became accustomed to, and  
 
quite adept at what would now be called expeditionary warfare. This was something  
 
to which no other power was able to adapt. The mighty German Army, for much of  
 
this period unrivalled in Europe, found great difficulty in maintaining its troops in  
 
China without the support of other powers. Famously in 1897 the Germans could not  
 
find the capability to send even a battalion to Crete. Of course Germany was primarily  
 
a European power for much of this era and thus such concerns were beyond them.  
 
Perhaps more pertinent is the performance of the French. Obviously France had  
 
great continental commitments but it also possessed an empire second only to the  
 
British in size and scope. Yet in 1895 the French had to rent British merchant ships to  
 
enable them to invade Madagascar, even though France was considered to be the  
 
world‟s second naval power after Britain. Their conduct of the campaign was also far  
 
worse than anything the British Army at its worst achieved and was a disaster.  
 
Although at this stage considered one of the lesser Great Powers the U.S.A had equal  
 
difficulties, and struggled to invade Cuba in 1898 during the Spanish-American war,  
 
despite the fact that it was only 90 miles off its own coastline. It was a logistical  
 
nightmare in which the majority of the cavalry suddenly became infantry as a result of  
 
the drowning of most of the horses on landing! The culmination of British success in  
 
this field was during the South African War. Whilst the War itself was somewhat of a  
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fiasco, the sheer feat of transporting and maintaining the army in South Africa was a  
 
remarkable success. As Jay Stone comments:  
 
Under the circumstances, the fact that the British transported 250,000 men 
over 6,000 miles over land and water and sustained them in the field for 





More recently it has been written that, “It remains surprising that such little  
 





Although success in this field had a lot to do with the Royal Navy, it would be unfair  
 
to ignore the role of the army. This style of expeditionary warfare became quite easy  
 
for the army to undertake, and on the whole they became quite good at it. Forces were  
 
organised and deployed without too much trouble. It is true that the practice of  
 
drawing men from other regiments was still common for forces going overseas, as  
 
they needed to bring their battalion up to strength, but this had more to do with the  
 
peculiarities of the regimental system, particularly after the Cardwell Reforms, than  
 
anything else. It is often suggested that such forces were „cobbled‟ together for  
 
particular expeditions and it is true that many times, especially after an early setback,  
 
troops were sent from other parts of the empire. In some ways this showed the  
 
strength of the British position. In a similar way to the United States today, wherever  
 
in the world an incident occurred there were always British, Colonial or Royal Navy  
 
assets available to lend support. The obvious example of this is India from where  
 
troops, mostly British but occasionally Indian, were sent to support operations in  
 
Africa and the Mediterranean.               
 
 
Cardwell Reforms      
 
Although unquestionably important to the development of the British Army during  
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this period, there has been a tendency to overstate the magnitude of this series of  
 
reforms. Their most significant effect was to sweep away some of the more antiquated  
 
elements of the army and, indeed, Brian Bond described them as “a belated response  
 




 To understand the limitations of the reforms it must be remembered  
 
why the Government introduced them. Gladstone‟s administration of 1868 to 1874 is  
 
widely regarded as one of the great reforming governments. However, the reforms  
 
were not designed for the benefit of the army as a fighting force. The aim was to  
 
reduce the cost of the army. In some ways this was done by an attempt at greater  
 
efficiency. Cardwell himself had no military background, nor had he taken any  
 
significant part in military debate up to his appointment as Secretary of State for War.  
 
It has been argued that this actually proved to be an advantage as he took a detached  
 
view without prejudice for tradition or „esprit de corps‟.   
 
 
One of the earliest reforms was to reduce the number of British troops dispersed  
 
around the colonies. The reason that such a situation existed dated back to the Duke of  
 
Wellington, who had realised that a large army garrisoned within the British Isles  
 
would lead to demands for reductions in its size. In an attempt to prevent this  
 
Wellington sought to distribute the army amongst the colonies and thus keep it away  
 
from public view. The problem was that as a result many battalions found themselves  
 
almost constantly overseas, which was a disincentive to recruitment. As a result the  
 
number of British troops in the colonies, excluding India, was reduced from 50,000 to  
 
23,941 during Cardwell‟s time in office.
18
 This allowed him to introduce another  
 
reform which he hoped would improve recruitment and give the reserve of soldiers  
 
that was obviously needed. The argument for short service was clear to Cardwell. It  
 
would ensure that soldiers were in the prime of life during their military service. It  
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would also mean that a reserve could finally be established amongst the civilian  
 
population that could be called out in times of emergency to swell the ranks.  
 




 Although the savings were undoubtedly what attracted his cabinet  
 





Before going any further it is necessary to clarify the importance of the influence of  
 
Prussian military success on the Cardwell Reforms. Such successes strengthened  
 
Cardwell‟s hand in one respect, as public and military opinion moved towards the  
 
necessity of reform, but on the other hand it has been argued that it largely halted any  
 
attempt at a more wide ranging reform of the army. Brian Bond argues that the  
 
Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the last of a series of military triumphs for Prussia,  
 
actually had the effect of removing the main concern and preoccupation of parliament  
 
and the army, namely the threat of invasion. From the end of the Crimean War  
 
through to 1871 there were constant anxieties about invasion, concerns raised about  
 
coastal defences, and the capability of the army in Britain to deal with any landings.   
 
Up to 1871 the main threat had been France but there was now growing concern about  
 
the rise of Prussian/German power. After the defeat by Prussia, France was in no state  
 
to contemplate invasion, added to the fact the Napoleon III who was seen as the  
 
instigator of such fears was no longer in power.  Bond recognises the fact that in  
 
public opinion 1871 actually saw a rise in invasion scares, after the publication of  
 
General Sir George Chesney‟s rather alarmist book the „The Battle of Dorking‟,  
 
which envisaged a possible Prussian invasion. Whilst there was a reaction from both  
 
the public and politicians to this perceived fear, Bond illustrates that the reality of  
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such an invasion was somewhat different. He supports this with the words of an M.P  
 
who at the time said in the House of Commons of a possible Prussian invasion, “How  
 
are they to arrive in this country? Will they charter the British Fleet?”.
20
 Prussian  
 
victories were more important in terms of an example of organisation and for  
 
illustrating once again, as the Crimean War had, just how far behind the British army  
 
had fallen, but it is wrong to view Prussian success as the driving force behind the  
 
Cardwell reforms.   
 
 
In Prussia, short service was based on two years in the infantry, or three in the cavalry  
 
and artillery, and four or five years with the active reserve. There were two layers to  
 
the reserve system called the „Landwehr‟ and the „Landsturm‟ and service with the  
 
latter continued until the age of forty-five. The system had proved itself against  
 
Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866 and France in 1870. Indeed, in 1870, Prussia  
 
placed 400,000 men in the field at the start of the war against the French, the majority  
 
of whom were reservists. It was this that Cardwell wished to emulate. The problem  
 
was that the Prussian system was based on conscription. Conscription was impossible  
 
politically and the concept of short service had to accommodate the British need to  
 
garrison the empire.  
 
 
This was especially true of India where 60,000 British troops had to be established  
 
permanently. Three years service would make this very difficult and it would increase  
 
the cost of garrisoning the empire in terms of transporting troops back and forth. The  
 
British compromise was to introduce short service on the basis of six years service  
 
with the colours and six years in the reserve. The other element of the Prussian system  
 
that went with this was localisation. Prussia, and later Germany, was split into  
 
military districts each of which provided an army corps made up of regulars and the  
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different levels of the reserve. The British system was again somewhat different due  
 
to the demands of the Empire. Each Regiment would now have two battalions, one  
 
stationed at home and the other abroad. The one at home would keep the one abroad  
 
up to strength with drafts of men until it replaced the other battalion.  
 
 
Using the Prussian example the militia were linked with the regular battalions in the  
 
localisation scheme. The militia was the traditional volunteer force for home defence  
 
raised on a county or district basis. Each area was set a quota of men dependent upon  
 
local factors. Uniquely there was a degree of compulsory service, and if sufficient  
 
numbers could not be found through volunteers, as was often the case, local  
 
administration had the power to fill the ranks by ballot amongst the eligible male  
 
population. Although theoretically only for home service they did on occasion, most  
 
notably during the Crimean and South African Wars, serve in overseas garrisons so as  
 
to release regular troops for frontline service. With their being linked to the  
 
localisation scheme the theory was that the three battalions, two regular and one  
 
militia, formed a „brigade‟. It was an obvious attempt to copy the Prussian system but  
 
in many ways it failed. There were notable occasions when both battalions found  
 
themselves overseas at the same time, and the militia battalion was very limited in  
 
what it could do.  
 
 
The main and perhaps only advantage to emerge from short service was the  
 
development of a reserve. In 1882 it was used for the first time and 10,800 reservists  
 
were recalled to the colours for service in Egypt.
21
 However even raising this number  
 
proved a struggle and this was not what the reserve was designed for. The reserve was  
 
for large-scale wars rather than colonial campaigns. If anything this highlighted the  
 
weakness of the British Army since to place an army of 20,000 men in the field in  
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Egypt it was necessary to have half the force made up of reservists. Any attempt to  
 
emulate the Prussian system was unlikely ever to work because of the difference in  
 
responsibilities and circumstances of the two nations. Whilst antipathy towards  
 
conscription was a key difference there were other problems, such as Prussia and  
 
Germany‟s lack of an Empire, Germany‟s larger population, a smaller number of  
 
people involved in industry, and the fact that it was never envisaged that they would  
 
operate far from mainland Germany.        
 
 
Unquestionably the most controversial of Cardwell‟s reforms was the abolition of the  
 
purchase system whereby officers had bought their initial commission and every  
 
promotion thereafter up to the rank of Colonel. Obviously, this did not encourage a  
 
professional spirit, and indeed such a spirit was frowned upon. Such a  
 
system meant that a regiment became virtually the property of its colonel. As  
 
Cardwell wrote to Gladstone, “Our principle is that the officers shall be made for the  
 
Army. Their principle is that the Army is made for the officers”.
22
 Originally  
 
Cardwell had expected little opposition, but it soon became clear that this would not  
 
be the case. In fact the opposition was led by the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of  
 
Cambridge. As Cardwell had used the Prussian and German victories to support his  
 
reforms, the Duke of Cambridge now used them to support the status quo. The Duke  
 
pointed out that all Prussian officers were „gentleman‟ of breeding whereas the French  
 
were largely officered by men who had come through the ranks. To the Duke of  
 
Cambridge Prussia‟s crushing victory over France proved that the British system was  
 
fundamentally sound. Although his position sounds rather archaic it must be added  
 
that, at the same time, he advocated better training and instruction for officers.  
 
 
Although it was argued that the purchase system would not have prevented any of  
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Cardwell‟s other reforms this missed the point. As Brian Bond put it, “Purchase was  
 
the standard under which military reactionaries congregated”.
23
 The aim of  
 
Cardwell‟s reforms was to increase the efficiency of the army and therefore lower its  
 
cost. The type of officer needed to achieve such efficiency was discouraged by the  
 
purchase system, as money and not merit was the criteria for advancement. Cardwell  
 
found that he had little support for this within his own party, never mind parliament in  
 
general. The problem was that very few within parliament were without some relative  
 
or another who had a personal interest in purchase. This was why Cardwell was  
 
forced to accept that compensation to officers would have to be based on the market  
 





The „enthusiasm‟ for army reform, which the Prussian victories helped to encourage,  
 
had died away by the time the Bill went through the house. The second reading  
 
provoked widespread opposition, although it is interesting to note that much of it was  
 
based on the proposed cost. The Bill passed by fifty-eight votes in the House of  
 
Commons due to the enforcement of strict party discipline and the unofficial support  
 
of Disraeli, the leader of the opposition. In the House of Lords it was defeated, largely  
 
due to the non-committal nature of the Duke of Cambridge‟s speech; he had been  
 
persuaded to speak only after the intervention of Gladstone and Cardwell. The  
 
government threatened to introduce the Bill through Royal Warrant, as the purchase  
 
of commissions only existed by Royal command, the Brokerage Act of 1809 having  
 




 November 1871, a Royal Warrant cancelled the purchase of commissions.
25
      
 
 
The abolition of purchase did not lead to a radical alteration in the social background  
 
of officers, nor create a more professional type of officer. Harries-Jenkins dedicated a  
 
 44 
whole chapter to the purchase debate and its outcome. His work demonstrates that  
 




 This is supported by W.S.Hamer‟s view of the post abolition system where, 
  
Men of lesser means could gain rapid promotion through intellectual 
distinction, but the aristocracy and landed gentry still sent their sons „for to be 
a soldier‟. Men such as Henry Brackenbury and Sir Frederick Maurice were 
promoted on grounds of their own personal achievements. Others such as Sir 




Hamer stresses the point that little changed in the composition, and even someone like  
 
Brackenbury who is given as an example of promotion by merit, was himself from a  
 
landed family.  
 
 
It was only as a result of the First World War that the number of officers from the  
 
aristocracy declined in favour of those from the middle classes. The reason the social  
 
composition changed little was a much wider issue than the purchase system. The  
 
lifestyle and regimental expenses of an officer meant that their pay was never  
 
sufficient. It was essential that an officer had personal income outside of his pay.  
 
For most this meant through family wealth. Brackenbury was in fact one of the  
 
few exceptions, being able to support himself through his writing and journalism, but  
 
even this was difficult and his constant desire for service in India was partly  
 
motivated by the comparative cheapness of service there. The fact that the social  
 
composition of the officer corps did not change was also due to the attitude of the  
 
Duke of Cambridge. Cardwell may have hoped that merit was now the criteria for  
 
promotion, but the Duke still held power over promotion, and continued to adhere to  
 
the principle of promotion by seniority. Cardwell steered away from further  
 
confrontation with him, which once again illustrates the extent of royal influence. The  
 
government had in many ways „forced‟ royal support for the abolition of the  
 




Although Cardwell may secretly have liked to remove the Duke as Commander-in- 
 
Chief the royal connection was such that this was virtually impossible.
28
 Cardwell  
 
did hope that the support of the Duke could be gained for many of his reforms, thus  
 
strengthening his case, but the Commander-in-Chief clung to the old ideas. It is very  
 
easy to think of him as a conservative relic of the army of the Duke of Wellington. He  
 
shared Wellington‟s conservatism, which in many ways was as much about a way of  
 
life as the best way to govern the army. He was very popular with large sections of the  
 
army, partly because of his Royal status but also because of his ability and willingness  
 
to stand up to the civilian government. The problem was that many of his ideas to  
 
improve the army and the conditions of its soldiers were lost as he battled to retain  
 
the „old‟ army. That the Duke of Cambridge cared deeply about the army, including  
 
the ordinary soldier, was not in doubt but filled with antiquated notions about the  
 
army, war and the state in general his good intentions often caused more harm than  
 
good. In the end it became necessary for Cardwell to remove the last vestiges of  
 





After the Crimean War it had been envisaged that the Commander-in-Chief and  
 
Secretary of State would work together as equals. This was clearly not going to be the  
 
case. Cardwell eventually made the Duke of Cambridge leave his offices at Horse  
 
Guards and move to the War Office in Pall Mall. It sent a clear message about the  
 
„independence‟ of the Commander in Chief. This was part of a much wider scheme of  
 
reorganisation, which attempted to improve upon the very rushed and somewhat ad  
 
hoc changes that had taken place during and immediately after the Crimean War.  
 
Cardwell sought to create a single controlling force for the army, namely the War  
 
Office. The result was to reduce the Commander-in-Chief to the role of chief adviser  
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to the Secretary of State for War. It has been argued that Cardwell made these  
 
changes to rid the army of dual governance and that he had no wish to erode the  
 
status of the Commander-in-Chief as such.
30
 Cardwell undoubtedly realised that he  
 
needed the Duke of Cambridge if he was to achieve his reforms, as evidenced by his  
 
correspondence with Gladstone, but he wanted to make sure that the Duke  
 




 The Duke of Cambridge did retain full power over matters of  
 
command, discipline, training, and education, appointments, and promotion,  
 
recruiting and reserve forces. Nonetheless these changes firmly, and officially,  
 
established the supremacy of parliament, although royal influence remained.     
 
 
As has already been said, the Cardwell reforms continued the process of sweeping  
 
away the pre-Crimean War army, especially in the field of War Office organisation.  
 
The problem is that the Cardwell reforms are often viewed on their own and not as  
 
part of a continuing process of reform throughout the century. There were  
 
undoubtedly problems with the reforms. The idea of linked battalions failed to have  
 
the desired effect. The home battalion became little more than a training battalion,  
 
with its main purpose being to provide recruits for the battalion overseas.  
 
Consequently the majority of soldiers left with the home battalion were unfit, too old,  
 
or too young for service overseas. This was illustrated by the Egyptian campaign of  
 
1882 when the home battalions were called for overseas service but were woefully  
 
under strength and needed to be supported by reservists. This was also linked to short  
 
service, which was blamed for the defeats and setbacks against the Zulus, Boers and  
 
Afghans in the late 1870s and early 1880s, on account of a supposed lack of  
 





 Linked battalions and short service were good ideas in  
 
principle, but whilst there remained a lack of good recruits, and with conscription  
 
unacceptable, they were doomed to failure. As Edward Spiers has shown Cardwell  
 




 This missed the fact that the main drawbacks to service  
 
were the conditions. Poor food, low wages, cramped and squalid living conditions, no  
 
married quarters, vicious and humiliating punishments, and the social stigma that was  
 
attached to being a soldier could not be easily swept away. This was something that  
 
Brackenbury himself had noticed and wrote upon extensively in his articles on  
 
military reform during the late 1860s and early 1870s, of which more will be said in  
 
the chapter on Brackenbury‟s literary career. Until such concerns began to be  
 
addressed there was little attraction in the life of a soldier and the army continued to  
 
struggle to find good men to join. If there was a success story for short service it was  
 
the fact that Britain finally established a trained reserve. In 1869 the reserve,  
 
including the militia, had stood at 33,000: by 1899 the reserve, excluding the militia,  
 
numbered some 80,000 men.
34
 Even this had its drawbacks. The fact that during this  
 
period the reserve was called out several times meant that reservists found it hard to  
 
obtain regular civilian employment. The legacy of Cardwell is best summed up by  
 
Brian Bond who wrote, “Cardwell should be regarded as a pioneer who blazed the  
 
trail for later reformers- not, as Sir Robert Biddulph suggested in his biography, “the  
 
man who revolutionised the British Army””.
35
   
 
 
Stanhope Reforms        
 
Edward Stanhope served as Secretary of State for War from January 1887 to August  
 
1892. His period in charge is often overlooked but many of the changes and reforms  
 
that he implemented were of equal importance to those of Cardwell.
36
 Like Cardwell  
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he had the advantage of spending a long period as Secretary of State for War. Other  
 
reformers such as Hugh Childers only spent a couple of years as Secretary of State  
 
and were unable to build up much impetus. Cardwell‟s reforms stood out as part of a  
 
reforming ministry whereas the Conservative Government to which Stanhope  
 
belonged was not expected to undertake dramatic reform. Like Cardwell he had no  
 
experience of the army before being appointed. This was a drawback initially as he  
 
entered the War Office during a period of great debate and uncertainty about the state  
 
of the army and the defence of Britain and the empire. Both the Stephen Commission  
 
on Warlike Stores and the Morley Committee‟s inquiry into the Manufacturing  
 
Departments of the Army were in progress as he entered office. Both had been  
 
appointed as a result of the problems encountered in the Sudan in 1884-85.  
 
Stanhope‟s reforms were in some ways less dramatic than Cardwell‟s and his  
 
reforms were more concerned with the capability of the army as a fighting force.  
 
 
The Stephen Commission was very critical of the whole administration of the army,  
 
and the Morley Committee found that the Manufacturing Departments were wholly  
 
inefficient and inadequate to meet military needs. The Government was also under  
 
pressure from the recently resigned Lord Randolph Churchill, whose resignation had  
 
led to the reshuffle that brought Stanhope to the War Office. Churchill attacked what  
 
he saw as gross extravagance in military spending. After less than six months in the  
 
job Stanhope faced aggressive questioning from Churchill and other members of the  
 
Select Committee on Army and Navy Estimates. All this shows that Stanhope came to  
 
the War Office at a very difficult time. 
 
 
One of his earliest moves came out of the reports of these two committees. They  
 
reached different conclusions over what was the best solution to the inefficiency that  
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they found. The Morley Committee advocated the creation of more civilian  
 
administrators, whereas the Stephen Commission wanted to increase military control.  
 
The Stephen Commission felt that such an enhancement in military control would  
 




Stanhope increased military administrative control, but held back from creating the  
 
council of senior military figures that the commission had recommended. This  
 
reorganisation of 1888 helped to clarify the division of responsibility between  
 
civilians and soldiers that had begun during the Crimean War.  Stanhope declared that  
 
the soldiers now had the power to use the military resources as they saw fit to meet  
 







Whilst this was true it omitted the fact that financial control of the civilian  
 
government had been extended. The Financial Secretary now had control over  
 
the whole War Office in terms of funding. On a rare occasion of unity both the Duke  
 
of Cambridge and Wolseley complained that they could not be responsible for the  
 
condition of the army whilst civilians maintained financial control.
39
 The  
 
reorganisation had the effect of making the soldiers „responsible‟, whilst civilian  
 
government kept hold of the purse strings. The Stephen Commission had in fact  
 
recommended that the soldiers submit an annual statement to parliament on what they  
 
felt was needed. With such evidence on public record it would be a considerable  
 
political risk for the politicians to ignore such advice. In light of this it is unsurprising  
 
that this recommendation was ignored. As debate raged on the subject of home  
 
defence the government could argue that it had now turned responsibility over to the  
 
„experts‟, whilst the soldiers maintained they could never be responsible for the state  
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of defences whilst they had no financial control. The Stephen Commission‟s  
 
recommendation would have been a good way round this problem as it would have  
 
kept financial control with the civilians, but the soldiers would have their chance to  
 
state publicly what they felt was needed, leaving the government open  
 
to criticism if such needs were not met. This division between military control and  
 
government financial control would become a common debate throughout the  
 
nineteenth and twentieth century.     
  
 
Stanhope‟s legacy was embodied in the so-called Stanhope Memorandum.
40
 Its  
 
significance has perhaps been misunderstood. The Stanhope Memorandum defined  
 
the purposes of the army. Up to this point no list of expected duties had been set  
 
down. The Adjutant General, Lord Wolseley, had been pressing for such a definition  
 
of duties for many years. The extra impetus for the memorandum came from Henry  
 
Brackenbury as Head of the Intelligence Branch. Brackenbury had been attempting to  
 
draw up mobilisation plans, which was surprisingly one of his duties, but had found it  
 
impossible without knowing what it was he was supposed to be preparing for. The  
 
memorandum, originally written on 8
th
 December 1888, set out five purposes in order  
 
of priority. First was to support the civil power within the United Kingdom, which  
 
largely meant the maintenance of law and order. Second, the army had to find and  
 
supply the necessary men for the draft for India that was set at a level agreed with  
 
the Government of India. Third, it was charged with garrisoning fortresses and  
 
coaling stations at home and abroad. Fourth, after providing for the aforementioned  
 
duties, it was expected to mobilise two Army Corps of regular troops rapidly for  
 
home defence and a third made up partly of regulars augmented by the militia. The  
 
fifth purpose was little more than an afterthought, which envisaged the possibility of  
 
sending abroad two army corps, a cavalry division and line of communication troops.  
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Fulfilling the fourth and fifth aims created problems in terms of a lack of sufficient  
 
support troops, and an explanation of the problems identified by Brackenbury in this  
 
area will be undertaken in more detail later. The weakness of the memorandum was  
 
that it largely ignored imperial defence, which had become the main purpose, in  
 
reality, of the army. It is also uncertain how widely this memorandum was known,  
 





Criticism has been made of the order of priorities. Gooch has asserted that the order of  
 
priorities - most notably the inclusion of support for the civil power as first priority –  
 
was “More suited to the conditions of 1818 than those of 1888”. This may be correct  
 
but does ignore the particular problems of the time.
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 The late 1880s and early 1890s  
 
saw a particularly high level of civil unrest. There had been disturbances in  
 
Lancashire, the „Crofters War‟ in the Western Isles and the „Tithe War‟ in north  
 
Wales. There had also been the Home Rule riot in Trafalgar Square in November  
 
1887. It is important to remember that support of the civil power also included Ireland  
 
and that during the 1880s there had been an increase in Fenian attacks both in Ireland  
 
and on the mainland. Added to this the early 1890s saw a rise in industrial unrest, and  
 
troops were used to cover during the London dock strike of late 1889 and the police  
 
strike of July 1890, whilst preparations were made for the army to take over the  
 
running of the Gas, Light and Coke Company in September 1890 when a strike  
 
threatened to cut off all power to the City of London.
43
 This period also saw the  
 
infamous „mutiny‟ of the 2
nd
 Battalion of the Grenadier Guards in July 1890.
44
 With  
 
further civil unrest anticipated the order of priorities was hardly surprising. It is easy  
 
to criticise the memorandum for failing to confront the issue of imperial defence or  
 
wider strategic issues. It is questionable whether Stanhope had the power to do  
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anything about such matters. What the memorandum did do was create a framework  
 
within which military planning could take place. It was within this framework that the  
 
hugely successful mobilisations plans, which worked with such ease and efficiency  
 
during the South African War, were drawn up.    
 
 
Stanhope also left more practical legacies such as the creation of the Army Service  
 
Corps. It was also through his efforts that the magazine rifle was finally introduced  
 
after a committee had been discussing it since 1883. It was Stanhope who persuaded  
 
the Treasury to allocate the necessary funds. He also obtained money for the building  
 
of a series of new barrack rooms which were desperately needed due to the unsanitary  
 
conditions that existed in many camps, although the argument he used was that it  
 
would save on repairs and the fact that the small size of barracks meant that many  
 
soldiers had to be housed elsewhere at extra cost. It was also during his tenure that  
 
breech-loading artillery was introduced, despite the fact that British industry had first  
 
developed this method twenty years before. In response to Brackenbury‟s warnings  
 
about the lack of defensive positions around London sixteen mobilisation centres  
 
were built, the so-called „Stanhope Storehouses‟, which would supply and maintain  
 
the defensive positions around London if invasion ever happened. Despite the  
 
criticism of the Stanhope Memorandum for its failure to address matters of imperial  
 
defence, Stanhope did establish, in 1891, the Naval and Military Committee, which  
 
was set up to coordinate the defence of ports and coaling stations. This was the  
 
precursor of the later Committee of Imperial Defence.   
 
 
One weakness of Stanhope‟s tenure at the War Office was his response to the  
 
Hartington Commission of 1890, and his failure to see that its recommendations  
 
offered him much of what he required. Stanhope had complained that there was, “as a  
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rule no well-informed and capable adviser who looked at a question all round”.
45
 This  
 
was an inevitable consequence of the system in existence. The Commander-in-Chief,  
 
who should have been able to do this, had far too much responsibility in other areas to  
 
ever achieve this. As for the other leading soldiers at the War Office, each of them  
 
had their own areas of responsibility, which took up their time. The solution was  
 
found in the Hartington Commission‟s recommendation of the creation of a Chief of  
 
Staff and therefore a General Staff.
46
 This office would be concerned at looking at  
 
strategic issues only, and planning and preparing solutions and responses. This was  
 
the answer to Stanhope‟s problem but he was unwilling to fight for it given that he  
 
would have faced resolute opposition from the Commander-in-Chief and the Queen,  
 
and there were few others, soldiers or politicians, who actively supported the idea.       
 
 




From the end of the Crimean War to the start of World War One the British Army  
 
never faced a European power in battle. Yet despite this there was not a year that  
 
passed by in which British soldiers were not involved in fighting somewhere in the  
 
empire. This meant that the army was under constant pressure to provide men for  
 
expeditions, as well as maintaining the permanent garrison in India. This often meant  
 
that fixed formations and structures, such as was seen on the continent, were  
 
unworkable given the size of the army. As a result many such campaigns required the  
 
creation of ad hoc groups with men and staff often serving in unfamiliar formations.  
 
As a consequence British military thinking tended to be very much based around the  
 
regiment rather than brigades divisions or corps. This is a contributing reason as to  
 
why the importance attached to the regiment and the sense of regimental esprit de  
 




Whilst it never fought in Europe during this period the army was engaged in almost  
 
constant warfare, gaining a great deal of combat experience, although there was  
 
considerable debate on the value of such experience. Imperialists saw the benefits of  
 
colonial wars but the so-called „continentalists‟ derided the value of such exploits and  
 
looked to learn from European warfare, in most cases Prussia. Colonel Lonsdale Hale,  
 
a vigorous continentalist wrote that,  
 
An Officer who has seen service must sweep from his mind all recollections of 
that service, for between Afghan, Egyptian, or Zulu warfare and that of 





Hale did make a legitimate point in terms of the difference of such styles of warfare,  
 
but he and others of the continentalist school were too obsessed with the Franco- 
 
Prussian War. Hale recommended to all officers that the official German account,  
 
“should be studied page by page, paragraph by paragraph, line by line”, at the  
 
exclusion of all else.
49
 Indeed this seems to have been a problem in the approach of  
 
the continentalists. As Howard Bailes pointed out, they never actually made a study of  
 
the conflicts but rather preferred to take the official accounts of the war at face value.  
 
Bailes also identified, “a difference of philosophical outlook between the  
 
continentalist and imperial schools”. The continentalists stuck rigidly to the lessons of  
 
the war as the official history had described it, whereas the imperialist school was  
 
more concerned with serious analysis and using events as evidence. As Bailes wrote,  
 







The imperialists, not least of all Brackenbury, felt that there were unquestionable  
 
benefits to be had from small wars. Wolseley also pointed out that if nothing else it  
 
got British troops used to being under fire and in combat and, as he underlined in  
 
 55 
1890, the Germans had not fired a shot in anger since 1871.
51
 Perhaps the definitive  
 
work of this period was Colonel Charles Callwell‟s „Small Wars: Their Principles and  
 
Practice‟. This became in effect the textbook for the British Army in this period.  
 
Callwell wrote that, “The Conduct of small wars is in fact in certain respects an art by  
 
itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare, but  
 




 The continentalist school, whilst many of its conclusions were  
 
valid, missed the point that colonial wars were now the main occupation of the army.  
 
As the Stanhope Memorandum had made clear involvement in a European war was  
 
unlikely, so there was little point in preparing an army to fight on the continent of  
 
Europe if it was to spend most of its time fighting throughout the Empire. The  
 
military writer T.M. Maguire also warned of too much concentration on European  
 
warfare,  
                                                                                                                        
While looking at the stars we may tumble in a ditch, and while lost in wonder 
at how to move effectively from Strasbourg, Mayence, and Metz towards Paris 
with many divisions of cavalry and armies consisting each of from three to 
eight corps, we may forget how to handle a few battalions in the passes of the 




A famous example of this attitude was Sir Edward Hamley‟s „Operations of War‟,  
 
first published in 1872, which was a standard text at the Staff College for many years  
 




This completely ignored colonial campaigning, and as Bailes states, “It is remarkable  
 
that the most famous military treatise of late nineteenth-century Britain should have  
 
said almost nothing about the immediate problems facing its army”, namely the  
 
constant fighting to maintain the Empire.
55
       
 
 
The existence of these debates goes a long way to disprove the assumption that there  
 
was little thought or intellectual debate in the British Army of this period. Whilst  
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perhaps limited there was a growing membership of intellectual groups inside the  
 
army. The „Army and Navy Magazine‟ did much to sustain the traditionalist view,  
 
and its early issues in 1884 attacked the Cardwell reforms, short service and in  
 
particular the reforming group led by Wolseley. The reformers were open to personal  
 
attack as having gained rapid promotion,  
 
By persistently blowing their own trumpets, and knowing nothing about their 
own or anyone else‟s regiment, and who abuse all offenders who do not think 
as they do; but their chief point is to unite at all times in belauding the Founder 
of the Society (Wolseley) especially, and each other in particular.
56
    
 
Reformers and Conservatives 
 
There has been much made of the rivalry between Lord Wolseley and Lord Roberts  
 
and their respective supporters, often called „rings‟. The rivalry was fuelled by  
 
personal ambition, battlefield success and the actions of many of their followers.  
 
More importantly, a key strategic issue divided them namely the status of India. To  
 
Roberts and those who followed the Indo-centric line British India was a power in  
 
itself. In an era when Russian aggression was a major concern it was argued that in  
 
this context India became a continental power having a direct border with areas of  
 
Russian influence. To this school of thought the main duty of the British army was  
 
to support the Indian Army and Roberts declared that in the event of war he would  
 
expect 20,000 to 30,000 British troops to be sent in support.
57
 To Wolseley and his  
 
supporters invasion of the British Isles was the obsession, which in their eyes was  
 
made ever more likely because of good relations between France and Russia. The  
 
periodic invasion scares of the late nineteenth century supported this view. To them  
 
the main aim was home defence followed by support for amphibious operations and  
 
any British allies. This, and the natural divide between the British and Indian armies,  
 
was a key source of rivalry. Brackenbury seemed to want to keep clear of such  
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divides. Whilst relying on Wolseley for patronage in his early days he was a friend  
 
and admirer of Roberts. He never seemed to take part in such rivalry and actively  
 
sought employment in India on several occasions.     
    
 
Whilst there was undoubtedly tension and rivalry between the two men and their  
 
supporters a much more important conflict within the army was between the  
 
reformers and conservatives. The reformers tended to be embodied in the form of  
 




 Yet because of his close association with the Cardwell Reforms he was often  
 
seen as a dangerous reformer. The conservative side of the army was represented  
 
through the Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge. Cambridge is often  
 
referred to as a „bow and arrow‟ general and whilst deeply reactionary in some  
 
respects, namely his refusal to acknowledge that control of the army was the  
 
responsibility of parliament rather than the Crown, even a brief glance at his  
 




 Occasionally reform met with his approval, most notably the reform and  
 
development of the Staff College, which Brian Bond argues would not have been  
 
re-established in 1858 had it not been for his support
60
.  He genuinely believed that  
 
his actions were always for the good of the army, and that he knew better than anyone  
 
what was best for the army. It was in this spirit that he opposed much of Cardwell‟s  
 
programme of reforms. Cambridge felt that the military setbacks of the 1870s and  
 
1880s were a vindication of his opposition and illustrated that the Cardwell reforms  
 
had not succeeded.  
 
 
Major-General Lord Edward Gleichen thought that the strain in relations between the  
 
Duke of Cambridge and Wolseley was not purely based on a division between reform  
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and conservatism. His experience was that some of the conflict was borne out of  
 
differences in work and systems of administration within the War Office. The Duke of  
 
Cambridge was overburdened, but would refuse to delegate.  
 
Everybody was devoted to this dear old gentleman and no one wished him any 
harm; but still it was fairly patent to those who happened to think about it- not 
a very large body in those days- that the centralisation of all authority in one 
person, however capable or beloved, was an impossible strain on the machine, 




Obviously Gleichen is referring to the failure to introduce a Chief of Staff, but  
 
Cambridge cannot be blamed entirely for that. It is quite true that he stated that there  
 
was no need for such an appointment as he himself fulfilled that role. Whilst this was  
 
to a large extent quite true, he had so many other duties and responsibilities that it was  
 
impossible for him to devote the time and detail to planning for future operations, nor  
 
did he have a staff dedicated to that aim in the form of a General Staff. The problem  
 
was that even after Cambridge retired in 1895 there was no adoption of a General  
 
Staff or Chief of Staff and nor was there until 1904, after the South African War had  
 
dramatically highlighted this problem. The Duke of Cambridge‟s position was made  
 
worse by the rather ad hoc way in which Wolseley undertook his work and his  
 
ignoring of the proper channels and red tape. In Gleichen‟s experience this led to a  
 
situation where “a department for instance, might receive direct orders to carry out a  
 
certain matter, which involved several other departments without the latter having  
 
been notified. The consequent confusion was dire, and only led to a loss of temper on  
 





It is clear that the Duke of Cambridge did much, often simply by his presence, to stifle  
 
reform. Both Cardwell and Stanhope held back some reforms fearing his reaction. The  
 
Hartington Commission, in 1890, recommended the abolition of the post of  
 
Commander-in-Chief in and had proposed replacing him with a Chief of Staff. The  
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Commission is often recorded as having wanted this to happen on the retirement of  
 
the Duke but it did add the caveat of “or at any favourable opportunity”.
63
 The hope  
 
of members of the Hartington Commission was that he could be persuaded to step  
 
down immediately so the recommendations could be implemented, but they phrased it  
 
so as to avoid royal anger at the suggestion. It failed to work and Her Majesty referred  
 
to it as “this really abominable report”.
64
 It was largely the Queen‟s response that led  
 
to the report being ignored. She saw it as a personal attack on her authority. “One of  
 
the greatest prerogatives of the Sovereign is the direct communication with an  
 
immovable and non-political officer of high rank about the army…”.
65
 She was also  
 




 The eventual death knell for the Hartington Commission  
 
was the arrival of a Liberal Government in 1892 and in particular Campbell- 
 
Bannerman‟s appointment as Secretary of State for War. He had been the major  
 
dissenter on the Hartington Commission and had given the government all it needed  
 
as an excuse to ignore the report. He held a typical Liberal aversion to anything that  
 
was remotely militaristic. To him the creation of a Chief of Staff, a truly professional  
 
senior soldier, would make the possibility of war more, not less, likely. As Brian  
 
Bond has written, “To such a mind the Duke of Cambridge, although an obstacle to  
 
important internal reforms, was at least safer than a General Staff”.
67
 Ironically it was  
 




     
 
 
In the words of Brian Bond, “By ousting the last Royal occupant from the highest  
 
office in the Army, the Government at last united theory and practice and severed the  
 
historic ties personally connecting the Sovereign with that service; a connection that  
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Queen Victoria had constantly and effectively exploited”.
69
 The problem was that  
 
little good came of the change. The position of Commander-in-Chief was weakened.  
 
The War Office Council was created and the heads of the other four great departments  
 
were placed on a par with the Commander-in-Chief, although the latter was still the  
 
senior soldier and chief adviser to the Secretary of State. Wolseley now saw the post  
 
as “the fifth wheel of the coach”. Moreover Wolseley probably came to the position  
 
too late. By this time he had lost much of his zeal and energy and was already  
 
experiencing a decline of physical and mental health. As a result he became just as  
 
argumentative and troublesome to the politicians as the old Duke had been. He  
 
survived in office till 1900.  His great rival Roberts, who performed the duty till the  
 
abolition of the office in 1904, when the recommendations of Hartington were finally  
 
implemented and a Chief of Staff created, replaced him. It had taken the defeats and  
 
administrative chaos of the South African War to illustrate the fact that the office of  
 





The Victorian British Army was unique among the great powers in that it spent the  
 
majority of the nineteenth century constantly engaged in warfare, albeit of a unique  
 
nature. As a consequence it had to remain a rather fluid organisation as it knew not  
 
what part of the vast British Empire it would be fighting in next. The question remains  
 
whether a better organisational structure could have been formed that would have  
 
successfully enabled both preparations for fighting a European war and continued  
 
imperial expeditions. In a strange way this was tried in that the reserve forces in the  
 
British Isles were prepared, to the extent they were prepared at all, to face any  
 
European foe that attempted invasion. The problem was that the preparation did not  
 
amount to much, and there were never enough trained soldiers stationed in Britain to  
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deal with any such invasion. A wider system for the regular army that combined  
 
European war and Imperial war readiness could have been possible. The problem was  
 
that it would have concerned an increase in the army estimates, and there was  
 
constant pressure from the Treasury on every Secretary of State for War to reduce the  
 
estimates; or would have required the implementation of conscription, which was out  
 
of the question during this era. No matter what successive governments said about the  
 
likelihood of having to fight a European war, it was appreciated by many soldiers and  
 
politicians that this might be necessary. The South African War led to large-scale  
 
reform in the British Army and ultimately the establishment of the British  
 
Expeditionary Force (B.E.F), which was largely set up to fight in Europe.       
 
 
What is often most remembered about the colonial campaigning of this period are the  
 
notable defeats, such as Maiwand, Isandlwana and Majuba. Denis Judd‟s assertions  
 
that for each defeat there were numerous decisive victories maybe true, but it ignores  
 
the question as to whether such defeats should, because of technological superiority,  
 
ever have happened. However whilst history has remembered the defeats it has to be  
 
said that many of the successes of the period were given exaggerated praise by the  
 
Victorian press. That there were tactical failings in the British army is undeniable, but  
 
this could never be resolved whilst so little thought, largely due to the want of a  
 
Chief of Staff and a General Staff, was given to the preparation for future conflicts.    
 
 
During this period there was a growth in the number of soldiers who saw it as a  
 
profession rather than merely a duty. There were an increasing number of officers  
 
who took their profession seriously, studied, and prepared for it. This is clearly seen  
 
through the expansion of such organisations as the United Service Institute and the  
 
Royal Artillery Institution. Unfortunately men of such calibre rarely achieved high  
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office during this era. Often they found their niche in an administrative post and never  
 
moved on because they were considered too valuable. Moreover the system of  
 
awarding high military office to those who had distinguished themselves in the field,  
 
regardless of the suitability for such office, continued to deny the more intellectual  
 
soldier high office. Indeed this is what makes Brackenbury‟s career so unique. He  
 
achieved important positions, partly because of his connection with Wolseley and  
 
because in general he was liked by politicians who admired his prodigious work rate,  
 
but also because he had developed a reputation as an intellectual officer who could  
 
sort out departments suffering from deficient organisation.  
 
 
Brackenbury‟s background and social status meant that his path into the army was  
 
common enough. However it was perhaps not a logical one. Although his intellectual  
 
ability was still to develop fully there was enough to suggest that he could perhaps  
 
have been better suited to an alternative career. His decision to join the army  
 
obviously have a lot to do with the fact that he had failed to take to the law but was  
 
undoubtedly influenced by his brother Charles‟s recent decision to join the army.  
 
There is also a wider point to be made concerning the Royal Artillery. Henry  
 
Brackenbury recorded that he visited his brother on several occasions after Charles  
 
had entered the Royal Artillery. This certainly influenced his decision. He must have  
 
seen something in the life that appealed to him. It might also be that the more  
 
„scientific‟ nature of the Royal Artillery appealed to him. This leads to an interesting  
 
point, that to an extent is beyond the scope of this thesis, but deserves  
 
acknowledgement. Both the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers were called the  
 
„scientific‟ corps of the army. The „science‟ of their work meant that a degree of  
 
intelligence and study was required. There is surely a correlation between this and the  
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prevalence of artillery and engineering officers amongst the pantheon of Victorian  
 
military heroes. Gordon, Kitchener and Roberts, amongst others, all came from the  
 
„scientific‟ side of the army. If Brackenbury was to join the army this was  
 
undoubtedly where he would be best suited. However the army remained an  
 
institution that generally looked down upon study, and artillery and engineer officers  
 
remained the scorn of cavalry and infantry officers.     
 
 
Although there were periods of great activity, such as Cardwell and Stanhope‟s  
 
tenures in office, the whole period was one of continuous military reform. The  
 
significance and importance of this is often lost as the second half of the nineteenth  
 
century started with a disastrous war, the Crimean, and finished with one, the South  
 
African War. This often detracts from the significance of the improvements that took  
 
place. Indeed it ought to be remembered that the Royal Commissions that investigated  
 
the South African War concluded that if the Hartington Commissions proposals had  
 
been accepted then the disaster of South Africa might not have taken place.
70
 So the  
 
momentum for effective reform was there, even if there was often pressure from the  
 
forces of entrenched conservatism to prevent it from being carried through.        
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The Product of an Intellectual Soldier: 




No other Victorian soldier produced the same amount, and variety, of literature as  
 
Brackenbury. His five books were only a small part of his writing
1
. He wrote  
 
numerous articles for the weekly and monthly journals of the day - not all on military  
 
matters - as well as a considerable amount for the daily press. It will also be  
 
remembered that during his time as Professor of Military History at Woolwich he was  
 
producing a large number of lectures, many of which were unfortunately never  
 
published and have not survived. This chapter will look at the literary output of  
 





The Need to Write 
 
Brackenbury‟s literary career started out of boredom, and continued partly out of  
 
necessity but also because he found great benefit from it. In 1864 Brackenbury was  
 
appointed Assistant-Instructor in Artillery at the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich.  
 
He found that in his new appointment he had a great deal of spare time, due to him  
 
having two days a week free from the class-room along with Easter, Summer and  
 
Christmas vacations. On the recommendation of his Colonel he decided to put this to  
 
good use by writing on the history of artillery.
3
 He produced two papers on the subject  
 
of “Ancient Cannon in Europe”.
4
 Whilst doing this the same Colonel who had  
 
recommended he undertake his studies in the first place approached him and asked if  
 
he would contribute to the military articles in the latest edition of Brande‟s  
 
Dictionary of Literature, Science, and Art. This became Brackenbury‟s first paid  
 
writing work and put him in contact with the publisher William Longman who  
 
commissioned him to write an article on „Warfare in the Middle Ages‟
5
. During this  
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period he was also asked by Longman to edit a book by Major-General Michael Smith  
 
on Drill and Manoeuvres of Cavalry combined with Horse Artillery. This well  
 
thought out and scientific work impressed Brackenbury and it was through this book  
 
that he first saw the possibility of using his new found writing ability to put  
 
forward his own ideas. Once again thanks to Longman he found the opportunity  
 
through a meeting the latter had organised with J.A.Froude, the editor of Fraser’s  
 
Magazine. His first article for Fraser’s was on „Operations against Charleston‟,  
 
during the recent American Civil War. His next publication for Fraser’s was a series  
 





Whilst Brackenbury‟s literary contributions allowed him to explore the issues  
 
surrounding military reform and to express his ideas on all manner of military and  
 
non-military subjects they did have a wider benefit. Being the fourth son of a fairly  
 
minor landowning family he had virtually no private means. This was a severe  
 
drawback at a time when an officer‟s pay was insufficient to meet the cost of the  
 
lifestyle they were expected, and in some cases required, to keep. Brackenbury had  
 
now found a way of supplementing his pay, which at the same time helped to build  
 
his reputation as a thinker and reformer within the army. Brackenbury‟s private  
 
circumstances explain not only his literary career but also the publications for which  
 
he wrote. A comparison can be made with his brother Charles, who was also an  
 
officer. Although the third son, the untimely deaths of his elder brothers meant that he  
 
would inherit the family estate. Charles shared many of his brother‟s reformist and  
 
intellectual ideals. Yet due to his financial circumstances he wrote most of his articles  
 
for the „trade‟, his articles appearing in the United Services Journal, the Royal  
 
Artillery Journal, and the Army Magazine, amongst others.
7
 Henry on the other  
 
hand wrote rarely for such publications, instead writing for the popular press. In other  
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Along with writing for many leading Victorian periodicals he also formed a strong   
 
association with some daily newspapers. In 1867 The Standard employed him to  
 
write a series of occasional articles on military matters, his first being on the subject  
 
of „Corporal Punishment in the Army‟.
9
 This association also included articles for 
 
The Morning Herald and The Evening Standard, which were owned by  
 
the same proprietor. His connection with The Standard continued until he went to  
 




 In late 1876 he began a connection with The Daily Telegraph, which  
 
was to see him contribute occasional articles, most of which, due to their highly  
 
politicised nature, were written under the penname of „Anglophile‟. This later led to a  
 
brief association with the newspaper The World in the late 1870s. Some of his work  
 
was extremely well paid. In May 1877 he was approached to write an article for The  
 
Illustrated London News, about the ongoing Russo-Turkish War. As Brackenbury  
 
said, “I thought the terms offered insufficient, and was not anxious for the work, as I  
 
had plenty to do”.
11
 Hoping that they would not accept, Brackenbury demanded 100  
 
guineas for the article, which to his surprise was agreed. He went on to write an article 
         
entitled „The Armies of the Contending Powers and a description of the Theatre of  
 
War‟. Although the fee was exceptional it does illustrate the fact that  
 
Brackenbury was capable of making a considerable amount of money out of his  
 
literary career. What it also gave him was a chance to highlight his credentials as an  
 
army reformer.         
 
 
Army Reform  
 
Unsurprisingly this was an area in which he was particularly prolific. The most  
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 Brackenbury spoke his mind during this series of articles, often being  
 
highly critical of governments and soldiers alike. As he conceded early in his first  
 
article he was likely to gain the enmity of Horse Guards and the War Office for his  
 
comments. He was using these articles, in a magazine within the public rather than the  
 
military domain, to urge that military reform would have to come from outside the  
 
army. Military discipline limited the extent to which soldiers could criticise the  
 
military workings of the state. He was taking a considerable risk, perhaps even  
 
jeopardizing his own career, by being critical of the army and the government.  
 
Officers who write for public consumption have never been well thought of by the  
 
army, especially when the officer concerned is writing for financial gain. However  
 
this is not confined to the military and any junior member of an organisation who is  
 
publicly critical is unlikely to be thanked. His lack of experience was also an issue.  
 
His active service was limited to a brief experience in the Indian Mutiny, where he  
 
had been part of the relief sent from England, but had been invalided home before the  
 
end of the conflict. His administrative experience was as Adjutant of the Royal  
 
Artillery in the western district and in his current position as Assistant Instructor in  
 
Artillery at Woolwich. So, he was a young inexperienced officer offering grand  
 
opinions on the state of the army, both militarily and politically. Brackenbury‟s  
 
decision to write this series of articles should be viewed in this context.  
 
 
There were five articles published between December 1866 and August 1867. The  
 
date of these is significant as it is before Edward Cardwell had entered the War Office  
 
and commenced his programme of reforms. Not only did they predate the Cardwell  
 
Reforms but also Brackenbury‟s association with Wolseley. They are published at a  
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time when the army and the government were still coming to terms with the failures  
 
that the Crimea War had highlighted.  A series of piecemeal reforms of the army had  
 
been introduced and were being continued. The most notable of Brackenbury  
 
criticisms was that he felt the reforms rushed through during and in the immediate  
 
aftermath of the war were hampering any further change.  
 
 
During the war itself Lord Palmerston‟s new government had undertaken the 
 
dismantlement of the existing military system. In effect there were several  
 
government departments and ministers responsible for the army. The Home Office  
 
was responsible for the army at home, along with the militia and the yeomanry. The  
 
army abroad was the responsibility of the Colonial Office. There existed both a  
 
Secretary at War and a Secretary of War. There also existed the Board of Ordnance  
 
which had a separate responsible for the Artillery. As Brackenbury said,  
 
In one swoop, during war with one of the great powers, the whole of these 
immense interests were removed from the control of the officers in which they 
had hitherto been vested, and were consolidated or rather heaped together in a 
mass under a Secretary of State for war, who was made head of the new war 





The main problem that Brackenbury saw was the over-centralisation of the military  
 
machine; far too much responsibility, and therefore work, devolved on one man.  
 
Brackenbury used the early deaths of Secretaries of State for War, Lord Herbert and  
 
Sir George Cornewall Lewis, as examples of the extreme pressure of the office.
14
 This  
 
was a prophetic statement as both Cardwell and Stanhope would also die as a result of  
 
the exhausting work of a long stay at the War Office.   
 
 
His objections were not a defence of the old system, where he believed there had been  
 
too many people involved. He did however think that it had gone too far the other  
 
way in endowing one man with such demanding responsibilities. This would be borne  
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out by what happened during the tenure of both Cardwell and Stanhope where the  
 
organisation of the War Office was returned to a more balanced distribution, even if  
 
this did cement the supremacy of the Secretary of State over the Commander-in- 
 
Chief. One of Brackenbury‟s main points was the growth of administrative  
 
departments, pointing out that a large proportion of the army estimates “…goes to  
 




 Whilst this has been an age-old cry of the soldier about civilian  
 
administration, it does have some legitimacy in the period in question given the huge  
 
reduction in the number of departments, but not the number of administrators, now  
 
responsible for the army. Brackenbury‟s skill lay in administration, although up to this  
 
point it had only be seen in his own regiment rather than the grander appointments  
 
that were to come, so he more than most soldiers recognised its importance. His  
 
complaints about bureaucracy should be seen in that light.       
 
 
The success of the Prussian Army during the 1860s and 1870s meant that their unique  
 
military system became the envy of much of Europe. This was particularly true in  
 
Britain where many sought to copy it almost in its entirety.
16
 Brackenbury was less  
 
enthusiastic about the Prussian system than many of his contemporaries. Whilst he  
 
saw there were lessons to be learnt from the Prussians, it was clear to him that it was  
 
for the large part incompatible with the demands placed on the British Army. One of  
 
the key benefits of Prussian success in his eyes was the debate it had stimulated. As  
 
he wrote, “Just at present the public mind is more awake to military affairs than it has  
 
been for years past. The nation has been startled out of its slumber by the  
 
extraordinary successes of the Prussian Army, and has learnt that those successes  
 
have been due to provision and forethought”.
17
 Maintaining the so-called „balance of  
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power‟ in Europe had been a long-standing British preoccupation. Indeed at this time  
 
the annually renewed Mutiny Act stated in the preamble that the army was maintained  
 
largely to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Whilst this had become  
 
unworkable practically it was still the preoccupation of the foreign policy of  
 
successive governments. Prussia‟s military success, and the growing prospect of  
 
German unification, threatened the balance of power. Brackenbury urged that rather  
 
than adopt the Prussian system in its entirety “we must search and carefully examine  
 





Whilst he thought there were problems he did accept that “there is doubtless  
 
something very captivating in the results of the Prussian organisation”.
19
 He  
 
recognised that it had been efficient and extremely cost effective, “a mere fraction of  
 
our expenditure on the Crimean campaign”. The problem in his mind was that the  
 
system was reliant on compulsory service. This was totally unacceptable politically,  
 




However to Brackenbury there was a much wider problem than conscription, which  
 
concerned the demands that each nation placed upon its army. Both armies had the  
 
objective of defence of the realm, but this meant very different things. As  
 
Brackenbury explained,  
 
With us the realm means not only England, not only Great Britain and Ireland, 
but immense tracts of territory in Asia, in Africa, in America, in Australasia, 
territories whose two hundred millions of inhabitants are no less than seven 
times as numerous as those of the United Kingdom itself, and to some of 
which the mere journey occupies months, during which the voyager is out of 
all possible communication with home.  
 
Service in India for instance, which was where nearly 60,000 of the army was  
 
stationed, would be impractical for the conscript soldier as “the training of a recruit at  
 
home to fit him for foreign service, together with his voyages out and home, would  
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Even in 1866 Brackenbury was asking for a formal definition of the duties of the  
 
army, explaining to his readers that no formal preparation could be made until one  
 
existed. He would again plead this case when Head of the Intelligence Branch, and for  
 
the same reason, namely so that plans for the defence of Great Britain and Ireland  
 
could be prepared. Whilst Brackenbury was dubious about the possibility, and  
 
indeed likelihood, of invasion he was practical enough to realise that it could happen. 
 
He questioned the policy of relying solely on the Royal Navy to prevent it, using the  
 





Brackenbury realised that with the many commitments in the empire it was  
 
impossible for an army of 150,000 or more to be kept in Britain on the off-chance of  
 
invasion. His answer was to reform the reserve forces. He envisaged a well trained  
 
body of reserves, militia and volunteers who if invasion ever happened would form  
 
the basis of an army to resist it. It is interesting to note that in 1866 he is in many  
 
ways envisaging the creation of the Territorial Army, which was not created until  
 
1907. The idea that former or part-time soldiers would be asked to defend against the  
 
cream of an invading army does sound a little strange, but Brackenbury envisaged a  
 
reserve force that would be trained along the principles of the Prussian system. They  
 
would be grouped into local formations that would train together for part of the year.  
 
Reservists, volunteers and militia would form brigades and divisions that would not  
 
merely exist on paper but would be capable of taking the field fully supported by  
 
artillery, engineers and other support services. In his view they must to all intents and  
 
purposes be professional, if not full time, soldiers; as he wrote “we do not entrust the  
 
cure of our diseases to an amateur physician, nor the legal defence of our property to  
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This in Brackenbury‟s view was the lesson that could and indeed should be learnt  
 
from the Prussian system, namely that a reserve was not only desirable but also  
 
essential. A key problem with keeping reservists up to standard was that they found  
 
difficulty in gaining civilian employment. This was understandable as employers were  
 
hardly likely to want to employ someone who could be away training part of the year  
 
or could be recalled to the colours instantly. In a later issue on military reform  
 
Brackenbury did respond to this problem, and suggested that as many as possible  
 
should be found employment where the Government was the employer. His idea was  
 
sensible and was formed no doubt as a solution to the fact that compulsory service  
 
was impossible, but it had many problems. Perhaps this was a good case of  
 
Brackenbury the theorist, not being entirely realistic. The Government would never  
 
have supported an idea, which by its very nature would have been extremely  
 
expensive, albeit not as expensive as regular troops. His ideas were also perhaps a  
 
little before their time as at this stage there was no reserve to speak of, until after  
 
the Cardwell Reforms. It also envisaged the creation of storehouses, as places where  
 
supplies could be kept and the Army would congregate to meet any possible invasion,  
 
some twenty years before the creation of the „Stanhope storehouses‟. It can also be  
 
seen as a precursor to the creation of the Territorial Army in the aftermath of the  
 
South African War. All this is evidence of a soldier and officer who was thinking  
 
seriously about his profession and the ways in which it could be improved. If  
 
sometimes the „theory‟ seemed a little naïve and unrealistic his lack of experience and  
 
relative youth - he was only twenty-nine when these articles were published - can  
 
explain that. At this stage he had no real experience outside his own regiment, and at  
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this point all he had seen of war was his short period in India during the mutiny.  
 
Despite this it is remarkable how many of the ideas he put forward during this period  
 
were to be put into practice many years later.    
 
 
Soldier‟s welfare      
 
This is one subject on which he was surprisingly active in his articles on military  
 
reform. Brackenbury was later criticised by Wolseley and Ian Hamilton for not caring  
 
about the conditions and welfare of the common solider.
24
 Yet the poor conditions  
 
that the soldier endured were a constant theme throughout Brackenbury‟s five articles  
 
on military reform, with one being dedicated entirely to the discussion of this subject.  
 
However Brackenbury‟s main concern was improving the quality of the recruit and  
 
therefore the efficiency of the army. Whether this was his only motivation is  
 
impossible to know, but it rings true of a man who was constantly looking towards  
 
making the army a more efficient organisation. Whatever his motives he did suggest  
 
ideas which would have considerably improved the lot of the common soldier. Some  
 
were later to be adopted, most notably the idea of shorter service and the abolition of  
 
flogging, together with the improvement of barrack rooms and facilities, which  
 
although they were never raised to the standard that Brackenbury had wanted, were  
 
dramatically improved during Stanhope‟s period as Secretary of State for War. 
 
 




 At the time not only was there no discernable reserve but it was often  
 
impossible to meet the established level of the regular army. To Brackenbury the main  
 
problem in recruiting the necessary numbers were the conditions of service. It was  
 
also a constant theme of his articles that this was also discouraging a better class of  
 
recruit from coming forward. The problems were a combination of harsh conditions  
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of service and the social stigma attached to it, but also in Brackenbury‟s view there  
 
was no prospect of advancement. One of Brackenbury‟s more radical inducements to  
 
service was the suggestion that what would now be referred to as a quota system  
 
should be introduced where every fourth or fifth officer‟s commission should be  
 
reserved for a non-commissioned officer.
26
 It was perhaps radical ideas such as this  
 
that led to the Duke of Cambridge to refer to him as “a very dangerous man”.  
 
 
There were more conventional inducements to service also suggested by  
 
Brackenbury, such as improved pay, rations and living conditions. On the subject of  
 
pay he recommended an increase in the basic pay but he was more concerned with  
 




 He also used evidence to support the idea that this would reduce  
 
drunkenness, as the prevailing wisdom was that soldiers drank largely because they  
 
didn‟t have enough food. Another monetary inducement was the improvement of the  
 




The treatment of retired soldiers had recently been national news after the appearance  
 
in The Times of an article entitled „Waterloo and the Workhouse‟. Brackenbury  
 
wrote of a similar tale of a soldier who had served heroically throughout the  
 
Peninsular Campaign, had fought at the Battle of New Orleans, where he saved the  
 
life of his wounded officer, and subsequently the Battle of Waterloo. He had then  
 
gone on to serve in the West Indies and in the Portuguese Expedition of 1827-28.  
 
After leaving the Army he worked for the Dockyard Police. He and his wife were now  
 
in their seventies and reduced to living on 10d a day. Brackenbury finished off by  
 
saying, “Eight sieges and battles, including Waterloo; two forlorn hopes, a wounded  
 
limb; a commanding officer‟s life saved; twenty-one years services in Spain,  
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Belgium, America, the West Indies, and Portugal; and tenpence a day for a reward!”.  
 
Whilst Brackenbury‟s comments were of an emotional nature his true colours, namely  
 
the efficiency of the army and the quest for a better class of recruit, were on display  
 
later in the article when he wrote that, “This matter of pension is of vital importance;  
 
and if we want soldiers, we must treat it in no niggardly spirit, remembering that  
 
every pensioner who goes back into civil life leavens his own neighbourhood with  
 
good or bad opinions of the army”.
29
 Brackenbury‟s recommendation was that the  
 
pension should start at no less than a shilling a day, returning it to the pre 1847  
 
amount, which could rise to as much as 1s 6d per day for soldiers with good conduct  
 
or service before the enemy. This illustrates the intelligence with which Brackenbury  
 
wrote. Rather than making the case purely in the emotional vein, as so many did, he  
 
also made the case practically, by showing that the ill-treatment of soldiers, and a  
 
miserly pension were in effect bad public relations for the army. It created a negative  
 
view and hampered recruitment and, particularly for Brackenbury, it prevented the  
 
recruitment of a better class of soldier.  
 
 
Brackenbury devoted a whole article to military discipline. Again this was a popular  
 
subject at the time, due to the case of Private Robert Slim who had died during a  
 
flogging. Debates in the House of Commons, during June 1867, had seen a motion  
 
passed by one vote to abolish flogging which the government had ignored. The  
 
resolution had caused panic in the government and, in the words of Brackenbury,  “In  
 




 The result was that flogging had been abolished in time of  
 
peace except for mutiny and insubordination with violence. In itself Brackenbury felt  
 
that little good would come of this in terms of recruitment, but he argued that officers  
 
would now be more inclined to remove soldiers from the ranks for persistent bad  
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behaviour, and as a consequence a better class of recruit would be essential. Flogging  
 
was just one matter he touched on. He went into detail about the unfairness of the  
 
present regimental court system, the unsuitability of many officers for the task of  
 




        
 
 
Brackenbury did not only want a better class of recruit, but he also believed that he  
 
knew where such men could be obtained.  
 
We have a race of hardy villagers and stalwart country lads fond of sport, of 
all games that require pluck and skill, a quick eye, a strong hand, and a fleet 
foot, to whom the spice of danger enhances the pleasure of such games as 
football and cricket, and who are ready to join in anything promising a chance 
of adventure. It would seem that a soldiers life is exactly the career suited to 
such as these; but the fact stares us in the face that these men will not come in 




Brackenbury believed that if his recommendations in terms of pay, pension and  
 
conditions were enacted then such men would join the army. Whilst this would have  
 
removed many of the drawbacks to service it still ignored the social stigma attached to  
 
the army, which was only partly to do with money. There was still a wider dislike of  
 
militarism in any form that could not so easily be solved. There is no doubt that  
 
Brackenbury‟s recommendations would have improved the lot of the soldier and  
 
would have helped recruitment but he was perhaps naïve to believe that the type of  
 
recruit he sought would be induced purely by such changes. 
 
 
Chief of Staff 
 
His first article on „Military Reform‟ had touched on War Office organisation but it  
 
was in the fifth that he set out many of his key ideas and reforms. It was here that he  
 
first championed the idea of a Chief of Staff, an important point to remember given  
 
that he was much criticised in 1890 when it was suggested that he put forward this  
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idea purely for personal gain. To him such an appointment was obvious. It would  
 
reduce the substantial workload of the Commander-in-Chief and Secretary of State for  
 
War, and would give the army much needed planning and strategy. If nothing else  
 
should have been copied from the Prussian successes it was surely this.
33
 He  
 
recommended many alterations to the War Office administration, some of which he  
 
would enact as Director General of Ordnance between 1899-1904. A large problem in  
 
his opinion was he matter of supervision and control. It was impossible for one man,   
 
the Secretary of State, to do this for both the civilian and military side. The  
 
Commander-in-Chief was rapidly losing control over subordinate militarily controlled  
 
departments, a problem that attempts to rein in the Duke of Cambridge would  
 
exacerbate. There was a gap where a Chief of Staff should be. This lack of  
 
coordination and supervision was part of the reason for so many Royal Commission  
 
and committees being established, a situation that would continue throughout the  
 




Seventeen Royal Commissions, eighteen Select Committees of the House of  
Commons, nineteen committees of officers within the War Office, besides 
thirty-five committees of military officers, making a total of no less than 
eighty-nine committees and commissions, which have been held to consider 
one question or another, and in the majority of cases their reports have not 





Parliament and the Army 
 
Brackenbury returned to the subject of army reform when he wrote two articles for  
 
Saint Paul’s Magazine in 1868. The first was on „Parliament and Army Reform‟ and  
 
concentrated solely on the issue of the purchasing of commissions, a practice which  
 
was still in place. This was written in the last months of the Conservative  
 
government, and thus before Cardwell and the Liberal Party came to office.  
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Brackenbury was confident that the new government would abolish the purchase  
 
system. He noted that abolition now attracted more support in parliament than  
 
previously and that the press was now largely in favour. Brackenbury was very clear:  
 
The whole issue lies in this. Is the army to be a profession or not? Are the 
officers to enter it with a view to making it the pursuit of their lives, and 
devoting their entire energies to military service; or are they to enter for a brief 





This view is similar to that taken by Cardwell a few years later when he wrote that,  
 
“Our principle is that the officers shall be made for the Army. Their principle is that  
 
the Army is made for officers”.
36
 Both comments fitted into a wider feeling of a  
 
growth in professional society that occurred during the late Victorian era. For  
 
Brackenbury to suggest that „soldiering‟ was a profession was to put it on a par with  
 
the medical and legal profession. It was therefore something that one should study and  
 
take seriously rather than to be seen as a duty of social status, or as Brackenbury put  
 
it, “a pastime”. Brackenbury also expressed a rather modern view about the nature of  
 
officership. Many who defended purchase did so in terms of social character, as he  
 
put it „pluck and courage‟. Brackenbury espoused the view that courage before the  
 
enemy was only part of an officer‟s duty; “the duties of war are rare and far between,  
 
and the duties of peace are constant, and ever at hand”.
37
 It is very similar to the  
 
current creed of the British Army that states there is more to being an officer than  
 
behaving like an officer. Brackenbury‟s point was that there was far more to being a  
 
good officer than many believed. It was more than merely having natural leadership  
 
and courage, whether this came from social background or not. The army was a  
 
profession and it was Brackenbury‟s view that like any other profession it had to be  
 
studied and trained for and taken seriously. Active service played only a small  
 
part of an officer‟s life.    
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The second article was entitled „Our Army as it is, and as it should be‟. This was  
 
clearly written as a response to the Prussian success against the Austrians in 1866  
 
which had stimulated much debate in the British press. In it he provided an overview  
 
of the „evils‟ of the present military system. Once again he expressed the view that the  
 
greatest problem facing the army was recruiting.
38
 Once again Brackenbury took up  
 
the subject of promotion through the ranks. This time he argued that such a move was  
 
the natural progression from the opening up of the military colleges to anyone, rather  
 
than merely to those who were highborn. If there was no longer anything other than  
 
money preventing anyone becoming an officer surely, he argued, those who already  
 
had experience of the army were ideal candidates.
39
 In this article he referred to the  
 
fact that those few NCOs who were commissioned as officers were often treated, “as  
 
a kind of outcast from the society of his brother officers….if a third of the officers had  
 
thus risen, such social ostracism could no longer exist. And, indeed, it is probable that  
 
a very superior class of men would be promoted”.
40
 The promotion of officers through  
 
the ranks was a continual theme in Brackenbury‟s writing on the state of the army.  
 
The two main benefits he saw were that it would improve the class of recruit if there  
 
was a reasonable possibility of a commission and that it would further improve the  
 
efficiency of the army because such men would naturally have a more professional  
 
attitude. There is a question as to whether either of the desired effects would have  
 
occurred, but Brackenbury made a compelling case that was supported by the  
 
example of the French Army where such a system was in place. At this time the  
 
French Army was still held up as an example by many in the British military  
 
establishment, in a way that the Prussians were starting to be at this time and would  
 




One possible drawback to promotion through the ranks was money. An officer‟s pay  
 
was insufficient to meet the array of expenses that occurred whilst still providing a  
 
living wage. Thus some form of private income was always necessary. The reason for  
 
this was that officers pay had not been altered for quite some time. Again this  
 
reflected the „amateur ideal‟ that officers should not be making money out of serving  
 
the crown. Competitive rates of pay with other professions were unacceptable, partly  
 
because of cost but also because of the fear that this would create a professional  
 
military spirit which was considered by Victorian society to be both unacceptable and  
 
dangerous. The problem was that, whilst pay had not been altered since 1806,  
 




 Obviously any improvement in pay was dependent upon the abolition of the  
 
purchase system otherwise professional officers would be barred by financial  
 
limitations.   
 
 
It was in this piece that he included some equally outspoken comments upon military  
 
expenditure. For those who wanted a reduction there was a simple alternative, namely  
 
the introduction of conscription. This would give the country a cheap standing army  
 
and a considerable trained reserve and would allow further adoption of elements of  
 
the Prussian system. Brackenbury realised that this was extremely unlikely; therefore  
 
the alternative was a more expensive, smaller, volunteer army. In this case the only  
 
way in which expenditure could be reduced was “by placing all our military  
 
institutions, recruiting and promotion especially, on a sound and honest footing”.  
 
Whilst his words alluded to the corruption that undoubtedly existed, especially when  
 
it came to recruitment, it was more importantly a call for efficiency. He felt that the  
 
number of officers could safely be reduced and that the double administration of the  
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War Office and Horse Guards could be ended. To an extent the latter was achieved  
 
during the Cardwell reforms, but the reduction in expenditure was negligible. The  
 
much wider point was that without conscription an army adequate for home and  
 
imperial defence would always be an expensive operation. As Brackenbury wrote, “If  
 
Englishmen will not pay in person for the defence of England‟s possessions, they  
 
must pay in purse”.
42
    
 
 
Brackenbury was one of the imperialist school of writers, who felt that the uniqueness  
 
of the British position and their differing commitments called for an altogether  
 
different military system. He therefore did not fall into the trap of many military  
 
writers of wanting to copy excessively the practices of one of the great military  
 
powers of Europe. There were parts that Brackenbury admired in the Prussian system,  
 
namely their reservist system and localisation, and similarly parts he admired in the  
 
French system, most notably promotion through the ranks. His key aim was always to  
 
promote reforms that would, in his view, increase the efficiency of the army. That  
 
such recommendations were often radical was not necessarily his intent. Like  
 
Wolseley, being seen as a reformer and a „radical‟ he was often associated with the  
 
Liberal party and liberal views. However neither had any affinity with the Liberal  
 
Party, indeed Brackenbury grew to hate them for the stall in his career they had  
 
caused. He was basically a conservative both politically and socially.
43
 So when he  
 
recommended liberal and radical policies it was merely in what he saw to be the best  
 
interests of the efficiency and effectiveness of the army. Yet he was classed as a  
 
radical reformer, most notably by the Duke of Cambridge, and was therefore “a very  
 







       
 
After Brackenbury‟s service in the Ashanti War his work for the press declined  
 
dramatically, yet his literary career continued apace. After the conclusion of the  
 
conflict Brackenbury approached Wolseley about writing a narrative of the campaign.  
 
Wolseley agreed, and on his return Brackenbury put his proposal to publisher John  
 
Blackwood who recommended that if such a book was to be a success it would have  
 
to be published as soon as possible whilst public interest was still aroused. The  
 
ensuing writing, editing and publishing was a Herculean effort, and in only six weeks  
 
the book was completed! The Ashanti War, first published in1874 in two volumes,  
 
was a contemporary success and has remained the best account of the campaign. The  
 




 He noted that by the end of 1874 five works on the Ashanti Campaign  
 
had been published. With the exception of Brackenbury‟s they had all been written by  
 
special correspondents. The strength of Brackenbury‟s work was that it was the only  
 
one to concentrate on the military operations, rather than being a recollection of  
 
personal experiences. Obviously Brackenbury had the advantage of having been  
 
closely involved in the planning and organisation of the campaign and he also had  
 
access to the official papers from the War Office. This made his account uniquely  
 
authoritative. Whilst generally a glowing review, Cheadle did make two criticisms.  
 
Firstly, he felt that in some cases there was evidence of Brackenbury being too close  
 
to the events, and secondly, that he failed to make the necessary criticisms of certain  
 
mistakes and „disasters‟, although perhaps the latter criticism is unfair as it was  
 
largely a faultless campaign. Cheadle undoubtedly had a point but it is very  
 
understandable that Brackenbury should not want to alienate Wolseley by an overly  
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critical account. At a time when Brackenbury was trying to advance his military  
 
career such an account would have been far from helpful. It does perhaps highlight  
 
the dilemma faced by a man who was both a soldier and a writer about military  
 
matters. Whilst wanting to produce an „exciting‟ factual and descriptive account he  
 
also had to consider his own career and the consequences of being too analytical or  
 
critical. He would also have felt loyalty towards his comrades in the „ring‟ and would  
 
have undoubtedly hoped to see further service with them.           
 
 
His best-known works in this field dealt with the Ashanti Campaign and the Gordon  
 
Relief Expedition. He did, however, also write about a much smaller and less  
 
significant campaign conducted in South Africa. In November 1899 there appeared in  
 
Blackwood’s Edinburgh Magazine an article by Brackenbury entitled „The  
 
Transvaal Twenty Years ago‟. This dealt with the aftermath of the Zulu War in 1879  
 
and the subsequent campaign against the Pedi Chief, Sekukuni. Brackenbury had  
 
accompanied Wolseley to South Africa when the latter had been appointed to  
 
supersede Lord Chelmsford, but much to Wolseley‟s chagrin Chelmsford had fought  
 
the decisive battle of the campaign before he had the chance to take command.
46
 As a  
 
result all that was left for Wolseley to do was to quell the last elements of Zulu  
 
resistance and capture the Zulu King, Cetewayo. The campaign against Sekukuni was  
 
partly because of Wolseley‟s frustration at having missed the Zulu War. That is not to  
 
suggest that Wolseley was particularly bloodthirsty, but it was by successful service  
 
in the field that Wolseley enhanced his position within the Army and the State. It  
 
might also have been influenced by the fact that at the same time Wolseley‟s great  
 
rival Sir Frederick, later Lord Roberts was fighting a successful campaign in  
 
Afghanistan. This was certainly hinted at by Brackenbury in his article.
47
 Sekukuni  
 
had been a constant problem to the Transvaal Government. He launched sporadic  
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raids on other tribes and on the Transvaal settlers and lived on the plunder of such  
 
exploits. After such raids he would retreat to his „stadt‟ in the Lulu Mountains. Two  
 
previous expeditions had been launched against this stronghold, one by the Boers and  
 
one by the British. In August 1879 he had launched a raid on British settlers around  
 
Leydenburg, and this was all the justification Wolseley required for an expedition.  
 
 
That it was successful where others had failed was largely due to the meticulous  
 
planning of Brackenbury, as Wolseley himself conceded. The other campaigns had  
 
failed because of inadequate supplies, water and horses. This was all in place when  
 
the campaign was launched. Despite Brackenbury‟s key role in the campaign he  
 
makes little mention of his part in the proceedings. Indeed it was left to Wolseley to  
 
give credit where credit was due and he placed on record that it was because of  
 
Brackenbury‟s work as Chief of Staff that the campaign had been brief and  
 
successful. Again this illustrates a pertinent point about Brackenbury‟s writing.  
 
Whereas other writers would have made much of their personal contribution  
 
Brackenbury chose largely to ignore it or at the very least down play it. Partly this  
 
was a stylistic matter, as his narrative style of writing did not allow for this to the  
 
same extent that a more personal account of the campaigns would. Both this campaign  
 
and the Ashanti campaign were „textbook‟ operations for this style of warfare. On  
 
each occasion Brackenbury had played a key part in their success. His own failure to  
 
comment on this may partly have been a recognition, or even acceptance, of an age  
 
that had yet to fully realise the importance of such matters, as he did not usually suffer  
 
from modesty. Brackenbury‟s own attempt to lead battlefield charges illustrates the  
 
point that this was where it was perceived that „glory‟ lay rather than making the  
 
arrangements and plans that would allow a successful campaign. Many a campaign  
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„failed‟ during this period for want of adequate preparation and organisation, or more  
 
importantly because of a failure to recognise the vital necessity of such matters. It  
 
cannot be said that he used his writing as a way of seeking personal glory or to  
 
enhance his role in events. 
 
 
Indeed in his final book on his military campaigns, The River Column first  
 
published in 1885, he refrained from comment or praise for any of the individuals  
 
concerned. As he wrote,  
 
It would have been a pleasure to me to take this opportunity of praising those 
individuals to whom, in my opinion, such success as the Column attained is 
chiefly due; but my position demands so strict a neutrality that I have thought 
it right to avoid all words of praise, lest in any case their accidental omission 
might appear to impute the semblance of blame.  
 
Again this supports the view that Brackenbury did not write for personal glory. Indeed  
 
Brackenbury stated that his own motivations were, in a sense, to provide a lasting  
 
record of an extraordinary military expedition.  
 
I have written this simple narrative in the belief that the advance and return of 
four regiments of infantry through a hundred miles of cataracts and rapids in 
an enemy‟s country deserve, as a military operation, some permanent record, 
and because death has removed the only other officers possessing sufficient 





Although he never wrote a major military thesis, such a work as this was a useful  
 
contribution to those who studied the „art of war‟. It was a well-organised campaign  
 
in hostile territory, due to the enemy and also the difficulty of the terrain and climatic  
 
conditions. Whilst it has already been explained that he wrote largely for financial  
 
benefit, he was also writing to establish his reforming credentials. As a writer he was  
 
also capable of exerting a wider influence. We have already noted Brackenbury‟s  
 
belief that reform of the army would have to come from outside. Clearly the forum for  
 
this was the House of Commons. The type of publication Brackenbury wrote for was  
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widely read by the members of that house. It is inconceivable that Brackenbury did  
 
not realise the scope of his influence, therefore it is clear that rather than just writing  
 
for financial gain or career advancement he was also writing to influence army  
 
reform.    
 
 
Brackenbury never touched on the controversy that the campaign provoked. His was  
 
purely a military and logistical account of a quite remarkable military manoeuvre. In a  
 
sense this was perhaps a mistake when others, most notably Ian Hamilton, were  
 
criticising Wolseley, and by association Brackenbury, for their failure to reach  
 
Khartoum and relieve General Gordon. Brackenbury could have exonerated himself  
 
by the disclosure that the decision to withdraw had not been his, but a direct order  
 
from Wolseley. The River Column, which he commanded had not been designed or  
 
equipped to raise the siege of Khartoum, and it had also been dangerously  
 
undersupplied so that withdrawal was necessary if further supplies were not  
 
forthcoming. As an account of a military operation it was interesting and its  
 
republication in the 1990s for the U.S Military illustrates the lasting value of such a  
 





A criticism levelled at Brackenbury is that despite his prolific writing and his  
 




Cynically it could be suggested that this was because there was no financial gain in  
 
such a book but the truth is probably that, whilst there was perhaps a need for such a  
 
work, there was no demand. Within the Army itself an amateur ethos still existed, and  
 
little value was placed on studies of military history or contemporary tactics.  
 
Brackenbury himself had experience of this. Lt-Colonel G.F.R Henderson, Professor  
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of Military History at the Staff College had written a notable work entitled Stonewall  
 
Jackson and the American Civil War. Jackson‟s tactics during the war had given him  
 
a somewhat legendary status and the book did well commercially. However, despite  
 
its tactical interest Henderson told Brackenbury that, “Beside yourself, only one other  
 
General, or even Colonel, on the active list has said a word about the book to me”.
50
 It  
 
was a clear illustration of the lack of interest in such matters that existed at the time.  
 
Further evidence of this can be found in Colonel Lonsdale Hale‟s lecture and  
 
subsequent article for the Royal United Service Institute, in 1891, on “The  
 
Professional Study of Military History”, delivered largely as a criticism of the  
 
unprofessional nature of the officer corps and their dislike of study. Hale concluded  
 
that the average army officer, “found „study‟ and „history‟ bad enough by themselves,  
 
but when in juxtaposition, forming a combination absolutely detestable”.
51
         
 
 
This goes a long way to explaining why there was no distinctively British theoretical  
 
work on tactics. The closest was Charles Callwell‟s „Small Wars‟, first published in  
 
1896, but this looked purely at the colonial style of small wars. German literature and  
 
the Swiss-born writer Henri Jomini largely influenced other notable works, such as  
 
Edward Hamley‟s Operations of War, first published in 1866. Brackenbury  
 
recounted stories that illustrated the point that the majority of tactical and theoretical  
 
military history was being written for a small audience within the army. He did,  
 
however, write two articles, both for St Pauls Monthly Magazine, in 1867 and 1869,  
 
which dealt largely with the tactical side of his profession. 
 
 




 In looking at the weaponry of the nations Brackenbury felt it  
 
natural to comment on the tactical application of such resources. His starting point  
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was the Paris Exhibition of 1867 which had seen an uncommonly high display of  
 
military equipment. Although all types of military hardware were covered at the  
 
exhibition there was a particular emphasis on artillery. This had gone through  
 
something of a revolution with the introduction of rifled guns, which had dramatically  
 
improved their distance and accuracy. He also wrote about the developments and  
 
benefits of the new breech-loading rifles. In a rare note of praise for British  
 
governments he commended the speed with which they had recognised the benefits  
 
of such a weapon and had appreciated the lesson of the Dansk-Prussian War long  
 
before the majority of European powers.
53
 The fact that the decision had been to adapt  
 
and modify the Enfield rifle rather than adopt a completely new weapon also met with  
 
his approval. Brackenbury took the view that, as this was an emerging technology, it  
 
was far better to modify an existing weapon, thus giving the benefit of breech loading,  
 
and to await the further development of such technology.  
 
 
Even in an article that was supposed to be largely about military technology and  
 
tactics Brackenbury came back to his continuing concern over recruitment in the  
 
British Army. His view was that as tactics and technology were changing so must the  
 
old idea that the soldier was, in his words, “a mere machine”. It was therefore  
 
necessary for Britain to change the practice of recruiting from the lowest members in  
 
society. As he wrote,  
 
Other nations take the flower of manhood of the country for their armies, and 
the highest and lowest of their sons fight side by side in the ranks. Too 
independent to accept compulsory service even for our country, we yet are 
unwilling to pay the cost of our exemption, and instead of making the army 
the best of all professions, so as to attract men of intelligence and ability into 
its ranks, we seek only for how small a sum it is possible to get men of any 
stamp, and we lower our bidding till we can just fill our army with the dregs of 
our cities, and only raise the offer when even they cannot be drawn, even by 




The subject of recruiting was one that he was particularly passionate about, and to  
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which he regularly returned. This is not surprising for someone who was concerned  
 
about efficiency in all that he did. At the heart of Brackenbury‟s passion on this  
 
subject was the fact that all his other suggested reforms would not work efficiently  
 
unless a settled and effective system of recruiting existed.   
 
 
It is sometimes difficult to understand where Brackenbury stood on the issue of  
 
compulsory service. He never publicly advocated its introduction, not even when a  
 
popular movement in its favour was started with the support of Lord Roberts in the  
 
aftermath of the South African War. Perhaps this was because he believed that such a  
 
measure could never be accepted in peacetime. This view would certainly be  
 
supported by many of his articles on army reform. Yet he continually mentioned the  
 
idea in his writing with language which seems to suggest a longing for such a  
 
measure. Another interesting point from the passage quoted above is that relating to  
 
highest and the lowest serving together in the ranks. This only truly happened in the  
 
French army, and even then there were loopholes that could be exploited by those  
 
with power or money, yet Brackenbury emphasises the point in such a way as to make  
 
it sound as though this was the common practice in Europe. One possible reason for  
 
this can be found in his previous articles on army reform when he wrote that  
 
compulsory service was not only impossible in Britain for historical and political  
 




 It could be argued that Brackenbury‟s concept of the highest and the  
 
lowest serving together side by side in the ranks was an attempt to appeal to liberal  
 
ideas of equality. Having said this it does seem unlikely that Brackenbury was in  
 
favour of compulsory service as there is no direct mention of his support for it, and  
 
he was certainly not reticent about expressing his views on other, perhaps even more  
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controversial, matters. Brackenbury may well have sought to make compulsory  
 
service seem more generally acceptable. If this was his view it is supported by the  
 
evidence of the South African War, where a large number of volunteers from all  
 
levels of society willingly served together in the ranks. It was perhaps hoped that  
 
those in power who were diametrically opposed to this idea would seek to improve  
 





Brackenbury also wrote on „The Influence of Modern Improvements Upon Strategy‟,  
 
again for Saint Paul’s Monthly Magazine. This was during an era when there were  
 
several similar articles published.
56
 The reason for this was that emerging technology,  
 
especially rifled artillery, had recently been demonstrated in action, most notably in  
 
the conflict between Prussia and Austria. There were also incidents in the Dansk- 
 
Prussian War that had highlighted the ability of the breech-loading rifle. However  
 
Brackenbury stated clearly that his aim was to look at strategy, which he defined as  
 
the movement of troops in war, rather than tactics, the art of handling troops in the  
 
presence of the enemy. The first elements he looked at were the electric telegraph and  
 
the influence of railroads. He recognised that this had particular significance for  
 
Russia, and if applied correctly would enormously increase Russia‟s role as a great  
 
power. The railroads in particular were important in that they had increased the ability  
 
to concentrate troops at any one point and the ability to keep them supplied. He gave  
 
various examples from the recent wars in Europe and the American Civil War, where  
 
tens and indeed hundreds of thousands of troops were moved, along with guns and  
 
equipments, quickly and efficiently for battle. All this meant that mobilisation which  
 
in the past had taken weeks or months now took a matter of days. He did, however,  
 
appreciate that this now meant that considerable numbers of troops had to be used to  
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protect the railroads. Brackenbury could not resist the temptation to compare this with  
 
the chaos caused in Britain when volunteers were moved to Brighton for manoeuvres,  
 
which required the closing of the railway for four days simply to prepare for one  
 
day‟s movement, consisting of troops only without the extra problems and delays of  
 
guns, horses and stores.
57
 This was perhaps a somewhat unfair criticism, as unlike  
 
their state owned continental counterparts, British railways were largely private  
 
companies. It could also be argued that this was only a concern for European warfare.  
 
Rarely were railways used during the British army‟s colonial campaigns, and the  
 
likelihood of the army being significantly involved in a European war was considered  
 
slim.   
 
 
He also highlighted the importance of the telegraph, using the example of the recent  
 
conflict between Prussia and Austria, where the King and the General Staff had been  
 
in constant contact with the Headquarters of the three army corps. Again, this was  
 
subject to attack by the enemy but he pointed out that in this case it was quick and  
 
easy to repair, unlike railroads. Another technological advance he noted was the use  
 
of steam to power shipping which now negated the need to wait for a favourable wind  
 
before landing or collecting troops, and had the obvious effect of speeding such  
 
transportation. Brackenbury used such advances in technology to once again press for  
 
improvement in the education of officers. An officer who understood and could apply  
 
such technologies would be able to move his troops around rapidly so as to increase  
 
the chance of catching his enemy off guard. This was the strategy that was now  
 
important and Brackenbury supported his views with the words of General Sir Charles  
 
Napier: “An ignorant general is a murderer. All brave men confide in the knowledge  
 
that he pretends to possess, and when the death-trial comes, their generous blood  
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flows in vain”. Brackenbury did sound a note of optimism, stating that he felt such  
 
things were beginning to be understood: “The day is not far distant when a man who  
 





This was as far down the road of theory and strategy that Brackenbury ever went.  
 
It might be suggested that Brackenbury‟s main reason for not writing a major  
 
theoretical work was because he saw no financial gain in such an enterprise. Perhaps  
 
it is more pertinent to say that he was too busy writing for the popular press, which it  
 
must be remembered was vital to his financial security. Another point that needs to be  
 
made is that such a work would not necessarily have suited his style of writing.  
 
Brackenbury was at his best when writing a descriptive narrative. Even some of his  
 
official reports take on such a style, especially when he felt it necessary to give an  
 
account of how the present situation had arisen by filling in the background.
59





Frederick Maurice has often been referred to as the „pen‟ of Lord Wolseley. On  
 
occasion this distinction is also given to Brackenbury. Whilst Wolseley undoubtedly  
 
used Brackenbury to tell the tale of his campaigns, as evidenced by the latter‟s  
 
accounts of the Ashanti and Sudan campaigns, on army reform it must be  
 
remembered that Brackenbury wrote his articles long before any association with  
 
Wolseley, and whilst they shared opinions many of Brackenbury‟s ideas would have  
 
gone too far for Wolseley‟s liking. The obvious example of this is Brackenbury‟s  
 
desire to replace the Commander-in-Chief with a Chief of Staff, as evidenced by  
 
Wolseley‟s reaction to the recommendation of the Hartington Commission.  
 
Brackenbury‟s reputation as a military reformer preceded his association with  
 
Wolseley because of his literary work and this perhaps goes someway to explaining  
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why his „devotion‟ to the Wolseley „ring‟ was not as strong as that of some of his  
 
contemporaries. Brackenbury‟s literary work had helped him to develop a career and  
 
reputation before he met Wolseley. On the other hand it must be added that  
 





The financial imperative of Brackenbury‟s writing needs to be understood. It gave  
 
him the money he needed to maintain a military career. Maintaining the lifestyle  
 
expected of an officer was an expensive business. If this money had not been  
 
forthcoming he may well have taken one of the many job opportunities outside of the  
 
army that he was offered.
60
 His literary career also gave him a means of advancement  
 
as it was the ideas he promoted in his articles which brought him to the attention of  
 
political and military reformers with whom he became associated. The fact that he had  
 
built up a considerable reputation can be seen not only by the reviews of his work but  
 
in the fact that he started to be approached to write on military subjects at  
 
considerable rates of pay. Whilst the payment of 100 guineas for one article, paid by  
 
The Illustrated London News, was exceptional it does show the level to which his  
 
reputation as a writer had risen. Editors were attracted by his ability to engage with  
 
the non-military reader. Virtually all his articles appeared in the popular press rather  
 
than „trade‟ journals such as United Service Journal. He had a clear narrative style  
 
which, whilst largely free of military jargon, was still technical enough to engage the  
 
military reader.  
 
 
His reputation as a writer moved him into new circles of associates, both socially and  
 
professionally. Socially he found himself mixing with some of the leading lights of  
 
the artistic scene of Victorian London, including Henry Irving, Arthur Sullivan and  
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W.H Russell. He was on good personal terms with John Blackwood, the editor of  
 
several periodicals, and continued this relationship with his nephew who succeeded  
 
him as editor. He also enjoyed good relations with other literary editors and  
 
proprietors including J.A Froude, William Longman, and Edward Lawson (proprietor  
 
and editor of The Daily Telegraph and later Lord Burnham). The fact that he was  
 
writing for „general‟ publication also gave him an advantage in that his articles were  
 
being read and considered by the leading politicians of the day, who whilst they might  
 
not read the United Service Journal, were likely to read Fraser’s Magazine, The  
 
Fortnightly Review, or Blackwood’s Magazine.
61
 This undoubtedly benefited him,  
 
if only simply because of name recognition. It is doubtful that politicians were aware  
 
of many captains or majors who they did not know personally, yet Brackenbury‟s  
 





One other important figure that it brought him into contact with was Prince Arthur,  
 
Duke of Connaught, the son of Queen Victoria. In November 1872 Brackenbury was  
 
still teaching at Woolwich when Prince Arthur‟s Secretary, Sir Howard Elphistone,  
 




 The lectures were given at the Lord Warden Hotel in Dover, where  
 
the Prince was serving as an officer in the Rifle Brigade. The lectures were also  
 
attended by the officers of the garrison at Dover, which made for an interesting  
 
audience. The lectures were well received and Brackenbury received a letter of thanks  
 
from Queen Victoria saying how useful the Prince had found his lectures. As a result  
 
of these lectures Brackenbury was later invited to spend the weekend with the Prince.  
 
Brackenbury also used his friendship with the Prince when he asked him to preside  
 
over the lecture he gave to the Royal United Service Institution, thus helping to ensure  
 
a large attendance. The Prince‟s presence as chairman meant that the majority of the  
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War Office staff attended, including Wolseley. This is important in that it was shortly  
 
after this that the latter asked Brackenbury to accompany him on the Ashanti  
 
Campaign. Although they had met before this, the lecture undoubtedly further  
 
enhanced his reputation with Wolseley and meant that Brackenbury‟s name was fresh  
 
in his mind when he was selecting his staff for the campaign a few months later. All  
 
this had come about, directly or indirectly, because of Brackenbury‟s literary output. 
 
 
A fitting summary of the importance of his literary career can be found in the final  
 
pages of his autobiography Some Memories of My Spare Time.  
 
I attribute to a great extent whatever measure of success I had in my 
profession to it. It is not merely that to my pen I owed the means, which 
enabled me to keep my head above water, to buy books, to travel, and to study 
theatres of campaigns and battlefields, and the administration of foreign 
armies. Writing for the press compelled constant observation and constant 
work, preventing the brain from rusting. It brought me into contact with 
superior minds. It was my studies for this outside work that enabled me to take 
up the Professorship of Military History. It was my work for the press that 
brought about that connection with the Red Cross Society, which gave me my 
first insights into administration. It was this Red Cross work and my work as a 
lecturer, outside my professional duties, which brought me under the notice of 
Sir Garnet Wolseley, and so gave me my first employment as a staff officer in 
the field.
64
    
 
At the time of his writing the British army officer was still largely an amateur.  
 
Although slightly exaggerated, the idea that being a gentleman of breeding and  
 
background was more important than making a thorough study of your chosen  
 
profession was still the majority view. This was starting to change at the time  
 
Brackenbury was writing. The Crimean War „shook‟ some of the complacency out of  
 
the officer corps and the realisation that technology was making „intelligence‟ and  
 
study as important as moral and physical courage was growing. Men like Edward  
 
Hamley, C.B Mayne, Francis Clery, W.H.James, J.F Maurice, George Colley, and  
 
even Wolseley, were developing literary careers and were studying their profession.  
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Notes                    
                                                 
1
 There is some debate over the number of publications that could actually be referred to as books. The 
Dictionary of National Biography includes amongst this number his lecture and Journal article entitled 
„The Tactics of the three arms‟. I would not include this as a book. Often ignored is his book on the 
Franco-Prussian War, written in French, which was never published.   
2
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within the boundaries of this thesis. It has been decided to concentrate on those articles that in 
particular refer to the themes of the thesis, such as army reform, military tactics, campaign memories, 
and anything else that reflects the military career of Brackenbury.  
3
 This was Colonel, later General Sir, J.H Lefroy, Director of the Advanced Class for Artillery Officers 
at Woolwich. He played a key part in the campaign for the adoption of rifled guns for the artillery, and 
was one of the officers approached by the Government for advice on the subject.  He also wrote a paper 
calling for the creation of an artillery school, which led to its establishment at Shoeburyness.    
4
 It had been intended to write a third paper on the subject, but a fire robbed Brackenbury of his notes 
and sketches. As Brackenbury wrote, “I had neither time nor heart to commence over again, and I 
abandoned the subject”. The original hand written draft of the first two survives at the Royal Artillery 
Museum at Woolwich. This was his first literary contribution written under his own name. He had in 
September 1859 written a parody of Tennyson‟s „May Queen‟ for Punch. 
5
 This article was actually published in The Gentleman’s Magazine in December 1866. 
6
 It is important to remember that these articles predated, and in some cases predicted, the Cardwell 
Reforms coming as they did before Cardwell entered office in December 1868. Brackenbury, Henry 
Some Memories of My Spare Time (London: William Blackwood & sons, 1909), pp.33-34. 
7
Charles Brackenbury did write occasionally for newspapers, but never on the scale of his brother. 
Charles acted as military correspondent for The Times during the war of 1866, which saw Prussia and 
Italy, allied against Austria, but this was an exception to the rule.   
8
 The Blackwood Papers at the National Library of Scotland contain some details of the amount of 
money he was paid, and not just for his work for Blackwood‟s. From these papers we know that 
Brackenbury was paid £300 for his book on The Ashanti Campaign, that for The Illustrated London 
News he was writing an average of 25 columns at four guineas a column, and that his work for The 
Daily Telegraph saw him paid £5 a column. Brackenbury to Blackwood 27
th
 November 1874, 
Blackwood Papers, National Library of Scotland, MSS MS 4315 and Brackenbury to Blackwood 2
nd
 
June 1877, Blackwood Papers, National Library of Scotland, MSS MS 4356.    
9
 This was published in The Standard on Monday 18th March 1867. Brackenbury wrote that corporal 
punishment should only be used on active service, a view which the later Cardwell Reforms would 
make practice.  
10
 From the commencement of the Franco-Prussian War, Brackenbury had been writing a „Diary of the 
War‟ that appeared in each days paper. The editor had wanted him to sign a formal contract, which 
Brackenbury had refused to do on the grounds that his military duties could take him away at any 
moment. When Brackenbury announced that he was leaving to work in Europe for the National Aid 
Society some rather acrimonious correspondence took place between the editor and Brackenbury. The 
upshot of it was that Brackenbury considered they would not welcome him in the future and thus the 
association ended.  
11
 Brackenbury,Henry, Some Memories of My Spare Time, pp.254-256. 
12
 These articles appeared in Fraser’s Magazine, Volume 74, 75 &76 in five parts from December 1866 
to August 1867.  
13
 Brackenbury, Henry „Military Reform: Part V‟, Fraser’s Magazine, Volume 76 ( August 1867). 
Pp206-207.  
14
 Brackenbury, Henry „Military Reform: Part V‟, p.209. 
15
 Brackenbury, Henry „Military Reform: Part V‟, p.212.  
16
 Amongst these were Colonel Lonsdale Hale, F.N Maude, and Charles Brackenbury, Henry‟s brother. 
There was slowly a reaction to this movement which united Ian Hamilton and Garnet Wolseley for 
probably the only time, in condemning the „slavish imitations from the Prussian‟s‟ as Hamilton put it in 
The Fighting of the Future (London: Kegan Paul, 1885), p.16.     
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extremely critical of him as a way of attacking Wolseley who he despised, and blamed for his lack of 
advancement.  
25
 As Brackenbury wrote his first article a Royal Commission chaired by Lord Dalhousie was looking 
at the subject of recruiting. The recommendation led to the creation of the reserve act in 1867, which 
created a paper reserve that didn‟t exist in practice until the implementation of short service, as part of 
the Cardwell Reforms. Brackenbury was highly critical of the Royal Commission for ignoring such 
matters as food and living quarters as disincentives for recruitment.   
26
 To an extent this was already done in the French Army, where a large number of officers came from 
the ranks. Many of the conservatives within the British army, most notably the Duke of Cambridge, 
thought this was a key reason for the failure of the French army against the Prussians, who of course 
were officered by „gentleman‟.  
27
 „Stoppages‟ was the term used to refer to money deducted at source for messing and washing 
expenses. This meant that whilst an infantry mans pay was 7s 7d a week, after stoppages he only had 2s 
11d.   
28
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29
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Volume 75 (March 1867), p.289.  
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32
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that if the recommendations of the Hartington Commission of 1890 had been enacted the disasters of 
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34
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35
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Henry Brackenbury and the Franco-Prussian War: 




The Legion of Honour and the Iron Cross are two of the most renowned and coveted  
 
decorations in the world.  To receive either is a great achievement and gives one  
 
admission to an elite group of people.  However, for one individual to receive both is  
 
a very rare achievement.  To the best of my knowledge there is only one man who has  
 
been awarded both.  That man was Henry Brackenbury, who received the awards as  
 
recognition of his tireless work for The National Aid Society during the Franco- 
 
Prussian War.  What makes this achievement even more surprising is the fact that  
 
Brackenbury was a serving officer in the British Army.  Brackenbury was later to gain  
 
public recognition as a prominent member of „the Ashanti Ring‟ and finished his  
 
career as a full General.  However, these early events in his career are not widely  
 
known, and such a rare achievement deserves recognition. This chapter will look at  
 
Brackenbury's role during the conflict, and its immediate aftermath.  This article does  
 
not presume to tell the story of the Franco-Prussian War or even of the National Aid  
 
Society, but it is interesting for the historian to see what light Brackenbury‟s role  
 
throws on a well-studied event.
1
   
 
 
Writing on the „Sick and Wounded‟ 
 
To this point Brackenbury‟s career had been largely uneventful. He had seen active  
 
service soon after his commissioning, during the Indian Mutiny, but since then had  
 
been filling various administrative and teaching positions within the Royal Artillery.  
 
After fourteen years service he was only a captain, which considering he had been  
 
commissioned as a lieutenant illustrates that his rise had been far from dramatic. By  
 
this time his literary credentials were well established and his series of articles on  
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army reform that had predated and anticipated the Cardwell reforms had in  
 
particular given him a certain level of recognition.
2
 It was Brackenbury's literary  
 
abilities that were to bring him to the attention of the people for whom he would work  
 
during the conflict.  In 1867 he had visited the Paris Exhibition and had been  
 
interested in the display of ambulances and materials of the French „Societe  
 
Internationale de Secours aux Blesses‟.
3
  This led him to look at similar work in  
 
Prussia, Austria and Italy.  He also studied the work done by similar organisations  
 
during the American Civil War.  These studies convinced him that Britain needed a  
 
society to provide relief for the sick and wounded of conflicts.  As a consequence, in  
 
January 1868, he published two articles in The Standard entitled 'Help for the Sick  
 
and Wounded'.  These articles described what he had seen in Paris and the studies he  
 
had undertaken into such voluntary bodies in other countries.  He concluded:                                                   
 
We have seen what other nations have done.  What is England doing?  We 
have our Nightingale Fund for training nurses, our Patriotic Fund for the relief 
of Crimean suffers.  Where is our branch of the 'International Society for the 
Relief of the Sick and Wounded', and what work is it doing?  Where is its 
shipload of comforts to follow the Abyssinian expedition?...In Heavens name 
let us be up and doing.  We have signed the Convention of Geneva.  We are 
bound in honour to be working in time of peace not for ourselves alone, but 
for all the other nations, whose wounded may, by even the remotest 
possibility, ever fall into our hands.  We invite discussion and action on a 
subject affecting both our soldiers lives and our national honour.
4
   
 
The two articles brought him to the attention of like-minded people such as John  
 
Furley, Capt C.J. Burgess, and Colonel Loyd-Lindsay (later Lord Wantage).  When  
 
war broke out they were to remember him. 
 
 
First visit to the scene of war 
 
In 1868 Brackenbury was appointed as Professor of Military History at The Royal  
 
Military Academy, Woolwich.  As a consequence of this position he was able to  
 
obtain a government grant of ten shillings a day so he could conduct battlefield tours  
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of Europe in the vacations in order to obtain material for his forth coming series of  
 
lectures.  For Brackenbury these tours served a dual purpose.  Besides giving him  
 
material for his lectures they also gave him extra opportunity to write.  His tours  
 
normally led to several articles for The Standard, and not only on military matters.   
 
In 1870 he was preparing for a similar tour of France, Belgium and Germany and had  
 
received official permission to travel abroad.  The start of his visit was delayed by the  
 




  Brackenbury's permission to go still stood, but having heard that  
 




 July Brackenbury left for France with Captain Hamber.
6
  He deliberately  
 
left no forwarding address for fear of being recalled.  Here we see how seriously he  
 
took the need for studying his profession.  The two heavyweight armies of Europe  
 
were about to engage and Brackenbury had no intention of missing it.  It appealed to  
 
him on many levels. As an historian he longed to be there at the making of history and  
 
as a military writer he was intrigued.  In early July he had written an article in The  
 
Standard on „The Armies of France, Prussia and Spain‟.
7
  Now he had the chance to  
 
see two of these armies at close quarters and in campaign conditions.  As a man who  
 
had already shown that he had an interest in and flair for  administrative work he was  
 
no doubt intrigued to see how the armies would cope in the field, and as a tactician the  
 
situation was full of interest.  For here the mighty Prussian General Staff would go up  
 
against the highly rated French Generals such as Bazaine, MacMahon and Canrobert  
 
all of whom had seen distinguished service in the Crimea.   
 
 
So all in all it was too good an opportunity to pass up, despite being fully aware of the  
 
possible repercussions his actions could have on his career if the military authorities  
 
or the government felt he had acted inappropriately.  Although technically he had  
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permission, his hurried departure and lack of forwarding address could have left him  
 
open to disciplinary action when he returned.  When he did return to England a  
 
fortnight later he found that the Government had published a ban on all officers of the  
 
armed forces from serving with either army or acting as newspaper correspondents.      
 
 





 July Brackenbury decided to risk visiting the frontlines, despite having  
 
been warned by many in Paris that foreigners, and in particular journalists would be  
 
most unwelcome.  He set off with Captain Nolan, a fellow officer in the Royal  
 
Artillery, who was acting as correspondent for The Daily News.
8
 Before going they  
 
had obtained special passports from the British Ambassador in Paris, Lord Lyons, a  
 
precaution that was to prove valuable later. Even on the train they were looked on  
 
with suspicion by soldiers and civilians alike.  Brackenbury makes an interesting  
 
observation regarding the mood of the French.  “Neither amongst the soldiers nor the  
 
civilians who were our companions on that night‟s train journey was there any sign of  
 
enthusiasm.  They looked on the war as something that had to be faced, but their  
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hearts were not in it”.
9
   
 
 
Brackenbury and Capt Nolan arrived at Strasbourg in the early hours of the 19
th
. They  
 
obtained good rooms at a local inn, and walked around the town. Later they walked  
 
down to the bridge which crosses the Rhine.  The first absurd sights of war were seen.   
 
“On the opposite side of the bank the German (Baden) sentries paced up and down  
 
within 250 yards or so of the French sentries on our bank”.
10
  No one fired a shot.  It  
 
was one of those strange instances of war where the opposing factions were in view of  
 





 Brackenbury and Nolan visited Polygone where a division was encamped.   
 
With little obstruction they were able to walk freely around the camp, visit artillery  
 




  The freedom with which two civilians were able to walk around an  
 
army division at war seems surprising to our more security-conscious times, but in  
 
many ways it was still a legacy of the way in which civilians had readily visited  
 
armies at war for years. However in only a few days time Brackenbury and Nolan  
 







 Brackenbury and his companion followed the division as it broke camp  
 
and left in the manner of a full military parade with the band playing at full volume.   
 




  The two men took the train and arrived before the French troops, and  
 
booked in at the local inn.  After breakfast Brackenbury was asked to leave his room,  
 
as it was required by the French General's staff.  During that day the two Englishmen  
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found themselves being watched by the police agent for the division.  At first he asked  
 
Brackenbury and Nolan to share a glass of wine with him but it soon became  
 
apparent that they were suspected of being spies.  The suspicion was increased by the  
 




Unfortunately, my companion, seeing the Order of Maximilian on his breast, 
commenced to speak Spanish to him; and nothing is so likely to gain one the 
credit or discredit of being a spy as the power of speaking three or four 
languages.
13
     
 
Fortunately the documents which Lord Lyons had provided them with were sufficient  
 
to protect them. As Brackenbury himself later wrote, “Our suspicious friends were  
 




  The French officers still tried to pump both men for information. A guard was  
 
placed outside their rooms overnight, and their papers retained. Yet in the morning  
 
they were told they were free to go, and were even invited to stay on with the division  
 
if they wished, but they decided to try and get to Metz. This incident reminds us of the  
 
very real danger that Brackenbury was placing himself in.  
 
 
When they arrived at Metz the danger they had been in was brought home to them.   
 
Two British officers and two special correspondents had been arrested as spies and  
 
badly treated, although they were later released.  With the whole town in the grip of,  
 
as Brackenbury called it, „Spy Mania‟, he decided that he would move on to the  
 
comparative calm of independent Luxembourg.   
 
 
With his leave almost over Brackenbury started his return journey via Spa and  
 
Brussels, and reached London by August 1
st
.  With this his first contact with the  
 
Franco-Prussian War came to an end and he returned to his teaching duties at  
 
Woolwich.  The impact of his seven long letters to The Standard that he had written  
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whilst in France led to an offer from the editor to write a „Diary of the War‟.  This  
 
was to be a daily article, written every evening, so as to take full advantage of the  
 
latest telegraphs from the front.  As Brackenbury later wrote:  
 
The idea was that I should write every evening a summary of the days war 
news, up to the latest hour, explaining its probable bearing on the future of the 
operations, with such comments as would make the Diary at once intelligible 
to the general reader and useful to the military student.
15




 August Brackenbury made something of a coup when he became the first  
 




  The series of articles came to an end when Brackenbury left to return  
 
to the scene of battle. 
 
 
The National Aid Society 
 
Mention was made earlier of Brackenbury‟s articles on the need to set up a British  
 
organisation to provide help to the sick and wounded of war which appeared in The  
 
Standard in January 1868.  It was this work which brought Brackenbury to the  
 
attention of John Furley and Captain C.J.Burgess, later to play an important part in  
 
the National Aid Society.  After his initial visit to France, he was invited to join a  
 
committee that was set to create a society to help the sick and wounded on both sides  
 
of the conflict.  On 4
th
 August 1870 the National Aid Society was founded and  
 
Brackenbury was elected to the executive committee.  Brackenbury‟s close friend  
 
Colonel Robert Loyd-Lindsay (later Lord Wantage) was elected chairman, and the  
 
Prince of Wales accepted the presidency. The executive committee also included the  
 
Earl of Shaftsbury, Lord Overstone, Baron N de Rothschild, Viscount Bury, Sir Harry  
 
Verney, Captain Douglas Dalton and Mr John Furley. Several leading surgeons acted  
 
as advisors.  The day the society was formed was also the day that the first action of  
 
the war was fought at Wissembourg.  That very evening John Furley and Captain  
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Burgess set out for the continent to see what was needed and what the Society could  
 
do.  Money was being donated at a surprising rate. Colonel Loyd-Lindsay had written  
 
in The Times about the need for the society and had stated that he had placed a  
 
thousand pounds in the bank for its use, and he encouraged others of a like mind and  
 
bank balance, to do the same.  As Lady Wantage, his wife, later wrote,   
 
After Loyd-Lindsay‟s letter the Red Cross Committee made no further appeals 
for funds: these were given spontaneously, and an overwhelming stream, both 




Within three weeks of the society‟s formation it had forty surgeons working on the  
 
continent and by the end of September sixty-two surgeons and sixteen nurses were  
 
working for the society near or at the front.  All this had been achieved with an ad hoc  
 
system, with no previous experience of such an undertaking, for nothing like this had  
 
ever been tried in this country, and all under the wartime problems of communication  
 
and movement.  One of the biggest problems was trying to guess where the next  
 
engagement would be and trying to prepare for it. This, added to the growing scope of  
 
the war, was the reason that it was decided to appoint a military agent of the society  
 
who could conduct business at the front on its behalf.  When Brackenbury arrived for  
 
a committee meeting of the National Aid Society on 2
nd
 September 1870, he was  
 
taken to one side my Colonel Loyd-Lindsay and asked if he would go to the front as  
 
the military agent of the society and organise its work.  Brackenbury‟s immediate  
 
reaction was to point out the two main drawbacks to his appointment.  First there was  
 
his work for The Standard and secondly, his professorship at Woolwich.   
 
Brackenbury was willing to give up his journalism, but was not willing to give up his  
 
professorship.  He felt that it was unlikely that, having just come back from the  
 
summer vacation, he would be allowed the extended leave that such an appointment  
 
would require.  However, as we have already seen, The National Aid Society had  
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friends in high places. Loyd-Lindsay tried appealing to the Governor of the Academy  
 
at Woolwich, General Sir Lintorn Simmons, but to no avail.  He then appealed  
 
directly to Cardwell, the Secretary of State for War, and it was he who ordered that a  
 
month‟s leave be given to Brackenbury so that he could take up the appointment. The  
 
influence of the prominent members of the committee is perhaps only half the reason  
 
behind the Secretary of State‟s decision. If the National Aid Society work was to be  
 
successful it had become obvious that someone was needed to handle the  
 
administration and organisation of the efforts on the continent and The National Aid  
 
Society wanted Brackenbury. If he were able to achieve the improvement that was  
 
wanted it would do no harm to British prestige and might do much to gain the respect  
 
and thanks of the combatant powers.   
 




His initial month‟s leave was paid but by the time the month was up Brackenbury‟s  
 
work was in full flow.  Colonel Loyd-Lindsay appealed to the Cardwell for an  
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extension to Brackenbury‟s leave, stressing that to remove him now would be to the  
 
detriment of the Society and to the wounded of the conflict.  Again he was successful,  
 
and Brackenbury‟s leave was extended to the end of the year.  The only condition was  
 
that he was to receive no pay during this period.  This brings up an interesting point  
 
about Brackenbury‟s service. Although he lost no seniority, which of course was  
 
made up by length of service, he lost all his pay both as Professor of History at  
 
Woolwich and as a Captain in the Royal Artillery.  To many this may not have been  
 
much of a sacrifice as with few, if any, officers were able to meet all their expenses  
 
their pay. Yet Brackenbury had also given up his only other source of income, his  
 
journalism, and to this end he really was making a sacrifice. Perhaps he saw an  
 
opportunity in this service that was far beyond monetary value.  He would of course  
 
be right at the front of a conflict between the two most powerful armies in the world,  
 
which would appeal to him as a soldier, a tactician and a historian.  He would also be  
 
presented with an opportunity of unique experiences.  He would be one of only a  
 
handful of British officers who saw the conflict as it happened which gave him a view  
 




  Unlike official observers, who were stationed largely at headquarters,  
 
both men got to see the conflict on the front lines.  That is why he was able to write to  
 
Loyd-Lindsay on the 9
th
 September, that, “It must have been an awful fight here. 129  
 
Bavarian Officers and 2000 men killed in and about Balan.  Street-fighting in its  
 
worst form, and what is worse than street-fighting?”.  His vivid account continued:                                                                                                                 
 
There they lay side by side together, French and Germans, enemies no longer, 
all quiet in there common suffering.  Floors covered with the poor fellows, 
with every sort of wound.  Some dying with balls through the chest, some with 
crushed arms or legs from shells.  One Frenchman had lain for three days in a 
ditch, and was brought in to have his thigh amputated.  He asked for a cigar 
the moment the amputation was over.  Another Bavarian with his thigh 
smashed to pieces by a shell; and, alas! In such a condition that I could not go 
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near him, though his wounds are dressed with pure carbolic acid.  The wounds 
are now in their stage of suppuration, and a cigar was necessary for men who, 
like myself, are not accustomed to such places.
19
   
 
It was perhaps a benefit that the inexperienced subaltern got his first view of such  
 
horrendous sights when there were no troops relying on him.  It obviously helped to  
 
prepare him for the sights he would see in his later active service career.
20
    
 
 
Brackenbury set out for the continent on the 3
rd
 September 1870, accompanied by the  
 
Honourable Reginald Capel, another agent for the National Aid Society, and a  
 
courier.  Their first stop was Brussels where Brackenbury obtained papers from the  
 
Belgian Foreign Minister allowing him travel to the frontier, and asking the local  
 
authorities to give him every assistance possible.  His first task was to find a suitable  
 
place for a depot from which the Society‟s resources could be allocated to hospitals  
 
near the front lines.  The committee back home had been debating two locations,  
 
namely Luxembourg and Arlon.  A quick visit to Luxembourg showed him that the  
 
scarcity of transport in the area made it quite impractical for that purpose.  The  
 
situation was not much better at Arlon but he received every help possible from the  
 
authorities there who gave him the ground floor of the Palais de Justice to use as a  
 
warehouse.   His early days were full of problems, mainly to do with lack of stores,  
 
but by 9th September he was able to telegraph Loyd-Lindsay, to the effect that the  
 
Society was now fully at work at Arlon, supplying all the hospitals around Sedan.  
 
 
In his writings from that period, Brackenbury makes some interesting points about the  
 
usefulness of the work the Society did, above the worthy aim of reducing the  
 
suffering of the sick and wounded.  Whilst recognising the good work of Furley and  
 
others, he now felt that the Society‟s work had to be raised to another level. Almost as  
 
soon as he arrived Brackenbury wrote that:  
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It only wants that the individual efforts going on should be completely 
organised (for which my powers are sufficient) to let it be seen what gigantic 
efforts England is making to relieve the misery which by all accounts is almost 
unspeakable.
21
   
 
Brackenbury was obviously keen that the world should see what the Society was  
 
doing, not necessarily for any personal glory for himself or the members of the  
 
Society but so that Britain could show her humanitarian side to the world.
22




October he wrote to Loyd-Lindsay:  
 
I cannot tell you with what pleasure I look on our work here; the first to enter 
Metz, the first to give succour, the first also in liberality, our Society has taken 
the place which England‟s generosity entitles us to assume. No one can know 
the misery we relieve; no one can ever estimate the blessings that are showed 
upon us for our work.
23
   
 
Whilst this might sound rather grand and patriotic, perhaps even slightly jingoistic, it  
 
must be remembered that Brackenbury was the first to give credit to the surgeons and  
 
agents who were at the sharp end of the Society‟s work.  More than that, it is obvious  
 
that Brackenbury is excited about what he is doing. In many ways it was an ideal  
 
situation for his type of soldier. He was engaged in demanding administrative and  
 
organisational work whilst at the same time getting a real sense of wartime and active  
 
service conditions. To an extent he lived on the frontlines with the soldiers, and whilst  
 
he never deliberately courted danger, he was on several occasions shot at because of  
 
this proximity.   
 
 
The really interesting part in what he writes is about „England‟s generosity‟.   
 
Brackenbury continually makes the argument that Britain‟s position and reputation in  
 
Europe, especially amongst France and Germany, is being enhanced by the work of  
 
the Society.  A week after the battle of Sedan, Brackenbury wrote to Loyd-Lindsay  
 
singling out the work of Dr Frank and Mr Blewitt at the hospital at Balan.  Part of this  
 
letter illustrates some of  his motives. “If England can ever gain kind thoughts from  
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France and Prussia, it is by the work of such men as these”.
24
  Perhaps here is  
 
evidence of his desire to show Britain‟s impartial humanitarianism.  Brackenbury  
 
tried desperately to avoid the Society becoming anything other than impartial.  He  
 
found this a problem when asked by the French Societe de Secours to distribute stores  
 
on their behalf.  Whilst the French Aid agencies were in complete chaos, the German  
 
medical and charitable arrangements were well organised.  John F Hutchinson, in his  
 
book about the Red Cross, points out that this had a great deal to do with the fact that  
 
the German organisation had been tested in war quite recently, in Denmark and  
 
Austria, and that this had led to many significant changes to the organisation.
25
  A  
 
year before the war Prince Pless had been appointed as Royal Commissioner and  
 
Inspector General of charitable assistance to the military in time of war. During the  
 
conflict he took strict control of the work of the German aid societies, who enjoyed no  
 
autonomy at all. At one stage the Prussians wanted to take control of the distribution  
 
of the Society‟s store, as they had done with the stores of the Berlin Society.   
 
Brackenbury resisted strongly, and successfully.  He pointed out that there had been  
 
cases of stores being given to troops who were neither sick nor wounded, and that if  
 
the stores under Brackenbury were used in this way he would be guilty of a breech of  
 
neutrality and open to the criticism of the British Government.  This was no  
 
exaggeration, as the case of Herbert Kitchener demonstrated. Kitchener served in a  
 
French Ambulance unit during the war, and later received a severe reprimand from  
 
the Commander-in-Chief, who told him that as a serving British Army officer he  
 
could have jeopardised British neutrality by his actions. After much debate  
 
Brackenbury won the argument. “I at last prevailed, and obtained that independence  
 
of action which I insisted on as an indispensable condition of further assistance”.
26
     
 
 
This is new evidence that the work of the Society was being recognised by both the  
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French and German authorities.  It was also recognised by the French Journalist M  
 
Thieblin, who wrote to Brackenbury, “I have seldom seen so honest Englishmen.  
 
There is nothing but work, hard work, and not a single boast, not even a shade of  
 
vanity so natural in men performing so splendid a work”.
27
  Brackenbury was also  
 
invited to dine with the Crown Prince of Prussia (later Kaiser Friedrich III). During  
 
the dinner on December 2
nd
, Brackenbury sat on the Crown Prince‟s left, facing  
 
General Von Blumenthal, his chief-of-staff.  Brackenbury‟s account of the dinner  
 
gives an interesting portrayal of the two men.  Blumenthal continually read out the  
 
despatches from the front as they were delivered to impress the guests as to the  
 
success the Prussians were having, but Brackenbury was not fooled.  He concluded  
 




  It is quite clear from Brackenbury‟s writings that he saw this  
 
as an obvious attempt to impress their British visitor.  This is interesting when  
 
compared with Brackenbury‟s record of his conversation with the Crown Prince.   
 
Prince Friedrich told Brackenbury of his admiration for what the Society was doing  
 
and of his hatred of war and assured him that the German states had not set out with  
 
the intention to annex parts of France, though he now conceded that such an outcome  
 
was inevitable because of national feeling.  Brackenbury later wrote that:  
 
I left profoundly impressed with the character of this Soldier-Prince, who, 
fresh from the battles on the frontier and with some of his troops engaged in a 
hard struggle at that very moment, was not ashamed to avow, in the presence 




Within only a month of Brackenbury‟s arrival the system of distribution was running  
 
smoothly.  He had visited every hospital in the Sedan area to ascertain their needs and  
 
had now been able to meet them.  The Society had taken control of a 100-bed hospital  
 
at Saarbruck, a 60-bed hospital at Briery, where they had also set up an advanced  
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depot to supply all the hospitals in the area around Sedan.  Arlon was still the main  
 
depot, supplying the whole area.  Depots were also being opened in Saarbruk and  
 
Remily. The whole system was maintained by hired wagons, which transported the  
 
stores between depots and to the hospitals themselves.  
 
 
When all this had been organised Brackenbury set off for London for a few days to  
 
make a report to the Society and to consult the committee on its future operations.   
 
The main question that he had in mind was how to move in to Metz as quickly as  
 
possible when the fortress fell.  On 4
th
 October he returned to the continent, and spent  
 
the next three weeks in Brussels.  He found information on the conduct of the war far  
 
easier to come by there, but he was still close enough to the depots at Arlon and  
 
Saarbruck if he was needed.  Brackenbury records that he had more than one audience  
 
with the King of the Belgians, who did much to help the Society‟s efforts.
30
  His  
 
relationship with the French community in Brussels, including both refugees and the  
 
French Minister Monsieur Tachard, also helped keep him informed about the situation  
 
at Metz.  He tried through them to establish when the fortress was most likely to fall  
 
and what the most pressing needs of the inhabitants would be.  As a result of this he  
 
was able to have such stores as were thought necessary distributed amongst the depots  
 
at Arlon Saarbruck, Briey and Remilly.  Whilst much of this sounds quite basic, it is  
 
important to point out that because of this planning and forethought the Society was  
 
the first to supply materials to the sick and wounded of Metz, even before the French  
 
or the Germans. 
 
 




 October the French fortress of Metz fell. Brackenbury heard of its demise by  
 
late afternoon.  He immediately telegraphed this information to the depots, but  
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 he went to the bank and withdrew as much gold as he was able to take  
 
out.  He was accompanied by the wife of Marshal Canrobert, who was journeying to  
 
be with her husband before he was to leave for captivity in Germany.  On the way  
 
Brackenbury saw many French prisoners, later recounting, “It was a pitiful sight.   
 
There were 22,000 men still in the corps, and it had lost 10,800 in the two days about  
 
Renzonville and Gravelotte.  Half starved, worn and weary, they came out to lie down  
 
in the same mud where for so many weary nights the Prussian outposts had lain”.
31
   
 
Late on the 29
th
 they arrived in Metz, where rooms for the night were scarce.  
 
Brackenbury and Madame Canrobert were fortunate to be shown kindness by Captain  
 
von Foerster, General von Kummer‟s aide-de-camp, who was able to get them  
 
permission to spend the night in the mansion house that had been the French  
 
divisional headquarters before the surrender.  It now stood completely empty, and as  
 







Meanwhile stores from the Society poured in to Metz from the depots at Arlon,  
 
Remilly and Saarbruck.  Mr Bushman, another member of the National Aid Society,  
 
had arrived with the stores from Saarbruck and was met by Prince Pless who offered  
 
him a building for a depot. The next day Brackenbury accompanied Mr Bushman to  
 
meet with Prince Pless.  This was the first of several meeting between the two men,  
 
many of which dealt with the future distribution of materials around the Paris area.   
 
As a result it was decided that the Society would establish a depot at Chateau Thierry,  
 
later moved to Meaux, so as to meet the future demand around Paris. It was not just in  
 
Metz itself that the Society helped the relief of the troops engaged in that zone of the  
 
conflict.  At Forbach, on the railway line between Metz and Saarbruck, a „restaurant‟  
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was established that helped not only the German sick and wounded but, as it was on  
 
the line back to Germany, many French Prisoners on their way to captivity.  Along  
 
with supplying food, coffee and wine, it also gave out warm clothing.  Brackenbury  
 
estimated that this „restaurant‟ helped 19,500 men.  The care of prisoners was  
 
something that was very much in Brackenbury‟s mind. He wrote several times about  
 
the „pitiful‟ sights of these men.  He even visited Mainz to see the treatment of the  
 
prisoners in the large camp that had been set up there. “I was convinced that the  
 
Germans were doing all they could for them, but their conditions left much to be  
 
desired, as there was a great want of warm clothing”.
33
  Brackenbury even persuaded  
 
the Society to place £1000 at the disposal of Madame Canrobert to be used to help the  
 
French prisoners.   
 
 
He decided to make Metz his headquaters for the foreseeable future and rented a  
 
house to use as an office.  This was a considerable risk to his own person as typhus  
 
and smallpox were rife in the town, but again illustrates his devotion to the work. He  
 
stayed in Metz because it was the best place for him to do the work.  In fact he  
 
continually took risks while in the service of the Society. Whilst in France he always  
 
wore his military uniform as a Captain in the Royal Artillery, and although he always  
 
wore the armlet of the National Aid Society, which carried the Red Cross and was  
 
signed by the French and German authorities, this was no guarantee that he would not  
 
come under fire.  Whilst with the Germans around Thionville Brackenbury had his hat  
 
shot off his head by a French marksman.  Obviously the marksman had no way of  
 
seeing the armlet, but even if he had been able to there was no guarantee that it would  
 
have made any difference.  As John F Hutchinson points out, “No attempt had been  
 
made to familiarise French soldiers with the terms of the Geneva Convention or with  
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the meaning of the Red Cross flag and armband”.  The situation was hindered  
 
further by the fact that French medical staff, on the whole, refused to wear such  
 
armlets. “French army surgeons were evidently still wedded to the idea that they were  
 
combatants first and physicians second and believed that wearing the badge of  
 
neutrality would be seen as a confession of weakness or cowardice”.
34
  This made the  
 





Returning from the front 
 
At the end of January 1871 Brackenbury returned to England to resume his teaching  
 
duties at Woolwich. His last report for the Society, written in February 1871, makes  
 
for interesting reading. “Our aid, given most impartially to the French and Germans,  
 
has saved lives and relieved suffering to an extent difficult to realise”. He goes on to  
 
record the thanks that both French and Germans had given to the society and praises  
 
the people who worked for it.  
 
In spite of this strange mixture of classes and professions, so well has the staff 
been selected, that among all those sent out by your committee – amounting to 
considerably more than 100 in my district – there has not been one case of 
dishonesty, and scarcely one failure of any kind.  And I must not omit here to 
speak of the noble self-sacrificing exertions of the medical staff of our various 




He stated that everyone, even down to the drivers of the wagons, had done well. “It is  
 
not to be wondered at that, as Captain Nevill writes, the people who see the work can  
 
only slowly believe that it is done without some deep ulterior motive”.  Throughout  
 
the war there were comments and accusations that the Society had been acting in  
 
breach of its neutrality.  Brackenbury answered these critics in unequivocally fashion.  
 
I have been very much grieved to see persistent statements that we have done 
more for the Germans than the French, and that we have only been relieving 
the Germans from doing for their own and the French wounded what 
otherwise they must have done.  Both these statements are very wrong, and the 
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last argues entire ignorance of the terrible strain under which Germany is 
carrying out this war. Germany is making enormous efforts on behalf of the 
sick and wounded but do all she can, she cannot meet the wants.   
 
He later went on to say that,  
 
In regard to our aid not being given equally to the French, I have often been 
accused abroad of doing more for them than the Germans.  I have honestly 
striven to keep the balance even, but the spectacle of destitution and 
humiliation, mental and bodily suffering which the invaded districts of France 
afford, compel the sympathies of most men rather towards weak France than 




After his submission of this report he received a semi-official letter from Loyd- 
 
Lindsay thanking him for his efforts, both personally and on behalf of the committee,  
 




 Loyd-Lindsay‟s thanks were the first of many  
 




 January 1871 making Brackenbury an officer of the Legion of Honour, although  
 
Brackenbury did not receive the decree officially until 4
th
 March, as protocol  
 
demanded that it be sent to him via the War Office.  In February the King of Bavaria  
 
conferred upon him the Order of St Michael (1
st
 Class), along with a letter praising his  
 
work, and in early March, Brackenbury heard through the British Minister in Berlin  
 
that the Crown Prince wanted to award him the Iron Cross.
38
 There was, however, a  
 
snag.  The award would only be made if Brackenbury was given official leave to  
 
wear it.  There were two main problems with this.  Firstly Queen Victoria was  
 
renowned for her antipathy towards „her‟ officers wearing foreign decorations, and  
 
secondly the government took the view that as he had not been involved in this work  
 
on behalf of Her Majesty‟s Government they could not give permission for him to  
 
wear it. Brackenbury, now to his horror, found that a similar decision applied to his  
 
French and Bavarian awards.  Mr Eastwick, M.P asked parliament to approve that an  
 
exception to be made for those who had served for the Red Cross, and this was  
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original passed.  However, Gladstone objected to it and on calling for another vote  
 
the motion was defeated, with five of the Liberal M.Ps who had originally voted in  
 
favour being persuaded to change their minds.  Gladstone did give an undertaking that  
 
the Foreign Secretary would look into the matter but nothing was ever done.  
 
Fortunately for Brackenbury the awards were still sent to him one by one.  The  
 
Bavarians had sent their award to him long before the matter had been raised in  
 
Parliament. Not long after the debate the German and French awards arrived. Later on  
 







The work he had done, added to his reputation as a writer, had turned him into  
 
something of a minor celebrity. Long after he was still being remembered for it. The  
 
Empress Eugenie, now exiled and living in Chiselhurst, asked to see him, and  
 
Brackenbury duly visited.  Once the Emperor Napoleon III had returned from  
 
imprisonment in Germany, Brackenbury was invited again and spoke at length with  
 
him about his work for the Society.  He also remained life long-friends with  
 
Marshal Canrobert and his wife, who he escorted to Versailles during the commune  
 
when the Marshal had been brought back to deal with the situation in Paris. Although  
 
not of interest to the topic under discussion it has to be added that Brackenbury was  
 







Later on in 1871 Brackenbury started work on a book, in French, on the conduct of  
 
the war from the French perspective.  In it he was highly critical of the actions of  
 
Marshal Bazaine, who had kept signals from the Emperor and Marshal MacMahon to  
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himself and refused to march to their assistance.  Brackenbury clearly felt this had  
 
been done because of Bazaine‟s reluctance to serve under the Emperor‟s command,  
 
but that it might also have been because he foresaw the disaster at Sedan and knew he  
 
would be left with France‟s only army. The book was in print and was about to be  
 
published when Brackenbury heard that Bazaine was to be tried for his actions.   
 
Brackenbury immediately did all he could to stop its publication for fear of  
 
prejudicing the trial. The French publisher refused unless Brackenbury paid him the  
 
whole amount that he expected as a return for the sales. Brackenbury paid this out of  
 
his own pocket and all but a few copies, which were sent to him, were destroyed.  The  
 
remaining copies were, after the trial, distributed to friends. Sir Lintorn Simmons,  
 
Marshal Canrobert, the Staff College library and Crown Prince Frederick of Prussia,  
 
all received copies. Given that he would have written the book partly as a money  
 
making exercise, for Brackenbury to pay to have the book suppressed was quite a  
 
sacrifice given his financial limitations.  
 
 
Brackenbury‟s small part in the Franco-Prussian War has been largely forgotten but it  
 
is of some significance in terms of both his life and his growing reputation. The  
 
National Aid Society was a new and quite radical idea, which laid the foundation of  
 
charitable assistance in war in this country. Indeed in due course the society would  
 
become the British Red Cross. Brackenbury did actually support Sir John Furley‟s  
 
view that the society should maintain its organisation in peacetime and train up its  
 
units so that they were prepared for the next conflict.  It was also suggested that they  
 
should be able to assist at natural disasters in Britain.  However Loyd-Lindsay, as  
 
chairman, would not allow this, feeling that the society had been established to meet  
 
the need of war and that in peacetime it had no role, and as there was no desire to lose  
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him from that position, nothing was done about it. The work that Brackenbury and the  
 
other members of the Society did during the war undoubtedly did much to alleviate  
 
the suffering of many. The way in which Brackenbury was honoured for his work by  
 
the combatant powers illustrates the value they placed on his achievements. The work  
 
the Society did was without thought of financial gain, and at some personal risk to  
 
themselves.  Brackenbury risked not only his life, but also his financial security and  
 
his career in the army. He had lost his two sources of income, although only  
 
temporarily in the case of his army pay, and his leave of absence had not been very  
 
well received at the War Office or the Horse Guards.  Yet the Franco-Prussian War  
 
was an experience that served Brackenbury well.  It allowed his administrative  
 
prowess to come to the fore and gave him some sense of a large-scale conflict which  
 
could be applied in the varied field experiences of future years. 
 
 
Notes                
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along the French lines. By this time the Communists offensive had been stopped and they were now 
acting purely on the defensive. A lot of the fighting revolved around artillery, which was of obvious 
interest to Brackenbury, and he spent much time at the various French artillery batteries. It appears that 
Brackenbury‟s escorting of Marshal Canrobert was at the request of the Commandant of the army of 
Paris General Vinoy.     
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Brackenbury‟s active service and his various appointments up to 1886 are of great  
 
importance for several reasons. It showed that he was far more than just a good  
 
administrator. It also demonstrates the scope and depth of Brackenbury‟s  
 
campaigning career, which added to his various administrative roles, gave him a  
 
unique level of experience in the Army. His active service also brought him under the  
 
influence of Sir Garnet Wolseley, who would play a significant part in Brackenbury‟s  
 
advancement and career. It also showed that he was not only a thinking soldier but  
 
that he had experience in the field and knew how to fight. This chapter will look at the  
 
various experiences Brackenbury had during the period from 1873 to 1886. During  
 
this time he served in a variety of campaigns. Whilst not intending to be a history of  
 
any of the particular campaigns it will, however, be necessary to make brief mentions  
 
of the conduct of the campaigns. Although this period was dominated by service in  
 
the field, other appointments have been included to provide a general picture of the  
 
service life of Henry Brackenbury from his return from the Franco-Prussian War to  
 
his appointment as Head of the Intelligence Department at the War Office. The aim is  
 
to highlight Brackenbury‟s active service experience and to assess what role this  
 
played on his outlook and thinking. 
 
 
The founding of the „Ashanti Ring‟  
 
The Ashanti Campaign of 1873-1874 was one in a long line of punitive expeditions  
 
which were undertaken by the British Army, usually assisted by native and local  
 
forces, during the Victorian era. What made the Ashanti campaign different was the  
 
level of planning and skill that went into organising it. This campaign also saw the  
 
foundation of a group of officers, many of whom were considered the brightest and  
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best that the British Army had to offer, around the personage of Garnet Wolseley.  
 
Thereafter they followed him from campaign to campaign. These men were called the  
 
„Ashanti Ring‟, the „Wolseley Ring‟ and the „Wolseley Gang‟, the latter normally  
 
being reserved for use by those who were jealous and envious of them.
1
   
 
 
The Ashanti were a warrior tribe on Africa‟s Gold Coast. Europeans had garrisoned  
 
the once precious coastline since the 1600s.
2
 The British trading posts had long lost  
 
their importance by the time the British Africa Company went bankrupt in 1821 and  
 
the British government took over its assets. Where the company had been happy to  
 
bribe the Ashanti to stay away from their trading posts and to leave the Fanti tribes  
 
alone, the British government refused to take such action. The first Crown Governor,  
 
Sir Charles Macarthy, refused to pay tribute to the Ashanti and along with the white  
 
settlers and the Fanti went out to meet the subsequent Ashanti invasion. The settlers‟  
 
guns should have proved decisive but unfortunately the Fanti, not for the first or the  
 
last time, deserted during the battle and Sir Charles and his supporters were defeated.  
 
The Ashanti cut off his head and turned his skull into the Royal drinking cup. The  
 
British response was to see it as an act of barbarism, although to the Ashanti it was  
 
perceived as a compliment for the way in which Sir Charles had fought so bravely.  
 
However the British action does seem to have deterred the Ashanti somewhat as it  
 
was not until 1873 that they launched the next serious attack. This time it was repelled  
 
by a detachment of Royal Marines from H.M.S Barracuda. This occurred in January,  
 
and by June the Marines were still there and had suffered no problems. Then the rainy  
 
season began in earnest and by July the garrison had been decimated by dysentery  
 




 The problems that the marines suffered were no more than was  
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expected. The Gold Coast was renowned as a „white mans graveyard‟. The story is  
 
told, perhaps apocryphally, that an officer posted to the Gold Coast asked an officer  
 
who had seen previous service there what kit he should take with him. The answer he  
 
received was, “Take a coffin that‟s all you will need”.
4
 Whilst the British Government  
 
recognised the need for action against the Ashanti, largely to restore British pride,  
 
they were reluctant to commit „white‟ troops‟ because of the obvious health risks.  
 
Garnet Wolseley was given command of the expedition and was charged with  
 
bringing the campaign to a successful conclusion with the use of West African Hausas  
 
and the West Indian Regiment. It was felt that they would be better able to stand up to  
 
the conditions, and it must be said that they were also considered expendable in a way  
 
that even the much-abused British soldier was not.        
 
 
The evidence suggests that there was in fact tacit agreement between the Secretary of  
 
State for War, Charles Cardwell and the Colonial Secretary, Lord Kimberley, that  
 




 It was also suggested that if handled properly the Government would  
 
agree to such an action. This was partly why Wolseley was selected, despite being  
 
officially only a colonel. His conduct when commander of the Red River expedition  
 
in Canada had demonstrated both his organisational skills and his attention to detail.  
 
Just as important was the fact that he had been able to achieve success in Canada  
 
quickly and cheaply, both in terms of casualties and money. The aim of this campaign  
 
was simply to restore British pride and hopefully demonstrate British military  
 
superiority to such an extent that there would be no more Ashanti raids into British  
 
territory. It was made clear to Wolseley by the Government that this had to be done  
 
quickly and cheaply and with a small loss of life, at least for the British. This was why  
 
he was determined to use what he thought of as the brightest and best of the British  
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officer corps to help him achieve this end. He was criticised for what some saw as an  
 
unnecessary use of officers of such calibre, and was accused of, “using the finest steel  
 
in our Army to cut brushwood”.
6
 Yet this was to ignore the fact that such calibre of  
 
men were needed if the campaign were to be handled in the way the Government  
 
wanted. He needed men who were intelligent, good administrators and who  
 
understood fully the constraints under which he was expected to operate. This is not  
 
to say that they were not good „fighting‟ men. Two had already won the Victoria  
 
Cross, and another two would before their careers were out. It was not usual for a  
 
commander of an expedition to be given such a free hand in selecting his officers. It  
 
was to be a constant complaint levelled against him, mostly by the Duke of  
 
Cambridge, that he picked the same officers each time and objected to those who  
 
were „forced‟ on him by the War Office. The fact that he was allowed such a free  
 





Wolseley and his officers left England on the 12
th
 September 1873 and arrived off  
 
Cape Coast Castle on 2
nd
 October. It was this group of officers who became known as  
 
the „Ashanti ring‟, and later the „Wolseley ring‟. In the years ahead they would serve  
 
together on many occasions under his leadership, and over time others would be  
 
added to this group. They were of a different style of officer from that which was  
 
commonly found in the British army during this period, and perhaps nothing  
 
illustrates this better than the voyage to Africa. The normal sea-borne entertainments  
 
were replaced by hard study of the material concerning the area and the Ashanti  
 
themselves that had been provided by the War Office and through private means.  
 
Brackenbury and Captain George Huyshe gave a series of lectures on the Ashanti and  
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 It was in fact a professional campaign at a time when the  
 
professional soldier was looked upon with suspicion. This was still an era where  
 
social background was more important than ability. Officership was in many quarters  
 
essentially a reflection of social status. It was therefore not an occupation demanding  
 
hard study. The man who took his job seriously was obviously not a gentleman. Those  
 
who did take their military careers seriously and studied their profession were  
 
somewhat outcast. Wolseley fell into this category as did the majority of his officers  
 
on this campaign. The difference was that on this campaign they were amongst like- 
 
minded officers. 
             
 
Brackenbury‟s own appointment had been something of a surprise, not least to  
 
himself. On hearing of the proposed expedition he, like countless others who were  
 
keen to see action, wrote immediately to Wolseley offering his services in whatever  
 
capacity the commander thought best. Brackenbury did have a slightly better chance  
 
than many because his writing had made him well known and had brought him into  
 
contact with Wolseley at several meetings. Brackenbury had hoped that he might get  
 
a position concerning transport, given his experiences in the Franco-Prussian War,  
 
although he seems to have been doubtful of even this. He felt that he would be  
 
“looked upon as only a theorist a writer and a teacher”.
8
 He was genuinely surprised  
 
to receive Wolseley‟s offer to be his Military Secretary. The reasons for this can be  
 
found in Brackenbury‟s career to date. He had seen some, rather limited, active  
 
service during the Indian Mutiny and had served at the battle of Banda. He was  
 
therefore not completely untested in battle. Perhaps more importantly he had recently  
 
witnessed at first hand the Franco-Prussian War, and had probably got the best „view‟  
 
of any serving British officer. As we have already seen, many had doubted the  
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usefulness of studying European war as a guide to colonial conflict; other  
 
contemporary authors asserted that the Franco-Prussian War should be fully digested  
 
as the definitive guide to war. This point of view was also an exaggeration, but it does  
 
illustrate the importance that would have been attached to Brackenbury‟s experience  
 
of this campaign. His work during the Franco-Prussian war had also shown his  
 
considerable organisational and administrative ability. His writing would also have  
 
appealed to Wolseley, as a large part of them had been devoted to military reform, a  
 
subject close to Wolseley‟s heart and one on which he and Brackenbury shared the  
 
same general outlook. It is likely, and indeed logical, that as Brackenbury was  
 
currently employed as a Professor of Military History at Woolwich Wolseley would  
 
have had him in mind to give the lectures, as he subsequently did, to his officers  
 
regarding the forthcoming campaign. Whatever the reason his appointment was the  
 





The level to which he was dependent upon his favour is impossible to gauge. If he  
 
owed his subsequent success to Wolseley he was far from being the only one. It  
 
would be nice to think that an officer of Brackenbury‟s undoubted ability would have  
 
been successful without patronage from one source or another, but it is unlikely. What  
 
Wolseley saw as Brackenbury‟s strengths many would have seen as his weaknesses.  
 
As Joseph Lehmann wrote, “Most Commanders would have passed over the bookish  
 
soldier in organising a staff for active service”, but he “proved tireless and thorough,  
 
and soon demonstrated that he was a superb staff officer and an ideal military  
 
secretary, thereby vindicating his chief‟s estimate”.
9
 Lehmann also referred to  
 
Brackenbury as a “scholastic soldier”, a comment which he undoubtedly meant as a  
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compliment but which many of Brackenbury‟s contemporaries may well have used as  
 
an insult. This says a lot about the way in which staff work, particularly in this era,  
 
was viewed. For a campaign as complex as the Gold Coast involving issues of time,  
 
geographical, medical, financial and political considerations, a smooth running staff  
 
system was vital. This required a number of top class administrators and organisers,  
 
indeed „managers‟ rather than pure and simple fighting men, who were forced into  
 
doing staff work. Wolseley understood the importance of staff work in a successful  
 
campaign and the Ashanti campaign illustrates this more than most. Attention to  
 
detail was seen on a scale unknown for a colonial campaign of this nature and this  
 
was the key for the quick and relatively easy success. The Ashanti were a fearsome  
 
warrior nation and whilst the modern equipment of the British should have proved  
 
enough to defeat the Ashanti on its own, the quality of planning and staff work made  
 
victory assured. There were many occasions when failure to pay attention to such  
 
things caused embarrassing setbacks for the British in other campaigns, most notably  
 
the Zulu War, and meant that more troops, and therefore further expenditure, became  
 
necessary.      
 
 
Yet whilst Brackenbury appreciated the importance of such work, and had a flair for  
 
it, he constantly wanted to prove himself as a fighting soldier. Brackenbury‟s  
 
comments, looked at earlier in this chapter, about the way he felt he would be  
 
perceived say a lot about the way he felt he had to prove himself in this capacity. He  
 
constantly pushed himself to forward positions where he could engage in the attack.  
 
During the campaign Brackenbury persuaded Wolseley to send him forward during  
 
the action at Essaman to assist Captain Crease and his Marines. Crease led the attack  
 
on the hill whilst Brackenbury, supported by another of Wolseley‟s staff officers keen  
 
for action, Lieutenant Charteris, led the frontal assault on the village. It is perhaps  
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worth noting here that the Ashanti marksmanship surprised everyone with its  
 
accuracy and rapidity of fire, despite the age of their weapons. So such an attack was  
 
a far from easy one, and leading it illustrated his fighting qualities.  
 
 
Brackenbury played a key role in what seemed a meticulous campaign. Extraordinary  
 
lengths were undertaken to maintain the health of the British troops that arrived in  
 
December 1873. Whilst many of these precautions might seem very logical, such as  
 
lightweight clothing, protection from the sun and medical precautions, they were far  
 
from common on such campaigns. By the time British troops arrived Wolseley had  
 
already had several clashes with the Ashanti, but the poor conduct of the locally  
 
raised soldiers had given him the justification he wanted to call for British troops. By  
 
the time they arrived preparation to ease their suffering had been put into affect,  
 
mostly by the work of Major Robert Home. He had constructed seven „way-stations‟  
 
at ten-mile intervals between Cape Coast and Prasu, which was to operate as the  
 
forward base for the attacking force. The „way-stations‟ had accommodation for 400  
 
men, hospital facilities, water purifiers, ablutions and stores. Some even had fully  
 
equipped bakeries and abattoirs. Further precautions were taken for the march itself.  
 
A native carrier was assigned to every three soldiers to assist in the carrying of  
 
equipment, which included respirators, veils and cholera belts, and a dose of quinine  
 
was given to each man in his tea before the start of the march. Even the uniforms were  
 
made especially for the campaign as Wolseley had felt that both the home and  
 
colonial service uniforms were unsuitable to the peculiar conditions of the region.  As  
 
a result of these precautions the casualties caused by disease and fever were  
 
enormously reduced. During the campaign the enemy killed 18 men and 55 were  
 
killed by disease out of a force of a little over 1,500 Europeans. Compare such results  
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with the earlier despatch of 100 Royal Marines of whom 10 were killed and 58 had to  
 
be invalided home, and Wolseley‟s precautions to preserve the health of his troops are  
 
dramatically justified. More importantly for the British government the whole  
 







Everything the government wanted had been achieved. British honour was restored  
 
without too much trouble. It is no wonder that a good deal of praise was heaped on the  
 
leadership and men who had achieved it. They had gone into an area which was  
 
largely thought to be a „white mans graveyard‟ and despite difficult conditions and  
 
terrain, unreliable allies, and a far from easy opponent who greatly outnumbered  
 
them, had met with complete success. British technological superiority was obviously  
 
a crucial factor but there were many other campaigns where similar superiority  
 
counted for little because preparations had been inadequate. The campaign showed  
 
quite clearly the advantages of having a properly functioning staff that understood its  
 
work and did it efficiently and effectively. Wolseley was later to attribute most of the  
 
political success of the campaign to Brackenbury.
11
 Of course the campaign did take  
 
its toll on members of Wolseley‟s staff, partly because of the sheer volume of work,  
 
but also because they had been in the region longer than any other Europeans. By the  
 
end of the campaign Brackenbury alone amongst the staff had not succumbed to fever  
 
at one point or another. 
 
 
Brackenbury returned home to undertake an immense task. He had suggested to  
 
Wolseley that he write a narrative of the campaign. Wolseley, who was keen that  
 
officers should read about, debate, and learn from campaigns, agreed enthusiastically.  
 
Brackenbury used his literary links to obtain a contract from John Blackwood, with  
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the aim of producing the book quickly while it was still in the public consciousness.  
 
Brackenbury also felt obliged to produce it speedily as Blackwood had agreed to meet  
 
any loss that the book made, and so it was doubly important that it was produced  
 
whilst the events were still fresh in the public memory. There were slight delays over  
 
obtaining official papers, which Wolseley overcame on his behalf, but once that was  
 
done Brackenbury wrote, revised and saw printed two volumes containing 795 pages  
 
all together, in only six weeks!
12
 He worked between twelve and fourteen hours a day,  
 
assisted by two shorthand writers, to whom he would dictate for around two hours a  
 
day. The book was a complete success. The whole edition was sold, and has  
 
subsequently been reprinted many times. It is still considered by many to be the most  
 
complete and informative account of the campaign, although given the short period of  
 
time in which it was produced it obviously does not have the depth of detail and  
 
analysis that some subsequent works written over longer period have. Unsurprisingly,  
 
the effort of writing this book led to a serious deterioration in Brackenbury‟s health.  
 
As he later recalled, “During the preparation of this book I was unable to take any  
 
exercise or recreation, and in consequence suffered, after the first three weeks, from  
 
insomnia, and for the last fortnight took chloral every night. Yet the book never left  
 
my mind even in my sleep. I consulted a doctor, who advised me strongly to take a  
 
rest, saying I was running a serious risk of brain fever”.
13
 Despite the medical advice  
 







Despite his success, by the end of 1874 Brackenbury‟s career had stalled. He had  
 
hoped that his service in Ashanti would see him promoted to more interesting work  
 
but instead he found himself back with the Royal Artillery and posted to Sheerness,  
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which he described as “one of the dullest quarters”.
14
 He was unhappy with his  
 
appointment and his failure to be promoted a brevet Lieutenant Colonel, which he  
 
believed had been promised to him. At this point he was considering leaving the  
 
army, and had received some offers of work in the City. He consulted Wolseley who  
 
asked him to wait before making a decision.
15
 A few days later Wolseley informed  
 
him that he had been asked to go to Natal as Governor and General Officer  
 
Commanding, and wanted Brackenbury to go with him. Wolseley was sent because it  
 
was felt he could handle the delicate political situation, but also the growing unrest  
 
amongst the African tribes. Wolseley‟s role ended up being almost entirely political.  
 
Brackenbury became his private secretary and clerk of the executive council. This  
 
was not really a demanding job, and he filled his time by helping to run the  
 
government newspaper The Times of Natal and by giving a series of public  
 
lectures in Pietermaritzburg on „Incidents of the Ashanti War‟.
16
 He did, along with  
 
Colonel Sir George Colley and Sir Napier Broome, play a major part in the reform,  
 
and in some cases creation, of public services in Natal. However his time there was  
 





In October 1875 Brackenbury returned to England with Wolseley and received the  
 
promotion to brevet Lieutenant Colonel that he had hoped for the year before. He was  
 
given command of a field battery at Woolwich, an appointment that he seemed to find  
 
far more acceptable than Sheerness.
18
 The main task was to train recruits to be sent to  
 
India each autumn. Woolwich seemed to be where he was at his happiest, particularly  
 
when he was in either a training or teaching role. Before his major administrative  
 
appointments the only time he talked of happiness in his work was when he was  
 
teaching military history during this second period at Woolwich. He was very  
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disappointed when in late 1877 he was moved to the command of a garrison battery at  
 
Dover, which next year moved on to Newhaven. Both postings met with the same  
 
level of enthusiasm as Sheerness. Undoubtedly part of the problem was location  
 
which in all three instances he described as „dreary‟, largely because a lack of  
 
„society‟ in which he could ingratiate himself, but he also disliked the appointments  
 
because he had too little to do.
19
 There was nothing in his work to tax him, no  
 
problems of organisation, strategy or supply that he had to solve. His dislike of such  
 
appointments highlights three things. Firstly, there was his liking for the social  
 
trappings of high society, which was often missing in these appointments. Secondly,  
 
his general dislike of regimental duty, but more than that there was his desire to serve  
 
beyond and above the Royal Artillery. Thirdly, it is an illustration of his genuine   
 
enjoyment of hard and demanding administrative work be that in terms of  
 
organisation, strategy or supply. This is also further illustrated by the fact that he  
 
found his previous appointment of commanding a depot more interesting than  
 





In July 1878 he was saved from the tedium of Newhaven. Wolseley had been  
 
appointed Lord High Commissioner of the newly acquired „colony‟ of Cyprus,  
 
granted to Britain as a base from which to counter any Russian attempt to dominate or  
 
break out of the Black Sea. Brackenbury had already written an article on the need for  
 








 On arrival Brackenbury was appointed Assistant Adjutant and  
 
Quarter Master General to this force, but within only a few weeks the crisis had  
 
abated and the Indian troops were removed.
22
 However, Wolseley and his staff  
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remained and Brackenbury was now without a position. He was also prepared to  
 
leave Cyprus but was asked by Wolseley to become Chief Commandant of Police and  
 
Inspector of Prisons. Wolseley needed Brackenbury‟s organisational skills and his  
 
main task was to enlarge and reorganise the Zaptieths (who were a military police  
 
force of Turkish origin). This force consisted of 200 mounted and 400 foot. Certain  
 
parts of the island were particularly lawless, and Brackenbury and his police were sent  
 
by Wolseley to “bring order”. He was also given the task of reforming and  
 
remodelling the prison system. During this time he was also involved in a  
 
controversial legal case. Brackenbury, despite the fact that his entire legal career  
 
consisted of just two years in a notary‟s office in Quebec, was chief prosecutor in the  
 
case against Mr Cesnola who was accused of breaking into the ancient tombs on the  
 
island, something that was illegal under the Turkish law which the British authorities  
 




The complication came, as Lord Wolseley explained in his journal, because despite  
 
being an Italian, Mr Cesnola was also a United States citizen. The possible diplomatic  
 
repercussions were obviously a major concern for Wolseley, but in the end the U.S  
 
government was unsympathetic towards Mr Cesnola. Brackenbury disliked Cyprus,  
 
again because of its lack of „society‟ and the living conditions, but this time he had no  
 







In April 1879 Brackenbury returned to England, and whilst on leave was approached  
 




 Technically this was a civilian position, but at the time the majority of the  
 
administration of the island was under military rule. In short he would have been  
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senior administrator on Cyprus, and de facto deputy to the High Commissioner.   
 
Whilst interested in the offer he was reluctant to accept as he thought it might restrict  
 
his chances of further active service. This decision was arrived at after consultation  
 
with Wolseley who pointed out that both the High Commissioner and Chief Secretary  
 
could not be absent from the island at the same time, and Wolseley assured him that if  
 
he were to obtain a further active service command then he would want Brackenbury  
 
with him. With the agreement of the Foreign Office the offer was refused.  
 
 
Zulu War and Sekukuni Expedition 
 
Within a short while the wisdom of his decision was proved. After Lord Chelmsford‟s  
 
failure to bring the Zulu War to a successful conclusion, not to mention the disaster of  
 
Isandlwana, the British government decided, on the 21st May 1878, to send Wolseley  
 
to take command. The decision to replace Chelmsford unleashed the wrath of the  
 
Queen and the Commander-in-Chief in the direction of Wolseley and his staff. The  
 
Queen called Wolseley an „egotist and a braggart‟ (to which her Prime Minister,  
 
Disraeli, reminded her „so was Nelson‟).
26
 The Duke took the opportunity to attack  
 
Wolseley‟s selection of the same old staff.
27
 Cambridge actually tried to block the  
 
appointment of Wolseley‟s staff, and it was only after the direct intervention of the  
 
Secretary of State for War that the appointments were eventually confirmed. Wolseley  
 
and his staff departed on 29
th
 May, arriving in Cape Town on 23
rd
 June 1878. He then  
 
sailed for Port Durnford to join General Crealock‟s column, and from there to join  
 
Chelmsford and take over command. Unfortunately bad weather made it impossible to  
 
land and because of this Wolseley was unable to reach Chelmsford before the latter  
 
fought the decisive battle of Ulundi. As a result all that was left for Wolseley to do  
 
was to capture the Zulu King Cetewayo and settle the political division of Zululand.  
 
Brackenbury and Wolseley stayed on after most of the troops had returned to Britain  
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and India. With Colonel Colley returning to his appointment in India, Brackenbury  
 
was appointed Wolseley‟s Chief of Staff. It was during this appointment that the  
 
campaign against Chief Sekukuni was organised and executed. Sekukuni was a chief  
 
who had taken advantage of British preoccupation with the Zulus to defy colonial  
 
rule. He operated from a mountain top camp which had proved too much for several  
 
colonial and Boer attacks. The campaign against him was brilliantly organised and  
 
triumphed where others had failed. The success was, according to Wolseley, largely  
 




 This enabled Wolseley to confidently report to the War Office exactly  
 
how long and how much the campaign would cost, which was much to their delight as  
 
in the wake of the Zulu War the last thing they wanted was a potential disaster or  
 
another expensive operation. Wolseley had boasted to the War Office before the  
 




November. The fact that he was able to achieve this was largely down to the excellent  
 
planning of his Chief of Staff. This led to Brackenbury being described, by Wolseley,  
 
as “without question the most able administrator in the army”.
29
 Brackenbury again  
 
wrote of his experiences, although he waited twenty years, in supplying one of the  
 
few accounts of the campaign.
30
 The operation was overshadowed at the time by the  
 
campaign of Lord Roberts in Afghanistan. The only other point of note during this  
 
campaign was that Brackenbury again took the opportunity to prove his fighting  
 
credentials by joining Lieutenant Colonel Baker Russell and his men in the final  
 





Brackenbury left South Africa to take up an appointment as private secretary to the  
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Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, and again he replaced Colonel Colley. Again  
 
Brackenbury worked tirelessly at his duties, usually only taking a break during  
 
mealtimes when he ordered that he was not to be disturbed with telegrams or work of  
 
any kind. This is an interesting insight into his working practice. Brackenbury  
 
believed in working late at night and into the small hours of the morning. He later  
 
wrote, “My experience has always been that the early morning is the best time for  
 
study and taking in ideas, night the best time for giving out thoughts”.
31
 His friend,  
 
the novelist and civil servant Anthony Trollope, was critical. Trollope preferred to get  
 
up early in the morning and work for several hours before breakfast. He told  
 
Brackenbury that whilst, “I give the freshest hours of the day to my work; you give  
 
the fag end of the day to yours”.
32
 Brackenbury‟s demanding practice of work  
 
undoubtedly contributed to his continuing poor health. We have already seen that  
 
after the Ashanti campaign he worked himself to the point of collapse and had to  
 
spend several weeks recuperating. This seems to have been his usual pattern. After  
 
the Gordon Relief Expedition, and again the pressure of writing a book in the  
 
immediate aftermath, his health failed him, and he spent several weeks staying with  
 
friends at Taplow, Buckinghamshire, in an effort to recover.
33
     
 
 
During his appointment he and Lytton became good friends and Brackenbury enjoyed  
 
his work. Unfortunately his appointment was brief. When the Conservative  
 
Government of Lord Beaconsfield left office Lord Lytton also resigned as the Liberal  
 
opposition had been highly critical of the government‟s policies in India. Although  
 
Brackenbury was not obliged to resign with him he felt honour bound to do so and in  
 





Military Attaché in Paris 
 
There was no work for him and he was placed on half pay until December when he  
 
was offered the appointment of Military Attaché to the British Embassy in Paris. In  
 
the past he had turned down similar appointments, most notably to Vienna.
34
 The fact  
 
that he was on half-pay played an important part in his acceptance of the position, but  
 
he was also motivated by the thought that with his friends and contacts in the French  
 
Army he would be able to achieve a great deal.
35
 A particular advantage was his  
 
friendship with Marshal and Madame Canrobert. The role of Military Attaché is  
 
easiest described as an „open spy‟. He was part of the diplomatic mission to the  
 
country in question, charged with military matters that arose. The attaché represented  
 
the military of his nation in the host country, but he had no negotiating authority. His  
 
job was in short to find out as much as he could and to get as close as he could to the  
 
French military.   
 
 
He began work on 1
st
 January 1881 with great expectations, but soon found that his  
 
contacts and friends were not as much use as he had hoped. His friends were mostly  
 
of the imperialist faction of the army who were much out of favour since the end of  
 
the Franco-Prussian War. Not only did this mean that he was unable to get much  
 
assistance from them but that he was also treated with suspicion by a considerable  
 
section of the French army because of his associations. Yet his contacts were able to  
 
gain him access to the French army‟s manoeuvres in 1881, and this included the  
 
whole of the manoeuvres rather than the final corps against corps action, which was  
 
all that most attaches ever got to see.
36
 He had more success with his political contacts  
 
via the Waddington family.
37
 Brackenbury had been at Woolwich with Richard  
 
Waddington, who had later left the army and entered the family business, which  
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included several cotton mills in Rouen. Through him Brackenbury was introduced to  
 
William Waddington, a prominent French politician who later became Prime Minister  
 
of France. As a result of this friendship Brackenbury was invited to occasions that  
 
would not normally have been open to Military Attaches. He later wrote, “I  
 
particularly remember a dejeuner given by Richard Waddington where I was not only  
 




 Despite not being of high birth or particularly wealthy, Brackenbury  
 
seemed to have an endless supply of contacts and friends in high places that  
 
throughout his career were able to assist him. He was never solely reliant on  
 
Wolseley. Undoubtedly his military career benefited from this assistance immensely  
 
but had he not received it he may well have been one of the many eminent Victorians  
 
who started off in the army and later made their name in another profession. Wolseley  
 
himself had no doubt that Brackenbury could have reached “a very high position” had  
 





It was also during his appointment in France that he first met Sir Henry Campbell- 
 




Brackenbury was able to obtain leave for Campbell-Bannerman to visit some French  
 
military establishments, which he wanted to see in connection with his work as  
 
Financial Secretary to the War Office. Brackenbury also took the opportunity of  
 
learning much from Marshal Canrobert about his campaigns and his ideas on military  
 
planning. His professional interest in most aspects of soldiering also led him to take a  
 
tour of the Franco-Italian border where the political tensions between the two nations  
 
had led to significant military preparations being undertaken along both sides of the  
 
border. Obviously, if there was to be war between the two nations, as did seem quite  
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possible at one stage, the War Office would want to know all it could. It must be  
 
added that he was working under his own initiative here and not on instructions from  
 
London. He also sent information to Wolseley through private channels along with  
 
anything else he felt the latter should know about. Another example of this is the  
 
information that he gained from French Intelligence concerning the situation in Egypt.  
 




 Brackenbury continued to hold the position until May  
 





Ireland and disappointment 
 
In May 1882 Brackenbury returned home from Paris on a few days leave. The first  
 
news he heard when he returned to England on 7
th
 May was of the murder of Lord  
 
Frederick Cavendish, Chief Secretary to the Viceroy of Ireland, in Phoenix Park, 
 
Dublin. It had been carried out by a Fenian assassination squad called the Irish  
 
National Invincibles, which had been born out of the insistence of the Fenian‟s  
 
American backers that more aggressive means were needed to fight the cause of a free  
 
Ireland. The murder had several political ramifications. Not only was Cavendish the  
 
son of the Seventh Duke of Devonshire and brother to the influential politician Lord  
 
Hartington but he was also married to the niece of the then Prime Minister, Gladstone.  
 
It is believed that his murder was due to bad luck, as the real target had been Thomas  
 




 Burke had been selected as the target not only because of his office, but  
 
also because he was a Roman Catholic and viewed by the Fenians as a traitor. It was  
 
unfortunate timing that Cavendish happened to be walking across Phoenix Park with  
 
him at that moment, something that was unplanned and was therefore the main reason  
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for concluding that Burke was the actual target. They had nearly reached the  
 
Viceregal lodge when four men jumped from a cab and attacked them. The murder  
 
came as a great shock to the British government and establishment in general, unused  
 
as they were to political assassinations. Moreover, the murders were particularly  
 
gruesome. Rather than being simply stabbed the men were „slashed‟ and thus suffered  
 
greatly before death. In fairness it does have to be stated that the murders were  
 
condemned by the majority of other Fenian Groups and by Irish Nationalists in  
 
general. Charles Stewart Parnell, the leader of the Irish Nationalists at Westminster,  
 





Brackenbury had sent word of his arrival in London from Paris saying that he would  
 
be busy on Monday but would call at the War Office on Tuesday in case the  
 
Commander-in-Chief or the Adjutant-General wished to see him.
44
 Late on Monday  
 
evening he was informed that the War Office had been trying to contact him all day.  
 
Early on Tuesday morning he met with Hugh Childers, the Secretary of State for War  
 
who informed him that the Government wanted Brackenbury to go to Ireland as the  
 
head of police. It must be remembered that at this time it was common for soldiers to  
 
be employed in such capacities at home and in the empire. Brackenbury was reluctant  
 
to take the job. He was happy in Paris and believed that war would soon come in  
 
Egypt and that Wolseley was bound to take him with him. According to Brackenbury  
 
he tried to refuse but was told by Childers that, “It is war in Ireland, the Government  
 
have selected you, and I do not think you can refuse”.
45
 Brackenbury later wrote that  
 
because of this he felt he had to accept. More likely is the fact that Childers appealed  
 
to his ego. In a letter written by Brackenbury to Wolseley three days after his  
 
appointment there is nothing about his reluctance to take the job. Instead he wrote of  
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 It was obvious that he had been persuaded that this job was a great  
 
honour and promotion. Also, given Brackenbury‟s snobbishness, he would have been  
 
greatly honoured to know that Gladstone, Lord Spencer and Lord Hartington had  
 
recommended him for this position.  
 
 
Why was Brackenbury considered to be the best man for the job? Both Gladstone and  
 




 Lord Hartington was more likely to have been motivated by his family  
 
friendship with Brackenbury. The two men were friends and Brackenbury stayed at  
 








 Dukes of Devonshire. Lord Hartington was an important figure within the  
 
Liberal party, and seen as the leader of the Liberal Unionists, who were later to  
 
break with the Liberal Party and support the Conservatives. This, along with  
 
Wolseley‟s recommendation, probably did much to influence Gladstone‟s decision,  
 
perhaps hoping that the appointment of a close friend of the family would appease the  
 
Cavendish family or at least convince them the government was acting.  
 
 
The political balance had a further role to play as the murder of his brother had turned  
 
Hartington against Home Rule for Ireland, which was Gladstone‟s great crusade. The  
 
Viceroy of Ireland Lord Spencer had wanted to replace the head of the Royal Irish  
 
Constabulary, Colonel George Hillier, and had asked Wolseley whom he  
 
recommended. Wolseley replied Brackenbury, and thus Lord Spencer asked  
 
Gladstone to obtain his services.
48
 There were of course other reasons why his  
 
appointment was appropriate other than political expediency. Brackenbury‟s career to  
 
date had highlighted him as a top class administrator who would be able to organise  
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the Irish police forces in a unit that could fight the Fenian threat. He also had his  
 
experience in Cyprus. The similarities were greater than might at first be thought.  
 
They were both in a sense „occupying‟ police forces. The Cyprus police force he led  
 
was largely made up of Turks and was in effect the same force that had represented  
 
the Porte. Although largely Irish in composition the Royal Irish Constabulary was  
 
seen as the force of the „occupying‟ power in a very similar way to that in Cyprus.  
 
They were also both a military style of police, and thus it was perhaps no surprise that  
 
a soldier should be its commander.  
 
 
Brackenbury arrived in Dublin on the 13
th
 May, but as yet without an official position.  
 
The government had asked him to “take charge of the police” but there was no  
 
further detail on what this meant as at that time both the Royal Irish Constabulary  
 
(R.I.C) and the Dublin Metropolitan Police (D.M.P) were without a commander. It  
 
was not until the 17
th
 May that Lord Spencer confirmed that Brackenbury was to be  
 
Chief Special Commissioner, although this was later changed to Assistant Under  
 
Secretary for Police and Crime with the main task of organising a force to counter the  
 
Fenian threat. Confusion seems to have reigned at this time. Lord Spencer had asked  
 
for, and obtained the resignation of the commanders of the R.I.C and the D.M.P. It  
 
had been presumed that as the R.I.C was a quasi-military organisation that this would  
 
be the best place for Brackenbury. With the resignation of Colonel George Hillier  
 
from this position it had been explained to his deputy, Colonel Robert Bruce, that he  
 
would not be promoted. However ten days later there was a change yet again. Spencer  
 
decided that Brackenbury should have an overseeing view of both institutions. Thus  
 
Bruce, who ten days previously had been informed by Lord Spencer that he was not  
 
considered up to the job, was promoted commander of the R.I.C. This helps to  
 
illustrate the chaos and confusion, mostly caused by political indecision, which  
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greeted Brackenbury in Ireland.
49
  
    
 
Even before he arrived Brackenbury had set about obtaining all the information  
 
available on the Fenian organisations. He had already talked at length with Robert  
 
Anderson at the Home Office, along with Inspector Williamson and members of the  
 
detection force who were responsible for such matters.
50
 He also visited the Chief of  
 
Detection police in Paris, and found that at the present time this was the most active  
 
centre for the Fenian organisations. Paris was where most of their finance was coming  
 
from, albeit via a number of the other countries, most notably the United States. He  
 
discovered that Chicago, Philadelphia and New York were the main areas of support  
 
and organisation in the United States. Shortly after his appointment he wrote a long,  
 
confidential, memorandum to Lord Spencer, setting out what he had found and giving  
 
a series of recommendations.
51
 Whilst noting that the majority of support was coming  
 
from overseas, he stressed the importance of keeping a close watch on Liverpool,  
 
where its large Irish community and geographical proximity to Ireland made it an  
 
ideal base for Fenian groups. Brackenbury‟s investigations led him to believe that an  
 
order had been given for the Fenian groups to remain quiet for the moment for fear of  
 
further British action, but that in the meantime they were continuing to organise  
 





In terms of combating the Fenian groups Brackenbury did not believe that the forces  
 
then available were sufficient for the task. Whilst praising the Police for what they  
 
had done, he felt that they needed strengthening to act against such powerful secret  
 
organisations. Brackenbury proposed the creation of a new organisation. “To combat  
 
them, there must be a secret organisation formed, whose agents must work their way  
 
into its most important seats of administration and of action. Informers must be  
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brought, and men must be paid to enter these societies, work into the confidence of  
 
their leaders and betray them”.
53
 Such an organisation had to be separate from the  
 




 May Lord Spencer had received Treasury permission to create such a group  
 
which would be above the normal duties of the police and would coordinate all the  
 
various groups with responsibility for security. It was in short an intelligence branch  
 
for Ireland. It is not surprising that the creation of such a group led to Brackenbury  
 





Despite the government, and in particular the Treasury, agreeing to the creation of  
 
such a group they were still reluctant to pay for it. Brackenbury did not help matters  
 
by putting his „conditions‟ in terms that sounded like demands. He insisted upon total  
 
autonomy for the new organisation and that it be left entirely in his hands to employ  
 
agents as he saw fit. The Government were not happy with this but might have been  
 
persuaded to go along with it, but they flatly refused the £20,000 a year that  
 
Brackenbury wanted for the organisation. Nor would they accept his request that all  
 
informers be pardoned for their criminal offences, which Brackenbury later withdrew  
 
on the understanding that their assistance would be taken into account at any trial. The  
 
Government in turn offered £5,000, with further money dependent on results, but  
 
Brackenbury refused to start the work unless the Government pledged to support him  
 




…hook a big fish, and if the money required to land him is dependent upon 
my explaining the measure of success I have obtained, and setting to work the 
slow machinery of the Treasury, I should only have wasted my time and the 
Government‟s money. The matter is of such a serious nature that I can only 





The Viceroy supported Brackenbury and argued his case with Gladstone, stating that  
 
the amount that he was asking for was about the same as the money that the  
 
government had offered in rewards for information leading to the conviction of  
 
Fenian terrorists. Lord Spencer wrote to Gladstone, “I feel the absolute necessity of  
 
dealing a vigorous blow at the societies which exist in Ireland…. His proposals should  
 
I think be adopted”.
56
 This highlights the difference in opinion there was between  
 
London and Dublin on the seriousness of the current situation. There is an obvious  
 
correlation between the respective distances of the individuals. In fact Brackenbury  
 
was critical of the somewhat overdramatic measures that certain members of the  
 
Dublin government took to protect themselves after the Phoenix Park murders.
57
 Yet  
 
the government in London seemed to have already lost interest. Brackenbury wrote of  
 
the importance of what he was proposing saying that, “If we can break up one secret  
 
society, if we can only make the leaders feel that there is no safety, that they are being  
 
betrayed, their terrible confederations will fall to pieces”.
58
                                   
 
 
Brackenbury was frustrated with the position in which he had been placed. He had  
 
been reluctant to take the position but had been persuaded to take it by the same  
 
government who were now blocking his efforts. Brackenbury could not understand  
 
why they had been so insistent on him taking the job if they would not allow him to  
 
do it the way he wanted. Gladstone‟s government would have liked to do nothing  
 
about the Phoenix Park murders but party politics made this impossible. They came  
 
just after the Kilmainham Treaty, which helped to resolve the land issue, which  
 
seemed to suggest that Irelands problems could be resolved by negotiation. However  
 
the political situation within the Liberal Party meant that something had to be seen to  
 




governments handling of the crisis in the Sudan a few years later. Again the  
 
governments response was to send one man, in that case Charles Gordon. Both  
 
appointments were largely due to pressure that was being placed on them by the  
 
press, parliament and the public. Neither man was given specific instructions nor any  
 
help or suggestion as to how to accomplish their task. In fact Brackenbury‟s position  
 
was even worse. When Gordon arrived in the Sudan he was Governor General, when  
 
Brackenbury arrived in Ireland he still had no specific post. Brackenbury was not  
 
happy. He had made his recommendations and had outlined the establishment of a  
 
scheme which he felt would deal with the Fenian threat. The very government which  
 
had insisted upon his appointment were now unwilling to assist him. Money now  
 
seemed to be the main problem with Brackenbury refusing to undertake the work  
 
unless he knew the money had been committed, and the government unwilling to  
 
fund the project unless they had evidence of results. Both views have their merit, but  
 
it does once again raise the question over what the government expected Brackenbury  
 
to achieve. If no new money was being provided for his work, it could be argued that  
 
they expected him simply to reorganise and develop existing forces and resources.  
 
However, this was clearly not what the Viceroy Lord Spencer and Prime Minister  
 
Gladstone had agreed.  
 
 
Brackenbury‟s disenchantment with Ireland grew as news of the expedition to Egypt  
 
became public. Wolseley was to lead and Brackenbury felt sure he would be called  
 
upon. Confusion reigned as each man expected the other to ask him. Wolseley took  
 




 As a result the official list of officers was compiled minus  
 





name added to the list but met with the objection of the Commander-in-Chief, the  
 
Duke of Cambridge, who replied that no names could be added.
60
 What he really  
 
meant was that Brackenbury‟s name could not be added. The Duke of Cambridge was  
 
partly motivated by a dislike of Brackenbury and also because he resented Wolseley‟s  
 
appointment of the same staff time after time. Brackenbury sought Lord Spencer‟s  
 
permission to resign to join the expedition, hoping that if he travelled to Egypt he  
 
would be able to serve in one capacity or another. Lord Spencer was reluctant to let  
 
Brackenbury go for two reasons. Firstly, he had already lost several members of his  
 
staff to this expedition and secondly, he felt that the work Brackenbury was doing was  
 
more important than that of the expedition. As a result Lord Spencer insisted that  
 
Brackenbury must resign if he wanted to go which Brackenbury did.
61
 The  
 
government took grave offence and he was refused permission to even travel to  
 
Egypt. Brackenbury‟s actions were seen as disloyalty. The Home Secretary, William  
 
Harcourt, described Brackenbury‟s behaviour as „infamous‟ and „deceitful‟.
62
 The  
 
government had asked him to perform a task, albeit not one which he joined the army  
 
to perform, and he had let them down. They now used the argument that the situation  
 
in Ireland was far more important and dangerous than Egypt, which was different to  
 
the view they had taken when they were arguing against providing the money  
 
Brackenbury had requested. At that point Gladstone himself had written that  
 
Brackenbury was exaggerating the danger and that the situation was not as bad as it  
 
had been thirty-five years ago when he had been responsible for Ireland.
63
 This  
 
illustrates how Brackenbury was caught up in a political web. Firstly the Government  
 
told him the situation was extremely serious, indeed he was told it was „War in  
 
Ireland‟; then when he asked for money to perform his duties, duties which they had  
 
asked him to undertake against his better judgement, the Prime Minister declared that  
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the situation was not as serious as it had been thirty five years ago and that  
 
Brackenbury was exaggerating. Finally, they went back to their starting position  
 
declaring that the situation was extremely serious. It is not surprising that  
 
Brackenbury lost patience and longed to get away from Ireland, especially when there  
 
was the added incentive of another campaign with Wolseley. 
  
 
There does seem to be genuine surprise at Brackenbury‟s decision, which is hard to  
 
understand, given that it had been difficult to persuade him to take the job in the first  
 
place. He had then been frustrated that the Government had then rejected his  
 
proposals, on grounds of cost when they were already „wasting‟ this amount of money  
 
on rewards that were never collected. Brackenbury was now being expected to sit  
 
back and watch as the other members of Wolseley‟s staff undertook a campaign,  
 
which as Brackenbury himself pointed out was why he was in the army. His views  
 
were expressed in a letter to Lord Spencer. “I am above all things a soldier, and on no  
 
consideration, and for no inducements would I give up the profession that had been  
 
my life‟s work. While thoroughly willing to help the Government in any way in time  
 
of peace, in war I think I should be released for my proper work”.
64
 The problem was  
 
perhaps a much wider one than would first appear. The lack of any properly trained  
 
general staff meant that for every campaign such things were organised on a  
 
very ad hoc basis. Someone like Brackenbury was an ideal staff officer yet because  
 
there was no permanent staff arrangement he had to be found various positions during  
 
times of peace. Only so many of these appointments could be found within the Army  
 
itself. Consequently Brackenbury found himself in such positions as in Ireland or  
 
Paris or Cyprus, whereas in the continental armies he would have certainly been a  
 
member of the general staff where his skills could have been put to better use.  
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Brackenbury had a different view of soldiering from that widely prevalent in Britain  
 
at the time. He was fully aware of the importance of the planning and administration  
 
of any campaign, especially as more often than not during the period of colonial  
 
campaigning they were fighting the elements and conditions as much as the enemy.  
 
Brackenbury knew that this was where his talents lay. In a letter to Wolseley, that is  
 
taken slightly out of context and is often used to criticise him as a non-fighting  
 
soldier, Brackenbury complained that his ambitions were not being fulfilled as,  
 
“Never once have I been asked to serve on a committee or a commission, or in any  
 





This may sound a strange complaint for a soldier to make but it makes a pleasant  
 
change from the norm. It must be remembered that many of the „disasters‟ that the  
 
army suffered were as a result of poor planning and administration: very rarely, if  
 
ever, were they because of the poor fighting quality of the troops. Wolseley, who  
 
understood the importance of administration for a campaign, was always keen to use  
 
Brackenbury‟s services and often praised him as the best administrator and most  
 
intelligent thinker in the army. Yet the British army of this period was not one that  
 
looked kindly upon such officers.                                             
 
 
Brackenbury had tried to withdraw his resignation when it became clear that his  
 
decision was extremely unpopular with the government and also that his chances of  
 
service in Egypt appeared nil. However, Lord Spencer insisted upon him resigning.  
 
As he told Gladstone, “I felt I would have no real confidence in a man ready to throw  
 
up duties of such vast importance as these which he did undertake to carry out after so  
 
short a time, and for purely selfish reasons”.
66
 Whilst a fair comment it does ignore  
 
the fact that Brackenbury had been prepared to miss the Egyptian Campaign for the  
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sake of his work in Ireland. Shortly after taking up his position Brackenbury wrote to  
 
Wolseley, “The Egyptian Crisis coming at this moment makes me feel unhappy but I  
 
have put my hand to this plough now, and I will not look back- I cannot be in two  
 
places at once; and I am sure there is work of real difficulty, if not actual danger, here,  
 
now. Work that will tax all my powers”.
67
 It was only the attitude of the government  
 
and their reluctance to back his ideas that changed his mind. Whilst many officers  
 
would have either accepted this or tried to work the system to their advantage that was  
 
not Brackenbury‟s way. He considered himself to be the expert, which was why he  
 
was employed; if they did not agree with him them get rid of him. As he said to Lord  
 
Spencer, “use me or send me away”.
68
 Through this experience in Ireland we see the  
 
poor way in which Brackenbury dealt with politicians, although it must be added that  
 
this was largely when they were of the Liberal Party.
69
    
 
 
Brackenbury not only missed the Egyptian campaign of 1882, but was also now out of  
 
work. He was placed on half pay and was returned to his regiment, the Royal  
 
Artillery, where he only held the rank of major. So whilst he had been serving as a  
 
Colonel he was now drawing the half-pay of a Major. This period saw a  
 
recommencement of his literary career as this was the only way he had of supporting  
 
himself. The position Brackenbury now faced appeared bleak. “I had lost my  
 




 The position was made worse by the actions of others. The Home Secretary,  
 
who had been particularly strong in his criticism of Brackenbury‟s actions, now urged  
 
the Secretary of State for War, Hugh Childers, that “on no condition shall he be  
 
employed at present in any post of distinction”.
71
 Childers, the man who had done  
 
much to persuade him in the first place, felt the same way. He also found that he had  
 
enemies at the War Office who took this as carte blanche to keep him out of any  
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appointment for as long as they could. Brackenbury later found out that chief amongst  
 
them was Lieutenant-General Sir E.A. Whitmore, the Military Secretary to the  
 
Commander-in-Chief, who was obviously motivated by his chief‟s dislike of  
 







He was eventually returned to regimental duties at Portsmouth and in April 1883 was  
 
appointed to the garrison artillery at Gibraltar. Brackenbury seemed to enjoy his new  
 
appointment. There was plenty to do because, as he told his friend T.H. Escott, “the  
 
command had fallen somewhat out of order”.
73
 He also had plenty of spare time in  
 
which to write, and for the first time in several years he started to play cricket and  
 
tennis regularly. Despite this, and the fact that a posting in Gibraltar was more in  
 
keeping with his means, he was keen to gain more „useful‟ employment. He was  
 
desperate to put his career back on course, having now resolved to stay in the army  
 




 Wolseley, as Adjutant-General, tried to get Brackenbury appointed Assistant  
 
Adjutant-General, but was thwarted in his efforts by the Secretary of State and the  
 
Commander-in-Chief. Brackenbury also pressed his case to be appointed the new  
 
Assistant Director of Military Education which as a former Professor of Military  
 
History at Woolwich he felt he was a strong candidate for.
75
 Despite all his effort, and  
 
those that others undertook on his behalf, it soon became obvious to him that the  
 
coalition against him would keep him out of any important position at home for the  
 
foreseeable future. He started to look overseas, he hoped for a command in India,  
 
which was not forthcoming. He thought he had found his opportunity when it was  
 
announced that his old friend Valentine Baker was to be the commander of the newly  
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constituted Egyptian Army. Brackenbury wrote offering his services and was sounded  
 
out about becoming Chief of Staff with the rank of Major-General. The War Office  
 
gave their approval, doubtless pleased to get rid of him. Unfortunately Valentine  
 
Baker was still under something of a cloud in Britain for the scandal that had led him  
 
to be dismissed from the British Army.
76
 The Queen in particular refused to forgive  
 
and she let it be known that she would strongly object to his appointment. That was  
 
all it took to make sure that Baker did not get the post. As a result Brackenbury  
 
missed what would have been a great appointment for him. He would have excelled at  
 
the opportunity to oversee the organisation of a whole army.  
 
 
The Gordon Relief Expedition 
 
In the early summer of 1884 Brackenbury received a letter from Lord Wolseley  
 
urging him to obtain leave from Gibraltar to go to England as an expedition to the  
 
Sudan was imminent. Wolseley was certain that he would be asked to lead it and  
 
wanted Brackenbury to go with him.
77
 This time there was no problem obtaining  
 
permission to go, as the Governor of Gibraltar was General Sir John Adye, himself a  
 
distinguished soldier and fellow Royal Artillery man who could understand  
 
Brackenbury‟s desire for active service far more than the civilian administration in  
 
Dublin or London had been able to in 1882. Brackenbury arrived in Cairo in  
 
September 1884 and was appointed Deputy Adjutant General. It does appear that his  
 
„sins‟ had not been completely forgiven by the government or the War Office.  
 
According to Wolseley both the government and the Commander-in-Chief raised  
 
objections to his appointment.
78
 The Duke of Cambridge was said to be furious, but  
 
again how much of this was down to Ireland is unclear, as he was also known to  
 




personal dislike of Brackenbury. Wolseley‟s response was that he sought to employ  
 
only the best men for the public good saying that “H.R.H would prefer nonentities  
 
belonging to his own club, men socially agreeable to him and his own set”.
79
 This is  
 
an important point as there was bound to be favouritism from who ever commanded  
 
an expedition. If the Duke of Cambridge had been in command he would have  
 
appointed men, as Wolseley put it, of “his own club”. In Wolseley‟s case they were  
 
men who had proven themselves with him in the past, and it would be wrong to say  
 
that he did not take „new‟ officers with him. However, it did cause some bitterness in  
 
the army, and not just with the Duke of Cambridge, as certain elements, particularly  
 
those who had seen considerable service with the Indian army, perceived such  
 
expeditions as being closed to them. Also by this time many of the Wolseley „ring‟  
 
felt they had outgrown the patronage of Lord Wolseley and there was much discord  
 
amongst the various officers. 
 
 
Brackenbury continued to serve as Deputy Adjutant General to the force until he was  
 
appointed as Chief of Staff of the River Column. The aim of the campaign was to  
 
relieve General Gordon, locked up in Khartoum and by this stage surrounded by the  
 
Mahdi‟s Army. Gordon had been sent by the government to evacuate the Sudan of all  
 
Egyptians and Europeans, as the Mahdi, a Muslim prophet, had rallied the Sudan in a  
 
revolt against Egyptian rule but also in a much wider Holy War to „purify Islam‟. He  
 
had gone largely unnoticed by the wider world until an Egyptian army commanded by  
 
a former British Indian Army officer and armed with modern rifles and artillery had  
 
been massacred. British influence and unofficial control in Egypt had brought with it  
 
the burden of the Sudan.
80
 Gladstone‟s government was prepared to abandon the  
 
Sudan, and Gordon, who had previous experience there, was sent to organise the  
 
evacuation. The problem was that Gordon disobeyed his orders and refused to leave.  
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From the beginning he had been prepared to recognise the status of the Mahdi and  
 
allow him to rule a large part of the Sudan. Gordon was convinced that he could save  
 
the Sudan and given the awe in which he was held in that part of the world it was an  
 
understandable mistake. The problem now facing the British Government was what to  
 
do about him. It is impossible to explain to the modern reader the status that Gordon  
 
held in Victorian society. He was the epitome of the concept of the „Christian Soldier‟  
 
and his heroics in China and the Sudan had made him into a legend. The government  
 
tried to ignore him and hoped he would leave Khartoum of his own accord but when  
 
it became clear that he could no longer do this a military expedition had to be formed.  
 
 
Wolseley‟s plan was to dispatch two columns to relieve Khartoum, one going via the  
 
River Nile and the other across the desert. Wolseley hoped - and with some  
 
justification - that if he could reach Gordon and relieve the siege the Mahdi‟s power  
 
base would start to crumble. The Desert Column would have the more difficult route  
 
and thus the majority of equipment went to them. Initially the River Column was  
 
considered as a back-up plan. General Earle, a man of proven fighting quality,  
 
commanded this column, though Wolseley had a low opinion of his ability to  
 
organise an independent command. Compelled to use Earle because of his seniority,  
 
Wolseley decided to send Brackenbury to support him. The idea was that the qualities  
 
of the two men would complement each other. Earle would be competent to lead the  
 
column in battle, but it was envisaged that the biggest obstacle would be the journey  
 
itself rather than the enemy. Wolseley was renowned for taking the issue of second- 
 
in-command seriously and it was a vote of confidence in Brackenbury‟s fighting  
 
abilities that Wolseley had confidence in him to command such a force if necessary. 
 
 
Wolseley‟s decision to send a column down the Nile has been criticised as  
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unnecessarily complicated. He was motivated by his success in the Red River  
 
expedition in Canada in 1870, even going so far as to have Canadian style whaler  
 
boats built and shipped to Egypt along with employing Canadian boatmen, known as  
 
voyagers, who used such boats. Brackenbury faced many problems. By the time he  
 
arrived with the column much of the equipment and stores had been either stolen or  
 
lost. The Canadian‟s contracts were also due to run out soon due to the delay in  
 
starting the campaign and very few were keen to sign on again. There were virtually  
 
no camels available to carry baggage and to accompany the column along the banks  
 




The column also suffered from a lack of adequate maps for that part of the Nile, to the  
 
extent where Brackenbury commissioned one of his officers to travel the route and  
 
make a sketch of the area.
82
 However neither map correctly marked the cataract of  
 
Sherrari, which led to damage to many of the boats and caused a significant delay in  
 
the progress of the force. Consequently they were delayed by not knowing the type of  
 
conditions ahead, which made a mockery of the timetable for advancement, which  
 
Earle had given to Wolseley.  
 
 
The column continued its slow and steady progress, facing little opposition until they  
 
reached Kirbekan where they were ambushed. During the action General Earle was  
 
killed and command of the column devolved upon Brackenbury. He continued the  
 
advance. It is interesting to note that Wolseley made no attempt to replace  
 
Brackenbury as he did with the Desert Column when their commander was killed. In 
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Map showing part of the area the Relief force had to go through. Note that when 
Brackenbury took command after Battle Kirbekan (marked Kirkeban on the 




the case of the latter he despatched Buller to take over. Part of this may be down to  
 




The problem that Brackenbury faced was that ahead laid the Shukook Pass which he  
 
described as a position that a few men could hold against a thousand.
83
 He later  
 
admitted that he could have seized the pass after the battle of Kirbekan whilst the  
 
enemy was still in disarray but for his lack of mounted troops. Sending sufficient  
 
troops to take and hold it would have left the column without any mounted troops at  
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all, even for patrols. The lack of mounted troops was part of a much wider problem.  
 
Wolseley had been critical of Earle and Brackenbury for their lack of reconnaissance  
 
and their failure to provide him with sufficient intelligence.
84
 However with only one  
 
half squadron of the 19
th
 Hussars there was little more they could have done. In the  
 
end the column moved through the pass with little trouble, taking only two days,  
 
rather than the week that Wolseley had expected. The column continued to make good  
 
progress and Brackenbury was confident they could defeat the enemy that lay ahead.  
 
However events elsewhere changed the picture. Khartoum had fallen and Gordon was  
 
dead. The Desert Column was struggling, through casualties and a transport system  
 
that was near to collapse. Both columns were short of supplies and no-one knew what  
 
the aim of the campaign was anymore. Brackenbury was ordered to proceed and make  
 
contact with the Desert Column. However Buller, who had taken command of it,  
 




February, Brackenbury received an order from Wolseley to retire with the column.  
 
There have been many who have been critical of Brackenbury‟s decision to withdraw,  
 
but it was clearly an order.
85
 Even if it had not been an order it would have been  
 
foolhardy to continue. The column was short of supplies and was not equipped for a  
 
major battle. Without the hope of joining up with the Desert Column there was no  
 
point to their progress.  
 
 
Brackenbury withdrew without incident and acted as commander of the rearguard for  
 
the whole army. Early in August 1885 he returned to England. He was mentioned in  
 
despatches for his part in the campaign and promoted to the rank of Major General.  
 
Whilst still in Sudan Wolseley had said that he would have Brackenbury made a  
 
General. Writing in his campaign journal Wolseley emphasised that Brackenbury was  
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…an Excellent Officer and now on the high road to advancement. Indeed 
unless he be shot in the autumn even the hatred of H.R.H (Duke of 
Cambridge) cannot keep him back any longer. I shall have him made a Major 




Wolseley‟s official despatch mentioned Brackenbury in glowing terms.  
                                                                                                                               
It is very desirable to utilise to the full the opportunity which active service 
affords of gauging the military ability of our officers. Every campaign enables 
a selection to be made among those who‟s proved skill in the field and 
thorough knowledge of their profession mark them out as fitted for higher 
rank. Brigadier-General Brackenbury, R.A, comes, I consider, prominently 
under this category, and, in the interests of the army and the state, I would 
strongly recommend him to your favourable consideration. When Major 
General Earle was killed at Kirbekan, Brigadier-General Brackenbury 
assumed command of the Nile Column, and led its advance towards Abu-
Hamed. In this, and throughout the operations in the Soudan, he proved 
himself to be one of the ablest officers in Her Majesty‟s Army, and he would 





The list of promotions and awards for the campaign included, “For distinguished  
 
service in the Field: Lieutenant Colonel and Colonel Henry Brackenbury C.B, Royal  
 
Artillery to be Major General”.
88
 The original draft of the dispatch had been even  
 
stronger in its recommendation for Brackenbury‟s promotion but Wolseley had toned  
 
the whole document down somewhat in the second draft obviously conscious of  
 
objections from the Commander-in-Chief and accusations of favouritism within the  
 
„ring‟. There is a question as to how much Wolseley‟s drive for Brackenbury‟s  
 
promotion was down to his performance in the field and how much it had to do with  
 
Wolseley‟s feeling that he had „lost‟ other more senior members of the „ring‟. He had  
 
fallen out with Wood before the campaign in the Sudan, and his opinion of him  
 
deteriorated during the campaign.
89
 He had already started to find Buller impossible  
 
to work with. In fact Wolseley had written to his wife on 22
nd
 of December 1884 that  
 




 As it happened the Sudan was the last time either man went on active service,  
 
and Brackenbury never got the opportunity to prove himself in this position. So at the  
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age of forty-eight his field service career was over. It had been an interesting and  
 
varied career covering twelve years. Not only had he shown himself to be the most  
 
able administrator in the Army, who knew the importance of careful planning for a  
 
campaign, he had also proved he could fight. He proved his courage, which it appears  
 
he felt he needed to, in leading a number of charges against the enemy in various  
 
campaigns. Perhaps most importantly he proved that he could handle a large body of  
 
men. The advance of the River Column was as good as it could have been given the  
 
circumstances and the necessity of the retreat was out of his hands. Brackenbury had  
 
done all he could. Although he never said it there was undoubtedly a great deal of  
 
regret that he did not get the chance to command again, as evidenced by the fact that  
 
he continually kept himself ready for appointment during the war scares of the 1880s  
 
and 1890s. Given that at forty-eight, he could be considered quite young to be a  
 
general when he returned from the Sudan, he could have legitimately hoped to see 
 
further service. The problem was that few others recognised in him the talents that  
 
Wolseley saw and so the end of Wolseley‟s active service career spelt the end of  
 
Brackenbury‟s. It was now that Brackenbury got the chance he had wanted: to  
 
undertake staff appointments at the highest level. His greatest achievements were  
 
still to come.   
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interesting to note that this is before Brackenbury had „distinguished himself in the field‟ on this 
campaign.  
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The Intelligence Branch of the War Office was a fairly new organisation, having been  
 
formally established in 1873. Yet by 1885 it had reached its lowest ebb and could  
 
with some justification be said to have virtually ceased to exist. Whilst the office and  
 
administration was still there most of the section heads, including the head of the  
 
branch itself, had moved away. In a bizarre example of military „logic‟, the head of  
 
the branch, Major-General Sir Archibald Allison, was sent on active service in Egypt  
 
in 1882 and remained there for three years. Whilst slightly unusual it would have  
 
been understandable if he had been placed in charge of intelligence for the army in  
 
the field. Yet his appointments were as military governor of Alexandria and  
 
Commander of the Highland Brigade. So whilst the senior officer for intelligence in  
 
the British Army was “living in a tent in Egypt”, he had only limited contact with  
 
intelligence, even though he was still charged with gathering and presenting  
 
intelligence to the senior commanders of the army and the cabinet.
1
 This meant the  
 
deputy of the Intelligence Branch controlled the branch during this period: firstly  
 
Colonel East, then Colonel Cameron. Both men tried their best but were hampered by  
 
the same practice that had taken their head away. During the Gordon Relief  
 




 Added to the head of the branch being away, it is not surprising that  
 
by the end of the war the branch was in serious trouble. To say the branch had  
 
collapsed would be unfair. That would suggest that it had been unable to cope with  
 
the demands of war, which was simply not the case. Under the difficult situation the  
 
intelligence necessary had continued to be produced. What had happened was that the  
 
branch had been considerably weakened at the point at which it would, in a larger  
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conflict, need to be at its strongest. The war in the Sudan further highlighted the  
 
administrative and staff problems that were rife in the branch, and it could be argued,  
 
the army in general. 
 
 
Brackenbury was undoubtedly chosen because of his proven administrative ability but  
 
the appointment owed something to the intervention of Lord Wolseley, by now  
 
Adjutant-General.  Sir Frederick Maurice and Sir George Arthur support this view in  
 




 Yet whilst patronage had undoubtedly played a significant part in  
 
getting him the position, there was little doubt that he was capable and perhaps one of  
 
the best-qualified men in the British Army for the position.  He was also fresh from a  
 
successful spell in charge of the River Column in the Sudan. Although there was to be  
 
criticism of some of his decisions in later years, at that time his star was most  
 
certainly in the ascendant. The degree to which he was suited for the post was best  
 
answered by Thomas G Fergusson, who wrote that:  
 
In addition to his considerable talents as an administrator, staff officer, and 
writer, he was not without experience in military intelligence. Most notably, 
Brackenbury had served as military attaché in Paris in 1881-82 and so played 
a vital role in the collection of strategic intelligence on the armed forces of 
France.
4
   
 
He goes on to stress the importance of Brackenbury‟s service in colonial campaigns,  
 
his first hand witnessing of the Franco-Prussian War, and his „educational‟ career  
 
both in his writing and his previous spell as teacher at the Royal Military Academy,  
 
Woolwich. It was usual practice for the head of the department to have served in it  
 
previously at some point in his career. The fact that Brackenbury had not was perhaps  
 
an advantage. He was not set in the ways of the Intelligence Branch, which gave him  
 
the freedom to undertake the necessary reform. The branch had got into a bad way,  
 
and perhaps needed a new „broom‟ to sweep away the old ideas. However, at the  
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same time it could not be said that Brackenbury was in any way unqualified or  
 
unsuited for the position. This chapter will look at how Brackenbury took a branch  
 
that had virtually ceased to exist and turned it into an important part of the War Office  
 
machine that gained much praise from soldiers and civilians alike.
5
 Although his time  
 
during the South African War, which will be looked at later, was of great importance,  
 
Brackenbury would probably have considered his time at the Intelligence Branch to  
 
be his greatest period of achievement. 
 
 
Background to the Intelligence Branch 
 




 The Topographical Branch had been created as  
 
a response to the lessons of the Crimean War where a lack of maps and knowledge of  
 
the area caused extensive problems for the British Army. The lessons of another war,  
 
although this time one in which the British took no part, led to the decision by  
 




 The Franco-Prussian War had highlighted that the War Office  
 
lacked any detailed knowledge of either the French or Prussian armies and that  
 
because of its small size and limited resources there were not even any satisfactory  
 
military maps of either country. As a result, on the 24
th
 February 1873, the  
 
Intelligence Branch of the War Office was formally created with Major-General Sir  
 
Patrick MacDougall as its first head. The branch grew in both size and importance  
 
under him, largely due to the presence of political will that Prussian victories had  
 
created. In 1878 MacDougall left to take up command in Canada and Major-General  
 
Sir Archibald Allison replaced him. The branch lost direction under Allison, largely  
 
due to the fact that by now the „panics‟, which both the Crimean and Franco- 
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Prussian War had created, had lost their political impetus. Moreover there was the  
 
continued practice of sending officers from the branch on active service, and at the  
 
height of the Sudan expedition four out of the six Major‟s in the branch were on  
 
active service along with Allison himself. This could perhaps have been excused if the  
 
officers were taken on active service to perform intelligence duties, but even this was  
 
not the case. Most simply performed their regimental duties. This would continue to  
 
be a problem until sufficient funding for the department allowed more officers to be  
 
permanently on the establishment.     
 
 
Brackenbury‟s arrival at the Intelligence Branch 
 
One of the biggest problems facing Brackenbury was that many of the officers serving  
 
at the Intelligence Branch were only „attached‟.  This meant that the majority of them  
 
were still expected to carry out their regimental duties along side their intelligence  
 




 As an officer in the Grenadier Guards he was still expected to carry out his  
 
duties in that capacity along side his work at the Intelligence Branch.  This included  
 
every fourth night being on guard duty at the Bank of England.  This continued for  
 
eighteen months, until his Regiment went to Ireland.  As Parritt states when writing  
 
of Gleichen, “One wonders how staff officers in the Ministry of Defence today, would  
 
react to doing regimental guard duties every fourth night!”.
9
    
 
 
Brackenbury immediately identified this as a major problem. He needed a permanent  
 
and established staff if he was to enable it to produce the volume and quality of  
 
material that was needed. The whole operation was at present conducted in a very  
 





organisation, therefore the situation had to change. The point was further illustrated in  
 
the early days of his tenure, when three officers of the Royal Artillery attached to the  
 
branch were recalled to their regiment on the same day.
10
 It would be difficult for him  
 
to continue at the same level with three senior officers absent. Of further concern was  
 
the fact that this was happening in peacetime. The branch knew only too well from  
 
recent experience that if a major campaign was launched all the attached officers  
 
would likely be required by their Regiments. The branch would be denuded of  
 
officers at the very time it needed them most. Brackenbury‟s argument succeeded,  
 
despite Treasury opposition. In October 1887 the branch was increased to a strength  
 
of seven staff captains, six of whom were serving long terms at the branch. This was  
 






 It had originally been in the Adjutant General‟s Department, but in  
 
1874 had been transferred to the Quarter-Master General‟s Department.  The transfer  
 
back brought more prestige to the branch, as the Adjutant-General‟s Department was  
 
seen as the real hub of the War Office due to it being much larger than the Quarter- 
 
Master General‟s Department and the fact that the Adjutant General was seen as the  
 
deputy to the Commander-in-Chief. At the same time Brackenbury was given the  
 
authority to report straight to the Commander-in-Chief and the relevant members of  
 





His other immediate decision was to set up a „Ways and Means Committee‟ which  
 
was unusual in the fact that it only had two members, Brackenbury and the Permanent  
 
Under Secretary at the War Office, Sir Ralph Thompson. Brackenbury‟s aim was to  
 
obtain a complete picture of how the branch operated and what it was required for.  
 
This meant that when the results were known he was able to undertake a full and  
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thorough reform of the branch and not be just “…‟tinkering‟ with the organisation  
 
rather than making any radical improvement”.
13
  This investigation led Brackenbury  
 
to the conclusion that the most likely threat came from an aggressive European power,  
 
possibly leading to invasion. He wanted to make the branch use the intelligence it had  
 
gathered to prepare the Army to meet these perceived threats. He therefore began a  
 
process of considering and planning for the mobilisation of the army in time of war.  
 
 
Although the invasion scares that occurred periodically throughout the late nineteenth  
 
century might seem rather fanciful and were often fuelled by works of fiction such as  
 
„The Battle of Dorking‟, they were taken extremely seriously at the time by both  
 
military and civilians alike. Large-scale fortifications and costal defences were being  
 
built and enhanced. Brackenbury, however, rather than merely responding to public  
 
concern believed strongly that the possibility of invasion existed. A continuing fear  
 
that he expressed throughout much of his career was the possibility of a Franco- 
 
Russian alliance that was hostile towards Britain.
14
 Britain had clashed with Russia  
 
over their intervention in Afghanistan, and the fear of a Russian invasion of India, no  
 
matter how unlikely that event actually was, continued to be a constant anxiety  
 
expressed in the press and wider literature. In 1885 there had been tension between  
 
the two nations during the Bulgarian crisis and the Royal Navy and the army had been  
 
readied for war. There was also continual tension with France around the world  
 
regarding trade, the most recent example of which concerned British operations in  
 
Egypt. This, when added to the existence of some rather bellicose French politicians,  
 
most notably the War Minister General Boulanger, meant that the possibility of  
 
invasion could not be ignored. Whilst believing that such an invasion would be  
 
unsuccessful, he feared it would be used as a gambit to hold British forces in India in  
 
check whilst France attacked the British Isles. There was some logic to this in the fact  
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that in the aforementioned Bulgarian crisis it was largely the Indian Army that had  
 
been moved into position to reply to Russian aggression. If all British and Indian  
 
troops had to be kept in India it would rob Britain of a very large part of its trained  
 
manpower. This view was supported by the intelligence gathered by his department  
 
that found that plans for an invasion of India by Russia did exist.
15
 It was also known  
 
that the proposed commander of such a force would be the highly regarded General  
 
Kuropatkin, a general in his late thirties who had created quite a reputation in  
 
command of the Russian conquest of Central Asia.
16
 Brackenbury‟s fear was that he  
 
would keep British forces tied down to the extent that the already thinly spread British  
 
Army would be unable to gather sufficient strength in Britain to repel any possible  
 
invasion. This was also based on the assumption, supported by Lord Roberts, the  
 
Commander-in-Chief in India, that the large majority of the Indian Army would be  
 
unable to match the Russian forces. It was therefore being argued that rather than  
 
taking troops from India in the event of war with Russia, extra British troops may well  
 
be needed there to deal with any such threat.
17
  
   
 
The obvious reply to this was the strength of the Royal Navy, but it must be  
 
remembered that France and Russia had the next two biggest fleets and that eighty  
 
years of unchallenged British naval supremacy had led to complacency within the  
 
service. Questions were being asked about the real strength of the Royal Navy,  
 
given that many of its ships could be regarded as obsolescent. The debate concerning  
 
the Royal Navy was widened by W.T Stead‟s series of articles „What is the Truth  
 
about the Navy?‟, written in 1884, which commented on the large shipbuilding  
 
programme of the French Navy and suggested that it had nearly reached parity with  
 
the Royal Navy as a result.
18
 It was the strength of this argument and the debate that it  
 
caused that once again raised the question of invasion and the plans for dealing with  
 175 
 
such an event. It was with this in mind that the continuing question of the need for  
 
fixed mobilisation plans resurfaced.  
 
 
Mobilisation plans  
 
The idea that the drawing up of mobilisation plans was the responsibility of the  
 
Intelligence Branch might seem rather anachronistic to the modern reader. It was  
 
perhaps slightly unusual but it must be remembered that at this time the British Army  
 
lacked any form of General Staff. This presented a major problem as there existed no  
 
body of soldiers able to prepare and plan schemes for the future that was devoid of  
 
any other organisational and administrative duties. There were many within the Army  
 
who saw the Intelligence Branch as the organisation best placed to fill this void.  
 
Brackenbury was amongst this number - in fact as a member of the Hartington  
 
Commission he was to press the case for the creation of a General Staff - but the  
 
Hartington Commission will be looked at in more detail later. Whilst the Intelligence  
 
Branch was able to undertake these duties in the absence of a General Staff this was  
 
on top of their already quite considerable workload. It was therefore not just a  
 
problem of who would do the work, but also what amount of time could be devoted to  
 
it. No body existed that could concentrate on this and this alone as a continental  
 
General Staff could.   
 
 
One of the duties that Brackenbury was charged with was the “preparation and  
 




  Brackenbury found it difficult to make such preparations without any  
 
form of mobilisation scheme being in place. He therefore decided to undertake the  
 
planning of mobilisation. The problem was what operations was he planning to  
 
mobilise the army for? There were no fixed duties for the British army. As we have  
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seen, it spent most its time engaged in colonial campaigning. It was becoming likely  
 
that there may well be a need for the Army to fight a European foe either on the  
 
continent or in repelling an invasion of the British Isles or the Empire. Brackenbury  
 
resurrected Wolseley‟s demands for the formal setting out of the duties, which the  
 
army was expected to undertake.
20
 The added pressure was enough and the Stanhope  
 
Memorandum, whist semi-unofficial in nature, clarified the situation.  However this  
 
was not officially arrived at until December 1888. In the mean-time Brackenbury had  
 
been advised to plan mobilisation on the basis of two army corps for service at home,  
 
and two army corps for possible service overseas. The basic instructions that  
 
Brackenbury received from the War Office were that he was to organise a scheme for  
 
the mobilisation of one army corps, with line of communication troops, for service  
 
outside of Britain and Ireland. He was also to produce a scheme along similar lines  
 
for the mobilisation of two army corps for service outside Britain and Ireland.  
 
Finally, he was to produce a scheme for the mobilisation of “all forces of the Crown”,  
 
so as to dispatch two army corps overseas and mobilise the rest for the defence of  
 





In a memorandum to Arthur Herbert, the Quarter Master General, and Lord Wolseley,  
 
the Adjutant General, Brackenbury set out the dismal picture.
22
  He had found that  
 
whilst there was plenty of infantry and cavalry for two, and even four, army corps  
 
there was a severe lack of support for them. In terms of the commissariat, transport,  
 
and medical staff, the Ordnance Store Department, and the Veterinary Corps there  
 
were insufficient men available at home for the mobilisation of even one army corps.   
 
He also found that to mobilise one corps 8,000 horses would have to be purchased. If  
 
that were not bad enough he found that for a second army corps 800 extra men were  
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needed for the artillery alone and even this was after exhausting the depot batteries,  
 
the riding troop, and the army and militia reserve. Moreover, the second corps would  
 
be completely without commissariat, transport or medical support. He did suggest  
 
that by using the militia and volunteers there might be sufficient Veterinary and  
 
Ordnance Department support, but of course these men could not be used outside the  
 
British Isles. In addition 11,000 further horses would have to be bought for a second  
 
army corps.   
 
 
The situation looked bad, but as Brackenbury pointed out it was in fact even worse  
 
than it looked.  
 
Yet this is after withdrawing from every part of the United Kingdom every 
field gun, every field engineer, and Commissariat and Transport man over one 
years service; and after withdrawing from the hospitals every medical officer 




In effect there would be plenty of fighting men of the infantry and cavalry left in the  
 
British Isles, but there would be no support for the movement of such a force. They  
 
would therefore be largely confined to defending and operating close to their  
 
fortresses which, as Brackenbury had seen in the Franco-Prussian War, could prove  
 
disastrous. There is a very pertinent point to make from the fact that there were  
 
sufficient fighting men but insufficient support services. It illustrates the lack of  
 
understanding and appreciation that existed within the army and government of the  
 
importance of such things. In the same way that the administrative skills of  
 
Brackenbury were largely ignored, so was the vital work of support services that  
 
enabled the troops to take the field fully equipped and supplied, and cared for their  
 
needs after the battle. Brackenbury placed the blame for this squarely on civilian  
 
government, who were not cognisant of the fact that battles and wars were not won by  
 
holding defensive positions alone and that there was more to the make-up of an army  
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than infantry, cavalry and artillery. An army‟s “…. very existence depends upon it  
 
containing a due proportion of the three arms, and being complete in those auxiliary  
 
services, without which neither infantry, cavalry, nor artillery, can live, march, or  
 
fight”. As a result of this lack of support troops, Brackenbury wrote, “It is useless to  
 




This was an understandable soldier‟s response but ignored the fact that many soldiers  
 
were equally unappreciative of this work. If nothing else this lent weight to  
 
Brackenbury‟s argument for a General Staff who, being responsible for planning,  
 
would do their best to make such forces available.   
 
 
Brackenbury would have been forgiven for abandoning the exercise there and then, as  
 
others had done in the past, but he believed deeply that the country needed to prepare  
 
itself better for the prospect of war. Brackenbury would have been as well informed  
 
as any man of the dangers that were facing the country and the Empire at that time.   
 
There was considered to be a very real danger of a major continental war and  
 
possible invasion of the British Isles.  Whilst the possibility of invasion is open to  
 
question, the situation was potentially full of peril. If Britain was unable to place even  
 
two army corps in the field there was a serious threat. To put the lack of even two  
 
army corps into a continental context, Brackenbury also published in his report the  
 
number of army corps “exclusive of garrisons and troops of the second line, the  
 
principal continental nations can place in the field complete in every detail,  
 
immediately after the order of mobilisation has been given”.
25
  Whilst this showed the  
 
obvious superiority of France, and Germany, being able to place nineteen, and  
 
eighteen army corps in the field respectively, and that Russia could place seventeen  
 
and a half in the field in Europe, it also highlighted Britain‟s position behind even the  
 
lesser of the great powers. The Austro-Hungarian Empire could place thirteen army  
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corps in the field, the Italians twelve, and most embarrassing of all Belgium could  
 
place two army corps in the field.  The figures are perhaps slightly misleading, as the  
 
other great powers had some form of compulsory service and all had land borders  
 
needing protection. Britain‟s lack of any land frontiers, the absence of conscription  
 
and the supposed superiority of the Royal Navy, always made her vulnerable to  
 
complacency regarding the size of army it required.  Yet this did not change the fact  
 
that the state of affairs should have been of great concern. Brackenbury‟s language  
 
got quite extreme. It could be argued that there was even a veiled threat, though more  
 
probably a warning, towards the government. He wrote about his experiences in the  
 
Franco-Prussian war, and the consequences that were visited upon the French  
 
government for failure to have sufficiently prepared the Army for it.  
 
Then a great nation turned and rent those who had governed it, and whom it 
rightly and justly accused of having deceived it as to the state of its army, and, 
by their neglect to make the army an efficient weapon, betrayed the trust that 
the nation had placed in their hands.   
 
Brackenbury could in no way be called an alarmist, nor did he really have a  
 
significant personal agenda, any more than a member of the armed forces has ever  
 
had. The final paragraph in his report underlined the point.  
 
If now I venture to press this matter in stronger language than is customary in 
official documents, it is because I am convinced that to leave our Army in its 
present state is to court national disaster, and because I have seen with my 





The work of mobilisation planning continued but Brackenbury felt that it was  
 
becoming too much of a strain on his staff.  Despite the deficiencies he produced a  
 
mobilisation plan in three parts in December 1886.
27
 This formed the basis of the  
 
mobilisation scheme, which was to work so successfully, much to the surprise of the  
 
War Office, during the South African War. Problems only occurred, like so much  
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concerning the South African War, after the numbers got beyond that which anyone  
 
within the army had ever anticipated. The main problem was how to make the  
 
despatch of two army corps a reality, and this had to be sorted out with the civilian  
 
side of the War Office. This would take too much of his and his staff‟s time at the  
 
expense of their real purpose of gathering and collating intelligence. In November  
 
1887 a separate mobilisation section was formed at Brackenbury‟s request so as to  
 
free the Intelligence Branch to concentrate on its primary duties. Brackenbury argued  
 




 This position was the de facto deputy to the head of the Intelligence  
 
Branch, and because of his desire to be more hands on he had not filled the vacancy.  
 
He argued that he was not asking for an addition to his staff but filling an already  
 
vacant post, albeit with slightly different responsibilities. On the 15
th
 August 1887  
 
Brackenbury wrote to Colonel John Ardagh asking if he would accept the position,  
 
stating that whilst official approval was still waiting he had the support of both  
 




 Ardagh had previously worked in the Intelligence Branch and his  
 
administrative skills had been demonstrated on active service in Egypt and the Sudan,  
 
where Brackenbury had established a high opinion of him.
30
 Although not one of the  
 
Wolseley „ring‟ he was highly thought of by the great man and in the years that  
 
followed their service in the Sudan together a great deal of private correspondence  
 
passed between Wolseley and Ardagh. On the 13
th
 October 1887 Brackenbury wrote  
 
confirming that official sanction had been given for his appointment and asking him  
 
to do all he could to return with speed from Egypt.  
 
The more I think the matter over, the more I feel that although we have, in our 
mobilisation scheme, laid the foundation of a great national work, we have 






He also confirmed that Ardagh would be his deputy and replace him in his absence.  
 
With this appointment the detail of the scheme began to be put in place. By early  
 
1888 the mobilisation section became independent of the Intelligence Branch, and the  
 





A conversation Brackenbury had with the future Major-General Sir Charles Callwell,  
 
when the latter was a staff captain in the Intelligence Branch, sums up Brackenbury‟s  
 
views on the way in which he perceived the operation of the branch. Callwell records  
 
the conversation as follows: 
 
I shan‟t expect you to be able to answer every question that may arise in 
respect to your particular work, right off the reel; I shan‟t even expect the 
information necessarily to be actually available in the department. But I shall 
expect you not to be helpless, but to find means of getting that information 
somehow within a reasonable time. If you keep your wits about you, if you 
look ahead, if, whenever anything crops up that you do not know all about you 
set yourself to find out all about it, if you keep sucking in information into the 
place and if you see that the information you suck into the place is properly 
registered and so made available when required, your particular section will in 
course of time become a real going concern.
32
   
 
This is a perfect example of Brackenbury‟s professional and business approach to his  
 
military work. Added to that, this statement clearly highlight that he knew his  
 
department‟s limitations, due largely to finance, and was not expecting miracles  
 
from his officers, but to perform in an equally professional and business like-manner.  
 
This concept of constantly „sucking‟ in information was to prove its worth. As a  
 
consequence it amassed a series of archives of military intelligence.
33
 The other key  
 
aspect he brought to the positions was an insistence on getting the right officers for  
 
the branch. This was illustrated some years later when he was advising on the  
 








      
 
 
One of the best sources of information about Brackenbury‟s time and achievements as  
 
Head of the Intelligence Branch, and the way in which he worked, is to be found in  
 
the biographies, memoirs and autobiographies of those who served under him.  
 
Callwell has already been mentioned. Another of these was Captain, later Lieutenant- 
 
General Sir James Grierson, who was given command of II Corps of the British  
 
Expeditionary Force (B.E.F) in 1914.
35
 Grierson and Brackenbury were very much  
 
alike. They were both intellectual soldiers, or as Grierson‟s biographer put it, they  
 
were, “scientific soldiers in the dawn of scientific soldiering”.
36
 They were both able  
 
to combine active service with administrative appointments, for which their  
 
intellectual capabilities suited them. Grierson admired Brackenbury‟s ability and saw  
 
him as proof that officers of their unusual abilities could be successful. It appears that  
 
Grierson was even more committed to his work than Brackenbury, who once  
 




 One of the keys to Brackenbury‟s success in building up the branch was  
 
the fact that he obtained the appointment of several good workers. Their, and his,  
 
sheer industry made it possible for him to achieve much with a relatively small staff.  
 
This seems to have been something that Brackenbury demanded from his staff.  
 
Mention has already been made of Gleichen who combined his work at the  
 
Intelligence Branch with regimental duties. Many of his other officers were men of  
 
equal drive and determination. It is worth considering the subsequent careers of some  
 
of those who served under Brackenbury during this period. Two of them, Sir Henry  
 
Wilson and Sir William Robertson, reached the rank of Field Marshal. Sir James  
 
Wolfe Murray was Chief of the Imperial General Staff for a period during World War  
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One. Five of them, Aston, Callwell, Dalton, Trotter and Gleichen attained the rank of  
 
Major General. It is also worth noting the background of those who served in the  
 
Intelligence Branch. When Callwell entered in 1887 he brought the total number of  
 
Staff College graduates to thirteen.
38
  It will be remembered that Brackenbury himself  
 
never attended the Staff College, so rather than being seen as championing the cause  
 
of the Staff College it was more to do with the practicalities of the situation. The  
 
absence of a General Staff meant that the obvious destination for the brightest and  
 
best of the Staff College graduates was unavailable. In its absence the Intelligence  
 
Branch attracted those graduates and in many ways began to take on the appearance  
 
of a General Staff. It was certainly the case that during Brackenbury‟s time in  
 





Brackenbury seems to have developed a good relationship with those who worked  
 
under him. They were full of respect and praise for him; he also seems to have  
 
developed good personal relationships with those under his command, which goes  
 
against the „unfriendly‟ and „loner‟ image that Wolseley suggested. According to  
 
Callwell he made it a point to get to know his staff outside of office hours. “Of the  
 
many officers who served under „Brack‟ in Queen Anne‟s Gate during the following  
 
four years, there was not one who did not simply swear by him nor part with him full  
 
of respect for his gifts”.
39
 Gleichen in similar vein also noted that, “We were zealous,  
 




 To a large extent it was a meeting of likeminded soldiers,  
 
but it was also the respect they gained through seeing him at work. The amount of  
 
material that the branch began to collect was large, and the collation of it a laborious  
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business. As Callwell recalled, “One could have occupied one‟s office chair for  
 







The majority of the intelligence gathered was by overt means. Reports came in  
 
from various sources and were added to the information kept on various subjects and  
 
countries. Much would come through official publications, newspapers, and  
 
translations of foreign military journals. The latter was another reason why  
 
Brackenbury encouraged the appointment to the Intelligence Branch of officers who  
 
were at the very least bilingual, as they could translate the material themselves, and  
 
for which they were paid extra.
42
 Whilst this was hardly sophisticated it meant that  
 
large folders of information were established that gave a well-balanced account of the  
 
various countries politically, socially and militarily. When added to the small amount  
 
of material that was obtained by covert means, it added to quality intelligence reports.  
 
 
The department was split into six sections.
43
 Sections A to E dealt with the various  
 
areas of the world, but there was also a Topographical Section (F) and a Central  
 
Section, charged with the collation, filing and distribution of the reports from the  
 
other sections. The Central Section was commanded by the deputy of the  
 
Intelligence Branch, but when Brackenbury arrived the post was vacant. It was for  
 
this position originally that he sought the services of Colonel Ardagh, who did  
 
become deputy, but he was so busy with the mobilisation scheme that the Central  
 
Section ceased to exist and the duties were taken over by Brackenbury himself. The  
 
shortage of staff, and more importantly money, meant that the size and areas covered  
 
by the sections were large. Where possible it was organised on a geographical basis so  
 
that section D covered Russia, India, Afghanistan, Burma, Siberia, China, Japan,  
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Siam, Central Asia and Persia. However, in other sections the geographical element  
 
was not so logical with section A covering France, Belgium, Italy, Spain and  
 
Portugal but was also responsible for Central and South America and Mexico.  
 
Section F was responsible for maps and the library. Brackenbury encouraged his  
 
officers to visit, as much as possible, the countries for which they were responsible.  
 




Whilst not much it was better than the previous situation whereby officers had to pay  
 
their own expenses. Visiting the areas under their surveillance was one obvious way  
 
of obtaining information. Whilst some of this was covert, much was gathered by  
 
invitation. Foreign manoeuvres were a good place to gain intelligence. Brackenbury  
 
issued instructions that:  
 
Officers attending manoeuvres in all foreign countries will find it adds much 
to the usefulness and pleasure of their visit if they take the trouble to get 
themselves duly presented to as many of the Officers as possible of the army 
to which they are sent, especially those of high rank. Two hundred visiting 





It was also less risky than other means of gathering intelligence, as there was little  
 
need for subterfuge. For example, Captain Repington visited the French Army  
 
manoeuvres in 1891 by official invitation.
46
 It would be interesting to know whether  
 
the French knew that he was head of the section responsible for gathering intelligence  
 
on them. It may well be that they saw him merely as an interested fellow soldier. This  
 




 He spoke fluent German and had built up friendships with many German  
 
Staff Officers over the years. He used such visits to gather intelligence from them on  
 
the Russians, which they had gathered through being prepared to, as Grierson said,  
 
“put down the necessary roubles”.
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 At the same time his easy access to the General  
 




This relationship worked both ways and was openly encouraged by Brackenbury.  
 
Indeed, the intelligence gathered by Captain Waters mission to Russia in 1891 was  
 
shared with the Germans; in fact his report was read by the chief of the intelligence  
 
staff in Germany before Brackenbury saw it.
49
 It must be remembered that this was at  
 
a time when Anglo-German relations were still good, and as Brackenbury‟s  
 
intelligence reports show, Russia was considered the most likely enemy, and  
 
Germany was seen as a potential ally. Under such circumstances intelligence on  
 
Russia was freely exchanged between the Intelligence Branch and its German  
 
counterpart on a practical if not official level. Grierson was ideally suited for this, as  
 
Brackenbury knew full well, because, as a member of the German General Staff  
 
wrote, “Grierson, that excellent comrade, is almost as well known at Berlin as at  
 
Woolwich, and the whole General Staff of our Army knows him and highly values  
 





Whilst a great deal of intelligence could be gathered like this it failed to provide the  
 
detailed knowledge that was sometimes necessary. There was also a limited amount  
 
that those in the Intelligence Branch could do themselves. They also took a very great  
 
risk, as it was harder for them to deny spying if they were detained and it was  
 
discovered they worked at the War Office. The same was true for military attachés, as  
 
in many countries they were usually followed. The answer was found in a large  
 
number of „volunteer spies‟, who undertook missions. Many were soldiers who on  
 
leave would visit the continent and gather what they could for the branch, though  
 
Brackenbury was reluctant to accept such offers, fearing that it might endanger his  
 
more legitimate intelligence gathering and lead to unfortunate clashes with foreign  
 





 A leading example of this, and a man whose success convinced  
 




Although a soldier he undertook such missions privately, originally without the  
 
knowledge of Brackenbury, and would present his information on his return. He  
 
managed to get himself access to the German Army manoeuvres and was thus able to  
 
get far closer than official guests to a new German machine gun that was being tested.  
 
He also found ingenious ways of smuggling out his information, such as hiding the  
 
details of fortifications in detailed drawings of butterfly wings. On another occasion  
 
he posed as a painter and in watercolours of Algerian costal scenes he hid in a code of  
 
dots and dashes the position of fixed defences, along with his opinion of the calibre of  
 
gun at the naval base at Bizerta.
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However not all were as effective as Baden-Powell, and there were those whose  
 
incompetence caused problems for the Intelligence Branch. Gleichen tells the story of  
 
an officer who when on such a mission was approached by two gendarmes. In a panic  
 
he started to try to eat the pages of his notebook, which contained the intelligence he  
 
had gathered. He was arrested, and it turned out that the two gendarmes had merely  
 
approached him for a light for their cigarettes.
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 In an attempt to try and avert such  
 
embarrassments Brackenbury issued his “Rules to be observed by Officers Travelling  
 
who are endeavouring to obtain Information for the Intelligence Division”.
56
 He made  
 
it clear that such individuals:  
 
Were not to consider themselves as employed by the Intelligence Division, 
and are, on no account whatever, to represent themselves to any person as 
being so employed, or as being engaged on any official work, or as having any 
official mission, unless they have received especial authority to do so from His 





The rest of his rules made it clear to the individuals concerned that they were on their  
 
own if they were caught, and that the penalties for being caught could be severe.  
 
Whilst he had his doubts about the motives and competence of many of these  
 
volunteers, he did appreciate their efforts. Later, when in India, he recommended to  
 
Lord Roberts that a similar course be taken to gather intelligence on Madagascar.  
 
Roberts was concerned about their lack of knowledge about French defences and  
 
forces in Madagascar, and with some justification as the forces there could have  
 
harassed British interests in the Indian Ocean in the event of war. There was a  
 
possibility that in the future an operation might need to be mounted from India against  
 
it but intelligence was lacking. Brackenbury wrote that:  
 
I should suggest following the plan which I found success with. Let your 
Intelligence Department do the thing quietly, by leave of absence being given 
to some officer who speaks French fluently, and is a cool hand. Let him go 
without any official mission, or any written instructions, but with the verbal 
information as to the points to be reported on…It is difficult work and 
dangerous work, but it can be done. No one except Woodthorpe, should know 
about it. Even you and I should have our hands clean, if any official 




Another success was the development of relations with other departments. The  
 
Admiralty had established its own Foreign Intelligence Committee only in 1882, with  
 
the role of collecting and producing intelligence and coordinating the work of the  
 
various naval attaches but it was not until 1887 that this became the Naval  
 
Intelligence Department. Like its army counterpart it was small, under-staffed and  
 
under-funded. Cooperation between the two was logical but did not occur until  
 
Brackenbury‟s arrival. Partly this was due to the chaos that the Intelligence Branch  
 
had been in, but it was also partly due to the parochial views of Brackenbury‟s  
 
predecessors. Brackenbury himself began the system of cooperation and coordination,  
 
and was able to build a close working relationship with his naval counterpart, Captain  
 
William. H. Hall R.N.
59
 The relationship between the two departments was largely  
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The other key relationship that Brackenbury built up was with the Foreign Office.  
 
Before Brackenbury‟s arrival there was little contact between the two. In fact the only  
 
contact appears to have been the passing on of military attaché reports and it was  
 
understood that despite the fact that they were military officers their reports were for  
 
the Foreign Office. One key reason for Brackenbury‟s keenness was the fact that the  
 
Foreign Office had a budget for intelligence that was approximately six times the size  
 
of his. The main element of this was the Secret Intelligence Service (S.I.S),  
 
which spent most of its budget on coping with the threat of Irish terrorists but the  
 
Foreign Office did use some of it for work overseas, most notably in Persia and  
 




 It appears, from the testimony of officers who served in the branch  
 
during this period that from time to time some of the Foreign Office‟s secret service  
 
money was used by the Intelligence Branch to fund overseas missions.
62
 A large  
 
amount of Foreign Office intelligence came from its ambassadors and military  
 
attachés, and like the Intelligence Branch much of this came freely from legitimate  
 
sources without recourse to financial inducement.  Problems occurred when they  
 
tried to gather intelligence themselves, given that they were often followed, as were  
 
other embassy staff. It was therefore much easier for a visiting officer from the  
 
Intelligence Branch, who would only be in the country for a few weeks, to move  
 
freely without arousing suspicion. It was partly for this reason, and also to save any  
 
potential embarrassment, that Brackenbury ordered his staff not to meet publicly with  
 






An interesting insight into how Brackenbury built these relationships is found in a  
 
letter he wrote to Lord Lansdowne in 1892. By this time Brackenbury had left the  
 
department and was working in India. Speaking of the relationship with other  
 
departments he said:  
 
There was, at first, some little jealously and suspicion both in the Foreign, 
Colonial and War offices of this (the quality of the Intelligence Branch 
reports). But when they grew to see how useful we could be, and how much 
trouble we often saved them, it all ceased. I made them understand we wanted 




This shows a skill in diplomacy and man-management that many have ignored  
 
regarding Brackenbury. Throughout his career he endeavoured to illustrate that his  
 
work was important and useful to others. In an atmosphere of inter-departmental  
 
rivalry Brackenbury was able to get them to work together by showing that they could  
 
serve each other‟s interests. Brackenbury knew that there was still hostility within  
 
other departments towards the work of the Intelligence Branch, in particular,  within  
 
the Foreign Office, but he chose to ignore this and continued to work well with them.  
 
Another reason he made the branch important was by pre-empting events.  
 
When I knew that any subject was engaging the attention of government, I 
used to prepare a paper showing the state of the question from one point of 
view, and send it either to all the cabinet ministers, or as to such only as I 
thought would be interested in it, and I have over and over again received their 
personal thanks for the papers sent.  
 
Such an attitude, of providing material before being asked about such matters, was to  
 
a large extent a new departure for the branch.        
 
 
Hartington Commission        
 
Although it had little to do directly with the work of the Intelligence Branch,  
 
Brackenbury‟s membership of the Hartington Commission deserves comment,  
 
especially as it came about partly because he was Head of the Intelligence Branch.  
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The setting up of the committee was an attempt by the government to defuse the  
 
hysteria caused by the invasion scares of the late 1880s. Much of the debate had been  
 
caused by the mobilisation plans of Brackenbury and Ardagh, and in particular the  
 




A Royal Commission was established under Lord Hartington, who had served as  
 
Secretary of State for War from December 1882 to June 1885. By limiting the terms  
 
of reference to looking at the administration rather than a detailed account of what  
 
was perceived to be „wrong‟ with the army and navy, the government hoped to limit  
 
its scope and avoid a report that suggested the need for a large-scale overhaul of the  
 
armed forces. It has also been suggested that the appointment of three former  
 
Secretaries of State for War, Hartington, W.H.Smith and Henry Campbell- 
 
Bannerman, was a clear attempt to avoid criticism of the War Office administration  
 
and the idea of civilian control of the War Office.
66
 Added to this, another key  
 
member was Lord Randolph Churchill, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer, who  
 
was an ardent campaigner for the reduction of military spending on the army.  
 
 
Brackenbury‟s presence on the Commission was partly recognition of him as an army  
 
reformer but also because it was his report that had highlighted many of the problems.  
 
It was undoubtedly hoped that his name, attached to a report, which, with the  
 
background of the other members, was likely to support the government and the  
 
principle of civilian control, would help to defuse the public argument. There was also  
 
a more practical reason in that one of the questions that the Hartington Commission  
 
asked was whether there was any link between Naval and Military Intelligence  
 
Departments, and also whether this should be enhanced: there was even a suggestion  
 





The commission was first appointed on the 15
th
 May 1888, but it took till July 1889  
 
before the first part of the report was published, with the second following in  
 
February 1890. The minutes of evidence were never published.
67
 The report  
 
commented on four areas. Firstly the measures required to secure full and sufficient  
 
administrative harmony between the two departments; secondly, the internal  
 
administration of the Admiralty; thirdly the internal administration of the War Office;  
 
and fourthly the relation of the Treasury to the War Office and the Admiralty and  
 
matters of financial control generally. The evidence was in two parts. Firstly there  
 
was a list of written questions that were sent to various officials, both civilian and  
 
military, and secondly a number of people were interviewed directly by the  
 
Commission. Many senior politicians including, Gladstone, Salisbury, Ripon, the Earl  
 
of Grey, Campbell-Bannerman, Hugh Childers, Stanhope and Hartington himself  
 
gave evidence to the commission. Admiral Hay, Admiral Hornby, Admiral Hood,  
 
Admiral Mends, Vice-Admiral Hoskins, and Captain Beresford represented the Naval  
 
viewpoint, whilst the Duke of Cambridge, Wolseley, General Adye, General  
 
Simmons, and Sir Ralph Thomson, the Permanent Secretary to the War Office,  
 
represented the Army. There were two main questions, although each had various  
 
sub-sections. The first was concerned with the defence of the Empire and matters of  
 
cooperation between the two services. The second question dealt with the relationship  
 
between the civilian and military side of both services. Given the diversity of those  
 
questioned it is not surprising that there was little agreement on any of the subjects  
 





The second section of the evidence was taken in front of the commission itself. The  
 
commission sat for 16 days, between the 16
th
 November 1888 and the 11
th
 April  
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1889, including a gap of nearly three months between December 1888 and March  
 
1889. Very few of the commissioners sat for all 16 days. In fact Hartington, as  
 
chairman, was virtually the only one present throughout. Brackenbury attended 13  
 
days, which was better than most, whilst Sir Randolph Churchill, though by political  
 
weight one of the most important members, was only present for 3 days. Other  
 
leading members, like W.H.Smith and Campbell-Bannerman, were also missing most  
 
of the time. It meant that in the end the report became largely the work of Hartington,  
 
Brackenbury, Sir Richard Temple M.P, T.H.Ismay and Vice-Admiral Sir  
 
F.W.Richards. This probably goes a long way to explaining why Churchill and  
 
Campbell-Bannerman dissented from the final report.  
 
 
The basic differences between the two services in administrative terms were in  
 
relation to professionalism and royal influence. The commission asserted that unlike  
 
the Navy, the Army, through the Commander-in-Chief, had the right of direct  
 
approach to the Crown on military matters. The case was made by Lord Esher that:  
 
The Navy is a constitutional force. Every Commission is signed by the 
(Admiralty) Board. The Army is a Royal force and, while the Queen never 




The other problem with administration was the status of the Commander-in-Chief.  
 
Unlike the Navy he was, in the word of the Royal Commission, “the only officer who  
 
had any direct responsibility to the Secretary of State”. He had far too much  
 
responsibility, and the Royal Commission reported that:  
 
This system appears to us to involve excessive centralisation of responsibility 
in the person of the Commander-in-Chief on whom the whole executive 
command, administration and supply of the Army now devolve.  
 
It was in the light of this that the Hartington Commission recommended that the office  
 
of Commander-in-Chief should be abolished. In the hope of avoiding royal  
 
disapproval it added the proviso that the change was to happen on the retirement of  
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the current Commander-in-Chief, the Duke of Cambridge, who it will be remembered  
 
was the Queen‟s cousin. It was recommended that the new position of Chief of Staff  
 
be created, who would be the senior of five senior military officers who would form a  
 
War Office Council. Under the new system the five heads would be responsible to the  
 
Secretary of State for the administration of their departments. The Chief of Staff  
 
would be given responsibility for military planning, mobilisation, consulting with the  
 
Admiralty, intelligence and the defence of the United Kingdom. The idea was to free  
 
such an individual from the more executive duties of the Commander-in-Chief and  
 
make him:  
 
…responsible for preparing plans of military operations, collecting and co-
ordinating information of all kinds, and generally tendering advice upon all 





Whilst this was one suggested scheme there was another, drawn up by Churchill, who  
 
wanted the creation of a Ministry of Defence. The Minister would be a senior member  
 
of the Cabinet. He would be advised by two professional heads at the army and  
 
navy, who would take over the duties of the Secretary of State for War and the First  
 
Lord of the Admiralty. The two military men would be members of the cabinet, but  
 
only when matters of a military consequence were being discussed. Such a policy was  
 
unpopular with most politicians, because it diminished their control, as the  
 
professional heads of the army and navy would run their departments largely  
 
independently of the government.  It was also unpopular with many soldiers, sailors  
 
and politicians because it would leave the services without an individual  
 
representative at cabinet level who would represent their interests alone. The scheme  
 




 This system also included a Chief of Staff for the Army,  
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who would be the direct subordinate and deputy for the new professional head of the  
 
Army. Under Churchill‟s suggestion this appeared to be an acceptable idea to  
 
Wolseley, as in this form the Chief of Staff would not be the senior soldier.      
 
 
The proposed creation of a General Staff, as envisaged by the Hartington  
 
Commission, caused a great deal of controversy, and outside of the commission itself,  
 
was very unpopular. The Duke of Cambridge and Lord Wolseley were for once united  
 
in their opposition. The Queen opposed it as she continued to hope that her son, the  
 
Duke of Connaught, would succeed as Commander-in-Chief. Most damning of all  
 
was the objection of Campbell-Bannerman. He was the only member of the  
 
commission to object to this idea in principle. However his objection was enough to  
 
give a somewhat sceptical government the excuse they needed to avoid the conflict  
 
with the Royal Family that creating a Chief of Staff would cause. In the end a War  
 
Office Council was established with the Commander-in-Chief as the senior member.  
 
It looked like a reform but in fact nothing happened, and the Royal Commission on  
 
the War in South Africa heard evidence that the council rarely met and was never  
 
called upon to vote on any matter.
72
 The attempt to create a body similar to the  
 
Admiralty Board had failed. 
 
 
There is no doubt that Wolseley believed that Brackenbury was responsible for the  
 
Hartington Commission‟s recommendation for the creation of a Chief of Staff. He  
 
believed that the new post had been suggested so that Brackenbury himself would be  
 
the ideal choice for the position. This caused a cooling in the relations between the  
 
two men, as Wolseley knew he was the obvious choice to be the next Commander-in- 
 
Chief but would not necessarily be for the position of Chief-of-Staff. The belief that  
 
the Chief of Staff would be Brackenbury was not just held by Wolseley. Grierson  
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wrote in his diary on the day he read the Hartington Commission‟s report: “Very  
 
good, especially creation of Chief of Staff. Sure to be Brackenbury”.
73
 Callwell  
 
agreed with Wolseley‟s opinion that Brackenbury, and to a lesser extent Major  
 
George Clarke, had been the driving force behind the commission‟s recommendation,  
 
but did not see this as a necessarily bad thing.
74
 Brackenbury‟s case for the  
 
appointment was supported by the fact that the proposed General Staff was to be  
 
made up largely of his existing Intelligence Branch.
75
 The Government was also  
 
reluctant to accept it. Largely it was the age old fear that such a „professional‟  
 
appointment could give rise to a disturbing level of militarism; the idea being that the  
 
more you prepared for war the more likely it would be. The other fear was that if they  
 
accepted this one part of the commission‟s report they would be under pressure to  
 
accept the rest.  
                            
 
Whilst Brackenbury obviously wanted the Chief of Staff appointment, he may not  
 
have intended it to be at the expense of Wolseley. Brackenbury supported Churchill‟s  
 
scheme for a national Ministry of Defence.
76
 This scheme provided for a professional  
 
head of the army, which would have suited Wolseley. It is more than likely that  
 
Brackenbury saw himself fulfilling a Chief of Staff‟s role under him as he had done  
 
throughout their service overseas together. Unfortunately there is no direct evidence  
 
to support this. The duties of the Chief of Staff were considered to be the same under  
 
either proposal. If Churchill‟s scheme had been accepted it would have pleased both  
 
Wolseley and Brackenbury. The problem was that Hartington was opposed to it,  
 
largely on the grounds that he knew it would never win political support. The report  
 
was uncommitted on the creation of a Minister of Defence, but strong in its support of  
 
the post of Chief of Staff. Brackenbury was naturally ambitious, but the creation of a  
 
Chief of Staff was not a new idea of his to attain high office, as Wolseley later  
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suggested. Brackenbury had first publicly urged the creation of such a post in 1867 in  
 
his series of articles on Military Reform.
77
 This was obviously at a time when he was  
 
in no position to be considered for the position, and nor did his career to date suggest  
 
that he ever would, as this was prior to his association with Wolseley. If this  
 
suggestion is read in the light of his 1867 article then it is obvious that the proposal  
 
was one that was thought important for the modernisation of the army, rather than for  
 
personal advantage. The creation of a General Staff would fit in nicely with  
 
Brackenbury‟s constant theme - the improved efficiency of the army. Most of the  
 
reforms he proposed in his articles had this aim in mind. A General Staff would  
 
improve the efficiency by planning, preparation and improved organisation  
 
throughout the army and it could be argued that such a body was a logical next step  
 
from mobilisation plans. A General Staff would have taken on the duties of the  
 
mobilisation and intelligence departments in a much more efficient way. It will be  
 
remembered that whilst Brackenbury saw the desirability of having both departments  
 
together he had insisted that the mobilisation section become separate as he had  
 
insufficient funds and manpower to do both duties effectively. A General Staff would  
 
have allowed him to do this. However, whatever his reasons, there was no creation of  
 
a Chief of Staff, nor was there until shortly after Brackenbury‟s retirement.
78
 
   
 




 December 1888 he was sent for by the Duke of Cambridge, “and he expressed  
 
to me in very strong terms his disapproval of the appointment of a Chief of Staff”,  
 
even if this appointment were to be under the Commander-in-Chief. It was the Duke  
 
of Cambridge‟s view that this would “destroy the connection between the Crown and  
 
the army, and that neither H.R.H (Cambridge) nor any good man would hold office  
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under these conditions”. This placed Brackenbury in a difficult position, and he  
 
consulted Stanhope on this matter. Brackenbury declared that his view on the creation  
 
of a Chief of Staff had not been altered by the Duke‟s position, but he asked  
 
Stanhope: “Am I, an officer on the staff of H.R.H, to advocate on the Royal  
 
Commission a course which H.R.H has strongly condemned?”. Brackenbury offered  
 
two possible solutions, that either he resign from the Hartington Commission or from  
 
the War Office.  
 
The former would, I think have an unfortunate affect, as it would be 
misinterpreted by the public and the press. The latter would impugn no one but 
myself, and I am quite prepared to sacrifice myself to carry through what I 
consider a most necessary reform. But I am unwilling to take a step, which 
will probably attract some attention, without ascertaining what the views of 
Her Majesty‟s Government are, by whom I was placed on the Royal 
Commission.
79
     
 
This really was a dilemma for Brackenbury, and one that only the government could  
 
solve. As Brackenbury pointed out, he had been placed on this commission by the  
 
government, but the normal military discipline meant that it was unconventional, to  
 
say the least, for a Lieutenant General to publicly and before a Royal Commission   
 
disagree with the Commander-in-Chief. This perhaps illustrates once again the  
 
slightly precarious position that Brackenbury was in. Had it been Wolseley in this  
 
position it is hard to believe that he would have hesitated to contradict the Duke, but  
 
Brackenbury did not have that security of position. Wolseley could not be disposed  
 
of easily, yet Brackenbury could simply not be re-employed when his tenure as Head  
 
of the Intelligence Branch expired. This may explain his anxiety about his future  
 







Stanhope replied that he had discussed the matter with his cabinet colleagues and that  
 
they all agreed that whilst his position was difficult there should be no question of  
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him resigning. Stanhope went on to say that being appointed to the Royal  
 
Commission gave Brackenbury, “absolute and entire freedom to follow and express  
 
his opinion on all the matters referred to the Commission”. Stanhope tried to make the  
 
case that no one would object if Brackenbury were to criticise the policy of the  
 
Secretary of State, and that therefore he should be free to criticise the policy of the  
 
Commander-in-Chief if necessary.   
 
But in this you are asked to be a member of the commission in order that you 
might join in telling the country irrespective of the views of the Secretary of 
State or the Commander in Chief, what you think wanting in the organisation 
of the war Office; as if you were to hold that your position precluded you from 
doing so, it would render any enquiry of this sort, which may be essential to 
the public service, nugatory. We therefore are strongly of opinion, and I 
venture to express it to you, that you are fully justified in going on to the end 




The significance of Brackenbury‟s problems should not be overlooked. It would be  
 
naive to think that he acted “solely upon grounds of public duty”, as Stanhope stated.  
 




However, that he was driving to improve the efficiency of the army cannot be  
 
doubted, and it was in this way that he was acting “upon grounds of public duty”, as  
 
he had always endeavoured to do. His career, his writing and his service had  
 
constantly demonstrated a determination to improve the efficiency, and therefore the  
 
capability, of the army. It was to this end that both he and Stanhope believed that the  
 
creation of a Chief of Staff was necessary. It is likely that Brackenbury had convinced  
 
Stanhope of the need for this appointment, but he would not have needed much  
 
persuading. Programmes like mobilisation plans, the so-called „Stanhope Storehouses‟  
 
and similar projects did really require a Chief of Staff to operate them efficiently. As  
 
Stanhope was committed to these programmes a Chief of Staff would have seemed an  
 




The Hartington Commission report was, by the standards of the day, small in size. Yet  
 
its findings could have had a profound effect on the military forces of Britain and the   
 
Empire. A Chief of Staff and more general cooperation and planning between the two  
 
services would have improved efficiency and effectiveness considerably. Indeed  
 
The War Office Reconstitution Committee of 1904 (commonly called the Esher  
 
Committee), which came in the wake of the disaster of the South African War,  
 
remarked that:  
 
We unhesitatingly assert that if the recommendations of the majority of the 
Hartington Commission had not been ignored, the country would have been 
saved the loss of many thousands of lives, and of many millions of pounds, 
subsequently sacrificed in the South African War…Upon many material 
points we have done no more than adopt and develop the principles laid down 
by the Hartington Commission, especially as regards the creation of the branch 
of a Chief of the General Staff.
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During his appointment Brackenbury did much to improve the Intelligence Branch.  
 
As well as enlarging it he also increased both the quantity and quality of the work, it  
 
was well collated and its use to the government was proved by the rise in importance  
 
of the Intelligence Branch, which was driven by the civilian side of the War Office.  
 
This is also illustrated by the fact that Brackenbury was given authority to present  
 
reports direct to the Secretary of State for War, and other members of the cabinet  
 
rather than having to go through the usual War Office channels of either the  
 
Commander in Chief, the Adjutant General or the Quarter Master General.
84
 The  
 
Foreign Office became very interested in the product of the Intelligence Branch, as  
 
It seemed able to gain more accurate information than they did by their own efforts.  
 
Nevertheless, despite recognising the benefit of their work the Foreign Office viewed  
 
the Intelligence Branch with suspicion largely because, according to Parritt, they saw  
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them as inexperienced amateurs whereas they were the professionals.
85
 Brackenbury  
 
was given permission by the Secretary of State, and reluctantly, the Commander-in- 
 
Chief to correspond directly, if necessary, with the Foreign Office and the Private  
 
Under Secretary for the Colonies. This was on the strict understanding that he was  
 
merely to provide information and not to touch upon matters of policy. It was a big  
 
jump in prestige for the branch, and one that had only come about because it had  
 
proved its worth through the quality of intelligence they were providing. The biggest  
 
step forward was that Brackenbury had now established the principle that the Head of  
 
the Intelligence Branch should be consulted on military matters concerning foreign  
 
powers. This was a significant advance from the position when Brackenbury had  
 
first been appointed, when it was considered, “a harmless but rather useless  
 
appendage to the War Office”.
86
 Brackenbury had changed this not only by improving  
 
the amount and quality of intelligence, but by also making those who received the  
 
intelligence appreciate it. Given the size of the Branch the results were little short of  
 
amazing. This was due partly to its reorganisation, but also because of the presence of  
 
the brightest and best of the army. From Brackenbury down every man was hand- 
 
picked to be the best for the post. It was their hard work and commitment that enabled  
 
them to produce and collate such vast quantities of intelligence, so much so that the  
 
quality of the work they produced was on a par with that of the vast general staffs of  
 
Europe. Grierson recalled that Count Von Schlieffen, Chief of the Great General Staff  
 
in Berlin, once told him that he was amazed that such a small staff could produce such  
 
work and do such a good job.
87
 With only 18 permanent staff and a budget of £11,000  
 
a year the Intelligence Branch was producing material on a par with the German  
 




 It was truly a remarkable reorganisation that had caused this: achieved  
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by enlarging the department and having hand picked men for the positions. It was not  
 
just the selection, but also the guidance Brackenbury provided in techniques and  
 
manners of intelligence gathering that were so impressive. His rules for officers  
 
travelling to gather intelligence continued to be used for many years to come.  
 
 
Brackenbury‟s Legacy  
 
Brackenbury‟s five year term as Head of the Intelligence Branch came to an end in  
 
1891, and he was replaced by Major-General Edward F Chapman who arrived from  
 
India. Brackenbury left to take up the appointment of Military Member of the  
 
Governor-General‟s (Viceroy‟s) Council. Chapman‟s time in charge, though largely  
 
through no fault of his own, was something of a backwards step for the Intelligence  
 
Branch. His major problem was that he had never served outside of India and was  
 
only returning home through ill health. It has been suggested that Lord Roberts  
 
largely engineered this appointment in a desire to have someone with vast experience  
 
of India and who understood the Russian threat. Chapman seems to have been liked  
 
personally by his staff but they all quickly recognised his limitations.
89
 He later  
 
confided in Brackenbury that he had little idea of what was going on in his  
 
department and asked for his help.
90
 Whilst in India Brackenbury continued to keep in  
 
touch with many of his former officers who were still in the Intelligence Branch. Most  
 
notable among these was Grierson who continued to keep Brackenbury supplied with  
 
documents from the Intelligence Branch.
91
 During Chapman‟s time the relationship  
 
with the Foreign Office soured. Unlike Brackenbury, who had worked for them when  
 
he was a military attaché, Chapman had no previous experience of the Foreign Office.  
 
Unlike Brackenbury, Chapman failed to keep close control of officers travelling  
 
abroad and was notably embarrassed by an officer who, on a mission to Russia threw  
 
his weight around in the British Embassy, leading to an official complaint by the  
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Chapman was succeeded in 1896 by Ardagh who was able to restore the branch to the  
 
level Brackenbury had left and good relations were restored with the Foreign and  
 
Colonial Offices. The Intelligence Branch was much criticised during the South  
 
African War for not having foreseen the capabilities of the Boers.
93
 However, the  
 
Royal Commission and numerous enquiries found that the Intelligence Branch had  
 
provided accurate and relevant information to the necessary authorities. It had partly  
 
been ignored and some important documents never got further than the Commander- 
 
in-Chief‟s office. Despite its limited numbers and finance the Branch proved itself  
 
successful during the South African War. Brackenbury‟s legacy was actually long  
 
lasting. The system he created, except for minor changes, lasted intact until 1965.  
 
Whilst partly saying something about the lethargy of the War Office it is perhaps  
 
partial proof of the soundness of what Brackenbury was able to achieve during his  
 
five years in charge of the Intelligence Branch.               
 
 
The other great legacy of Brackenbury‟s time in the Intelligence Branch was the start  
 
of the mobilisation scheme. His own view on the importance of these schemes was  
 
later set out in a personal letter to Sir George White. 
 
I was for five years teaching military history, and few men have studied the 
big problems of war more closely than I have done. All my study impressed 
firmly on my mind the conviction that no country was ever yet saved by 
fortifications, and that nothing can enable us to beat our enemies but a strong 
army for field fighting, and a strong Navy to sweep the seas.
94
     
 
This was to prove vital during the South African War where the smoothness and ease  
 
of mobilisation shocked even the War Office. Although a great deal of credit needs to  
 
go to Sir John Ardagh, who organised and fine-tuned Brackenbury‟s plans, and  
 
Colonel John Cowans, who put the plans into practice, it has to be remembered that it  
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was Brackenbury who drew them up. They were deliberately open-ended so that they  
 
would suit all purposes and they also had the effect of creating the impetus for a  
 
formal declaration of what the Army‟s duties were. Although the significance of the  
 
Stanhope Memorandum has been overplayed, and has been rightly questioned in more  
 
recent times, it was significant, if for no other reason, that it formally set down the  
 
duties of the Army for the first time.
95
 It thus allowed for more formal planning, such  
 




In an almost flawless mobilisation, 112,000 regular troops were equipped and 
sent to South Africa between 7
th
 October 1899 and 30
th
 January 1900. This 
was an unprecedented achievement for Britain and a tribute to the work of 
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An ‘African’ in India: 




During the years 1891 to 1896 Brackenbury held the rather grandiose title of Military  
 
Member of the Council of the Viceroy of India. This period that Brackenbury spent in  
 
India can all too easily be viewed as little more than an interlude between the two  
 
very significant appointments he held at the War Office.  We have already seen how  
 
important his time as Head of the Intelligence Branch was, and whilst his success  
 
there is plain to see, it is harder to see what lasting effect Brackenbury had in India.   
 
Perhaps this is not surprising.  Being able to change and leave your mark on a  
 
department at the War Office, despite its obvious difficulties, was far easier than  
 
making an impact on the government of a huge country such as Imperial India. This  
 
chapter will look at the context into which Brackenbury arrived in India in 1891,  
 
looking briefly at the British position in India at that time. It will then go on to  
 
examine what he did there, his attitude towards it, and his relationship with some of  
 
the key figures in India at the time. Finally an attempt will be made to analyse what he  
 
achieved during the tenure of his appointment.  
 
 
British power in India   
 
Whilst it is not necessary to outline in detail the history of British influence in India, a  
 
brief outline of the machinery of government will prove useful in terms of  
 
understanding the situation in which Brackenbury found himself.  British power in  
 
India was initially developed, not by the British Government, but by the Honourable  
 
East India Company.  It was only after the Indian Mutiny in 1858 that control of India  
 
passed to Her Majesty‟s Government. Rather than the 24 strong Court of Directors of  
 
the East India Company, India was to be governed by a Governor-General, commonly  
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known as the Viceroy, who was in turn responsible to the Secretary of State for India  
 
who as a member of the British Government was responsible to both the Cabinet and  
 
Parliament.  A council, whose members were chosen by the British government,  
 
advised the Governor-General. The Governor General, himself chosen by the British  
 




 The members of the council served for a fixed five-year period, and this was  
 
why Brackenbury spent only five years in India as the military representative on the  
 
council. More will be said about the status of his position later. 
 
 
The Military in India     
 
A single Indian Army did not strictly exist until 1895.  Before that date four main  
 
forces made up the available military strength; the three Presidency Armies of Bengal,  
 
Bombay and Madras, and the Punjab Frontier Force.  Each Army had its own  
 
Commander-in-Chief, and in practice the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal Army  
 
was also Commander-in-Chief India.  The military system in India had an  
 
unnecessarily complex organisation. The Punjab Frontier Force, for example, was  
 
actually under the control of the Government of India, not the Commander-in-Chief.   
 
As a result if the army Commander in the Punjab wanted to move an element of the  
 
force from its current deployment he had to ask the Commander-in-Chief India. He in  
 
turn had to ask the Governor-General, who then had to tell the Lieutenant Governor of  
 
the Punjab to order the Commander of the Frontier force to do what it was he had  
 
wanted to do in the first place. 
 
 
The Commander-in-Chief in India played an important part in Brackenbury‟s time  
 
there. He was usually an officer of General rank taken from the British Army; very  
 
few came from the Indian Army.
2
  Yet despite being a British Army officer he was  
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not subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief of the British Army.  The Secretary of  
 
State for India appointed him, although normally with the recommendation or support  
 
of the Governor-General.  More will be said of the Commander-in-Chief later when  
 
looking at the relationship between him and the Military Member of the Council. 
 
 
„The Great Game‟    
 
One of the major imperial concerns, in some cases bordering on obsession, of this  
 
period was the threat of a Russian invasion of India through Afghanistan and the  
 
northwest frontier. These anxieties started when the Russians began to fight their way  
 
down through the Caucasus, thereby expanding the Russian empire in Central Asia.   
 
In 1865 Tashkent fell to the Russians, followed by Samarkand and Bokhara in 1886,  
 
and in 1873 Khiva. Peter Hopkirk writes that:   
 
As the gap between the two front lines gradually narrowed, the great Game 
intensified.  Despite the dangers, principally from hostile rulers, there was no 





The Cold War that this created was commonly referred to as the „Great Game‟. There  
 
is some doubt as to who first used the phrase, but the term the „Great Game‟ was  
 
popularised by Rudyard Kipling in his novel „Kim‟.  
 
 
A great deal of the „game‟ was played out in Afghanistan, the country that lay  
 
between the two expanding Empires. Between 1839 and 1842 Britain had first  
 
ventured into Afghanistan and fought the first Afghan War.
4
  Although the details of  
 
the war need not concern us here, it has to be stated that the war was a disaster.  Of  
 
the initial force of 4,500 British and Indian troops and 12,000 camp followers, only  
 
one European made it back through his own means.  Pride was partially restored  
 
during General Robert Sale‟s defence of Jellalabad.  Not only did they lift the siege by  
 




Events took a significant turn in 1878 when the Russians signed a treaty with Amir  
 
Sher Ali, whilst at the same time refusing to hear representations from British  
 
officials.  The possibility of Russian troops being based in Afghanistan, and training  
 
an Afghan Army in European methods, was unthinkable to the British, some of whom  
 
thought it a prelude to invasion.  The response was a British invasion force of three  
 
columns, totalling 35,000 men and 144 guns, being sent into Afghanistan.  This action  
 
was ultimately a complete success, although there were a few setbacks along the way.   
 
Frederick Sleigh Roberts, later Lord Roberts, came to fame during this campaign for  
 
his defeat of a numerically superior force by use of guile and cunning.  This was the  
 
making of his reputation and special mention is made of it here because he was  
 
Commander-in-Chief in India during the first two years of Brackenbury‟s  
 
appointment there.    
 
 
As a result of the invasion the treaty of Gandamuk was signed on 26
th
 May 1879.   
 




 with the British, as well as ceding Kurram Pishin and Sibi to Britain.   
 
Sher Ali was replaced by Yakub Khan as Amir.  There were other elements to this  
 
treaty, such as the establishment of a permanent residency in Kabul, an agreement to  
 
allow British subjects to trade freely in Afghanistan, the building of a telegraph line  
 
from Kabul to India, and the stipulation that Britain would control the foreign policy  
 
of Afghanistan, thus making sure that Russian influence was officially kept to a  
 
minimum.  With the signing of this treaty the British thought hostilities were over,  
 
and consequently most of the Army left.  Only a small force under Roberts remained  
 




This force became vital when in September 1879 Afghan soldiers mutinied and  
 
supported a mob in attacking the British Residency in Kabul, killing the Resident and  
 
his staff.  Roberts was reinforced and his force was renamed the Kabul Field Force  
 
and ordered to advance on that town.  After bitter fighting Kabul fell and Yakub Khan  
 
was replaced by Abdul al-Rahaman.  However, another Afghan Prince, Ayub Khan,  
 
had started a popular uprising in Kandahar supported by many of the old regiments of  
 
Sher Ali‟s Army.  The British force in Kandahar supported the local ruler, the Wali,  
 
and along with his forces set out to stop Ayub Khan.  The British and the Wali were  
 
defeated at the battle of Maiwand and retreated to Kandahar where they were  
 
besieged.  It was Roberts again who came to the rescue and added to his growing  
 
reputation by relieving Kandahar and defeating the Afghan Army.  As a result of this  
 
war the Amir Abdul al-Rahaman agreed to have no dealings with the Russians, as a  
 
show of gratitude for Britain‟s support.  In return the British agreed to abandon the  
 
idea of a permanent residency in Kabul, and by May 1881 the British and Indian  
 
troops had withdrawn.   
 
 
Despite all this the fear of Russian expansion into Afghanistan did not go away.  In  
 
March 1885 Russian and Afghan troops clashed at the border town of Pendjeh.  In  
 
India the fear spread that Russia would use this as a pretext for an invasion of  
 
Afghanistan and that then it would only be a matter of time before India was  
 
threatened.  In Britain the incident was used by Gladstone and the Liberal  
 
government as an excuse to withdraw British troops from the Sudan in the wake of  
 
the embarrassment of Gordon‟s death at Khartoum.
6
  In India, the Governor-General,  
 
Lord Dufferin, assured the Amir of Afghanistan that if Russia attacked Herat, which  
 
was near the border, it would be met by a British declaration of war.
7
 It must be added  
 
that the Afghans treated the Russians with the same suspicion as the British. British  
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involvement in Afghanistan had proved costly, in terms of lives, money and  
 
prestige.  There was little prospect of financial gain there and the lengths to which the  
 
British had gone further illustrate the magnitude of the threat that was perceived to be  
 
posed by the Russians.  Sometimes British involvement in Afghanistan was renewed  
 
to restore the prestige that a military defeat in that country had cost but more often  
 
than not it was designed to keep Russia out and to create a buffer between Russian  
 
territory and India.  Nothing ever came of this „Cold War‟ but as Brackenbury arrived  
 





Military Member of the Council of the Viceroy of India  
 
Brackenbury had been to India before, having served as part of the reinforcements  
 
sent there following the Indian Mutiny.
9
  Later he had briefly held an appointment as  
 
Private Secretary to Lord Lytton, then Governor-General, but on the latter‟s  
 
resignation returned home with him after only a few months.
10
  Obviously this was  
 
not enough time for him to gain any meaningful experience of India but it did mean 
 
that, when he arrived in 1891, he was at least familiar with some of the structures and  
 
workings of its government.  It also meant that he had some knowledge of how the  
 
Governor-General operated, and as his appointment was to be in effect the military  
 
representative on the Governor-General‟s council, this would have proved useful.  
 
Given his reputation for organisation it would be very surprising if he had not done  
 
preparatory work before embarking for India.  
 
 
The position that Brackenbury held had something of an ambiguous nature.  The  
 
Commander-in-Chief was perceived as being junior only to the Governor-General.   
 




  In Britain the job of the Commander-in-Chief  
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was to put an army in the field and to make sure it was fully supplied and maintained.  
 
He also had responsibility for its discipline.  In India the Commander-in-Chief was  
 
expected to take the field with the Army, and the responsibility for supply,  
 
organisation and maintaining the army fell upon the Military Department, headed by  
 
the Military Member of the Viceroy‟s Council.  This department was in charge of  
 
what would commonly be called the „support services‟.  Byron Farwell lists its  
 
responsibilities as “…. military administration, medical stores, supply, transportation,  
 
clothing, remounts, military works and military finance”.
12
 This left the Commander- 
 
in-Chief to concentrate on training, discipline and maintaining combat readiness.  In  
 
practical terms it was actually an efficient division of powers and was in theory a  
 
much better system than the one found at home.  As the Indian Army spent most of its  
 
time involved in one campaign or another this allowed the Commander-in-Chief to  
 
concentrate on combat matters without being snowed under by administration.
13
  The  
 
system worked well when the Commander-in-Chief was someone who had served in  
 
India for a long time and was used to it.  It was when the Commander-in-Chief came  
 
from a mainly British Army background that problems arose, because it was likely he  
 
would want to be a Commander-in-Chief in the British style.  This was particularly  
 
true when Lord Kitchener arrived as Commander-in-Chief in 1902. He came to India  
 
wanting to overhaul the Indian Army to incorporate the lessons of the South African  
 
War and because he too feared imminent Russian invasion.  He had been used to total  
 
control, especially when he had commanded the Egyptian Army, and found it  
 
impossible to accept the status of the Military Member. He felt his reforms were  
 
hampered by the powers of the Military Member and concluded that “…. he would  
 
have found it easier to accomplish his mission if he had come to India as military  
 
member of council instead of as Commander-in-Chief”. Although an exaggeration it  
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does illustrate the not inconsiderable powers of the position Brackenbury occupied.    
 
It is important to underline the differing roles played by the two positions in the  
 
governance of India.  The Military Department:  
 
…enjoyed a watching brief over expenditure, and its head served as the 
channel of communication between the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief.  
Because he was expected to advise the civilian Viceroy upon broad aspects of 
military policy, the Military Member of the Council was entitled to criticise 
freely the plans and projects of the Commander-in-Chief.
14
   
 
To someone like Kitchener the idea that anyone, let alone someone who was of junior  
 
military rank, could freely criticise his plans to the Government of India would have  
 
been totally unacceptable.  To Lord Roberts, who served as Commander-in-Chief  
 
from 1885-1893, there never seemed to be such a problem.  This was perhaps a  
 
consequence of the perception of Roberts as the foremost military expert on India, and  
 
certainly it was likely to be a brave man who would dare to criticise him.  As a result  
 
of Kitchener's complaints about the Military Member a committee of inquiry was set  
 
up.  Two members of this committee defended the current position, namely Lord  
 
Roberts and Sir George White.
15
  White had followed Roberts, and was the other  
 
Commander-in-Chief with whom Brackenbury had worked.  Roberts and White were  
 
regarded as two of the most successful Commanders-in-Chief and the fact that they  
 
supported the current system contradicted Kitchener‟s assertion that it made it  
 
impossible for the Commander-in-Chief to achieve anything.   
 
 
Although the Military Member was always a serving military officer he held a civilian  
 
appointment and worked on a civilian council, and a precedent had been established  
 
that he did not wear uniform in his official capacity.  Some had been known to wear it  
 
on social occasions, but General Sir George Barrow wrote that he never once saw  
 
Brackenbury in his uniform the entire time he was in India.
16
 Brackenbury‟s own  
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view was that,  
 
I only wear uniform when other members of the council wear it. On state 
occasions I have always refused to inspect troops or to take salutes on parades 





The fact that Major-General Sir Edmond Elles wore his uniform to council meetings  
 
was a further source of annoyance to Kitchener. The Military Member sat in on all  
 
meetings of the Governing Council regardless of whether military matters were being  
 
discussed or not, and had full voting rights.  The Commander-in-Chief only sat in on  
 
meetings when military matters were being discussed but even then he had no vote.   
 
In light of all this the indignation that Kitchener felt is perhaps understandable.  The  
 
idea that a junior officer could sit on a civilian council, in a civilian position, wearing  
 
military uniform, and criticise and vote against his proposals understandably caused  
 
him some consternation.  Brackenbury‟s decision not to wear uniform at all illustrates  
 
the tact that he brought to the position.  He had previously served as Chief of Police in  
 
both Cyprus and Ireland, although he had disliked these appointments, and as both of  
 
these were in effect civilian positions he did have some relevant experience outside  
 
military circles, which undoubtedly helped him in the sub-continent.   
 
 
The Military Member of the Council was usually selected for his knowledge of Indian  
 
military affairs. All the members of the council were selected for their expertise in a  
 
particular area.  It was felt that with Brackenbury‟s record as an administrator, and  
 
Roberts expert knowledge, that this did not matter in his case.  Not being an  
 
expert on Indian matters, although he could never be called ignorant of the subject,  
 
resulted in him remaining quiet on most of the Commander-in-Chief‟s proposals.
18
  It  
 
was only when he thought he could add something to the debate, as a result of his  
 
experience elsewhere, that he used his privilege to pass comment and criticise the  
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Brackenbury and Roberts      
 
During the first two years of Brackenbury‟s service in India Sir Frederick Sleigh  
 
Roberts, who became Lord Roberts in 1892, was Commander-in-Chief.  Despite the  
 
fact that Brackenbury was a founder member of the rival „ring‟ of Lord Wolseley  
 
there appears to be nothing but mutual respect and admiration between the two.  It  
 
would not have been surprising if Roberts had viewed Brackenbury as a threat, given  
 
that he was widely regarded as Wolseley‟s protégé.  This perhaps goes to show  
 
that the rivalry between the two „rings‟ was not as strong as is sometimes suggested.  
 
In fact Roberts actually used Brackenbury‟s links with the Wolseley „ring‟ to try and  
 
change a decision.  In 1890 Wolseley, then Adjutant-General, had passed an ordnance  
 
that would have seen all officers holding certain positions promoted to Major- 
 
General.  Every eligible officer in Britain and the colonies received this promotion but  
 
none of the eligible officers in India did. John Lee wrote that “This was the most  
 
blatant piece of „African‟ preferment in the ongoing „war between the rings‟”. There  
 
is no doubt that Roberts saw it as such.
19
  Roberts had written continually  
 
complaining of the injustice but to no avail.  In August 1891 he asked for  
 
Brackenbury‟s support in trying to change the decision.  He specifically asked for  
 
help over Ian Hamilton's promotion, knowing the high regard Brackenbury held him  
 
in after their service together in the Sudan, but Brackenbury said he was willing to  
 
fight for all of them.  He then wrote, not only officially, as Roberts had done, but also  
 
privately to Redvers Buller, another of the Wolseley 'ring', who by this time had  
 
succeeded Wolseley as Adjutant-General at the War Office.
20
  Eventually the  
 
promotions were obtained, which probably had more to do with the Secretary of State  
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for India‟s intervention than Brackenbury‟s.  However this is another example of the  
 
strength of the relationship between the two, if only for the fact that Roberts was  
 
prepared to ask Brackenbury for help. This and his willingness to help again casts  
 
doubt on the strength of the rivalry between the „rings‟ in the British Army, and  
 
shows a growing relationship between the two men.  
 
 
This view is further supported by correspondence between Sir Redvers Buller and  
 
Brackenbury in May 1894. Buller had written to Brackenbury complaining of Roberts  
 
selecting certain „favoured‟ officers. Brackenbury replied that the same was said of  
 
them regarding the „Wolseley gang‟ saying, “Any Commander will want the men  
 
whom he has tried and found never to fail him, and will prefer them to those he has  
 
not tried”. He then went on to quote Roberts, “I think Wolseley has always been  
 
perfectly right. He has a great eye for selecting men and he goes on selecting the best  
 
out of his previous selections”.
21
 Whilst this does not have too much to do with  
 
Brackenbury‟s time in India, it does focus on the much wider issue of his involvement  
 
with the two competing „rings‟ within the army. He never complained of feeling  
 
sidelined or in any way unwanted in India because of his association with Wolseley.  
 
The relationship he had with Roberts perhaps illustrates both that the rivalry was not  
 
as aggressive as had been supposed and that Brackenbury‟s ability outweighed any  
 
rivalry.    
 
 
In fact their good relationship was nothing new, as two events serve to illustrate.  In a  
 
letter to the Governor-General in October 1886 Roberts discusses appointments in the  
 
Indian Army, in particular the possibility of his needing a new Chief-of-Staff and  
 




  At that time Brackenbury was serving as Head of the  
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Intelligence Branch at the War Office.  This is perhaps related to events that had  
 
happened some months prior to Roberts letter.  When Brackenbury had returned from  
 
Egypt in August 1885 he had been promoted to Major-General but had also been put  
 
on half-pay.  He himself records the reasons for this.   
 
I doubt if it is realised by the public generally how great are the difficulties of 
a military career to an officer who is not possessed of private means.  It would 
have been impossible for me to take a Major-General‟s command at home or 
in the colonies, involving as it would have done furnishing a large house, 
buying horses and carriages, and setting up an expensive establishment for a 
maximum period of five years.  My only chance was India.
23
   
 
The expenses of such an appointment were far less in India and so Brackenbury  
 
appealed to Roberts for a command there.  For his part Roberts was only too pleased  
 
to try and obtain the services of an officer who had already made quite a name for  
 
himself, and along with his good record for management and organisation, had just  
 
returned from leading a column in the field.  However Roberts was unable to obtain  
 
the appointment and within a few months Brackenbury was Head of the Intelligence  
 
Branch.  Brackenbury believed he failed to get the position, despite Roberts help,  
 
because “…the vacancy was wanted for someone else”, and that Roberts, “…. kind  
 
efforts were in vain”.  The real reason seems to be that there was a fear that Roberts,  
 
as an ex-artillery man, was filling all the positions in India with „gunners‟.
24
  At that  
 
time Charles Arbuthnot, Edward Francis Chapman, Edwin Hayter Collen, and George  
 
Pretyman, amongst others, were all ex-artillery men holding commands in India.      
 
 
Bryan Robson, in his edition of the Roberts papers thought that “Roberts clearly  
 
regarded some of his (Brackenbury‟s) views as unsound and found him less congenial  
 
than Chesney and his predecessors”.
25
  He gives no evidence for this judgement, and  
 
there seems little to substantiate it.  There is no doubt that the two men had  
 
differences of opinion, especially when it came to the 'Russian menace'. Brackenbury  
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thought that Russian preparations were a bluff and in this he was supported by the  
 
reports of the Intelligence Branch in London but, either because he did not think it his  
 
place or because he thought Roberts was too set in his ways, he quickly stopped trying  
 
to convince him. When Sir George White succeeded Roberts, Brackenbury made a  
 




 Roberts and Brackenbury also differed on the value and spread of  
 
education in the Army.  Brackenbury had initially felt that Roberts might be against  
 
his appointment and had written to him, “I know that you would rather the post had  
 
been given to another man, but none the less I do feel quite confident that you will  
 
give me every possible help in carrying out the duties devolving upon me”.
27
  Roberts  
 
replied that he had no objection. It appears that any objections Roberts might have  
 
had were due to his preference for a man with more experience of India, rather than  
 
fearing any major clashes over policy with Brackenbury. However, there is no doubt  
 
that they had differences of opinion; they came from two completely different military  
 
backgrounds. Yet there is no evidence of any animosity between them and they  
 
worked well together.  If anything, it could be argued that it was the different  
 
backgrounds of the two men that was the basis of a very good partnership.
28
                   
       
 
In July 1892, with preparations starting to be made for the departure of Lord Roberts,  
 
the Governor-General Lord Lansdowne, considered the “advantage of the present  
 
combination being that Lord Roberts possesses a special knowledge of India and the  
 
Indian Army, while General Brackenbury has considerable experience outside India,  
 
and knowledge of the views held at home”.
29
 A good example of this is found in  
 
correspondence between Roberts and Brackenbury in July 1891. Roberts wanted to  
 
obtain permission from the War Office in London to convert field artillery batteries  
 
into horse artillery batteries.
30
 Brackenbury responded “Knowing, as I do, that more  
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field batteries and not more horse artillery are wanted for the home mobilisation  
 
scheme, I do not think there would be the slightest chance of getting War Office  
 
approval”. As a result the matter was dropped, preventing any chance of a clash  
 
between the British and Indian army and the chance of any further antipathy being  
 
created. Lansdowne hoped that a similar relationship could be maintained with Lord  
 
Roberts successor, an appointment upon which Brackenbury, when asked for his  
 
opinion, said, “I know of only one officer in either the British or the Indian Army of  
 
at all sufficient standing, who possesses all the qualities required in Lord Roberts  
 
successor.  That officer is Major-General Sir George White”.
31
  It was, in fact, White  
 
who succeeded Roberts in 1893 and Brackenbury continued a similarly cordial  
 
relationship with him.   
 
 
Brackenbury‟s part in military reorganisation  
 
If one wants to find any lasting impact made by Brakenbury in India perhaps one of  
 
the easiest ways is to look at his role in the reorganisation of the Indian Army under  
 
one command.  A scheme for such a reorganisation had been floating around for  
 
many years.  Yet it was during Brackenbury's time in India that it was actually put in  
 
place.  The major problem with achieving reorganisation had been the division of  
 
powers that existed in India at that time.  Reorganisation needed the cooperation of  
 
the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief and the Military Member.  It was  
 
only now in the cordial atmosphere that existed between Roberts and Brackenbury  
 
and with the willingness of the Governor-General to trust their advice, that the  
 
circumstances were right for reform.  T. A. Heathcote supports the view that it was  
 




  As a result the posts of Commander-in-Chief of Madras and Bombay  
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were abolished and, although the army was split into four regional commands, it was  
 
now united formally under one Commander-in-Chief. This also had the effect of  
 
further expanding the Military Department. "With the centralising of the army  
 
administration… and the abolition of the presidential C-in-C's and military  
 
departments in 1895, the Military Department had grown in responsibilities,  
 
importance, and power", and therefore so had the Military Member.
33
   
 
 
Brackenbury also helped in the development of the Intelligence Department of the  
 
Indian Army, which had been created in 1890.  His experiences at the War Office  
 
proved useful here. In a detailed letter to Roberts he outlined the best ways for  
 
Intelligence to be carried out and the sort of men who were best suited for this type of  
 
work. He believed that a good Intelligence Branch could be obtained for 50,000  
 
rupees a year. The Accountant General thought this too much but Brackenbury  
 




 Brackenbury wanted the branch to be seen as a stepping- 
 
stone to advancement, thus encouraging the brightest and best of the Indian Army to  
 
join it. The branch was duly established under Lieutenant-Colonel Edmond Elles.  
 
There is evidence of a great deal of correspondence between the two on Intelligence  
 
matters. Elles appears to have been one of the Indian Army officers who panicked  
 
over potential Russian invasion. He believed that Russia was planning a double strike  
 
against India and China. Brackenbury told him that the Intelligence Branch in London  
 
had no evidence to support such ideas and warned Elles, “Avoid being an alarmist.  
 
There is an immense improvement in this respect in the Intelligence Branch  
 
summaries of late”. In his correspondence with Brackenbury, Elles does come  
 
across as an alarmist, at one point advocating attacking the Afghan army and  
 
occupying the country to forestall Russian advancement.
35




In some ways his time in India was a good preparation for what he would experience  
 
as Director General of Ordnance during the South African War. Here he came across  
 
what could be termed false economies which were damaging the military machine. In  
 
a letter to Lord Roberts, dated 16
th
 May 1891, he highlighted such an issue regarding  
 
remounts for cavalry and artillery regiments. Horses were being sent out that were not  
 
fit for service for another year for reasons of age or conditioning.  This was done  
 
largely to save money by keeping the horses a year less at the depots and allowing  
 
new ones to be stored there in preparation for future remounts. Brackenbury felt that: 
 
Surely it it‟s a false economy to have on the strength of regiments and 
batteries horses which are not fit for active service. We cannot ensure that our 
enemies will suit our convenience and wait till the horses have had a year to 
mature, and if they did, we should have to fill up casualties that had occurred 




Whilst Brackenbury had undoubtedly come across similar problems in his career he  
 
was now in a position to do something about it and the situation was changed so that  
 
remounts were not dispatched until a year later.   
 
 
Another key concern of Brackenbury‟s and “The point to which I first turned my  
 
office”, was the preparation of what would in modern military language be called a  
 
rapid reaction force. His plan was to prepare a force of 35,000 men that could be  
 
placed in the field as and when required. One key aim of this force was to meet any  
 
possible Russian invasion of Afghanistan, but Brackenbury admitted that its use was  
 
almost universal. He knew that similar ideas had been considered before but nothing  
 
had been done. Not only did Brackenbury bring his organisational skills to the  
 
problem but he also obtained the support of the Finance Minister of the Government  
 
of India, Sir David Barham. As he wrote:                                                             
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The troops are told off, the commanders and staff named, railway time tables 
are being prepared and are nearly complete. But this is only the paper work. 
The solid preparation is going on rapidly.  
 
Under Brackenbury‟s instructions, “All the stores, commissariat, ordnance, medical,  
 
veterinary, engineering, required for rapid advance are being prepared”.
37
 Such  
 
planning would have been easier for him than that which he had attempted whilst at  
 
the Intelligence Branch. In India he had more of a free hand, partly due to the  
 
seniority of his position but also because of the different nature of the relationship  
 
between military and civilian authority within India. The planning details were  
 
impressive even down to the creation of reserve railway lines in case, for whatever  
 
reason, existing ones could not be used. Such administrative duties, whilst disliked by  
 
most officers, were „exciting‟ to Brackenbury. “The administration of this great  
 
Indian Army is a task of immense interest to me”.
38
 With this basic plan in place he  
 
started to work on expanding it. By April 1893 he was writing that, “Our mobilisation  
 
scheme for putting four divisions, about 70,000 men and line of communication  
 
troops upon the North West Frontier is thoroughly practical and has been worked out  
 
in every detail, and is constantly kept up to date”.
39
 Moreover, because of the level of  
 
control he had he was able to have all the non-perishable stores for this force collected  
 
and available at advanced points.                                  
 
 
Brackenbury and the 'Russian Menace'   
 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the Russian threat was nothing new to him.  His  
 
time in intelligence gave him significant background knowledge of the subject whilst  
 
also keeping him aloof from the situation in India.  He therefore entered India without  
 
any of that obsessive fear of Russian invasion that seemed to grip all those who  
 
served there. Indeed, he urged the Governor-General, Lord Lansdowne to “doubt the  
 
wisdom of leading the Afghans and the people of India to suppose that we are afraid  
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of being attacked on this side of the Indus by the Russian”.
40
 His knowledge of the  
 
wider picture brought an element of realism to the invasion scare. This was an  
 
alternative viewpoint that Lansdowne appreciated. “The touch with Eastern affairs  
 
that I got in my five years in the Intelligence Department is invaluable to me here; and  
 
the Viceroy is good enough to keep me in touch by sending me personally early  
 




     
 
 
It was whilst he had been Head of the Intelligence Branch that he and Major-General  
 
Newmarch, then Military Secretary at the India Office, had been asked to write a  
 
memorandum for the Cabinet on troop deployment and the disposition of a field force  
 
in India after troops had been provided for garrisons.
42
  It is interesting to note that at  
 
the meeting at which the memorandum was agreed upon only two members had  
 
served in India for any period of time, namely Sir Donald Stewart and Major-General  
 
Newmarch.  Yet rather than take the advice from India for discussion by the cabinet,  
 
it was this report alone that formed the basis of the debate.  To an extent this serves to  
 
illustrate the suspicion that existed in Britain that the Indian government and military  
 
tended to panic about a possible invasion and their belief that more troops, and in  
 
particular British ones, were needed to successfully defend and garrison the country.   
 
 
The memorandum itself makes interesting reading on the dangers faced within India.   
 
"We believe that the conditions now obtaining in India are so different from those  
 
which obtained at the time of the mutiny, that a serious military revolt is no longer  
 
within the region of probability".
43
  This is an interesting comment when it is  
 
remembered that the troops in India were still dispersed under schemes designed after  
 
the Mutiny to guard against a repeat.  Until the reorganisation of 1895 troops were  
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scattered throughout India and every major city had its own garrison.  "This made it  
 
difficult to assemble troops in large numbers for exercise and the formation staffs had  
 
little opportunity of training for their active service duties".
44
 Brackenbury and  
 
Newmarch made the point that if the conditions of the Mutiny era no longer existed  
 
then thousands of troops could be used in a field force in the event of any invasion,  
 
thus negating to an extent the need for reinforcements from Britain to guard against  
 
such an attack.  The memorandum goes on,  
 
"But we consider that, in the event of the approach of Russian troops to the 
frontiers of India, or in the event of any serious disaster to the Army of India 
in the field beyond the frontiers, a state of things might arise which would 
demand the presence of strong garrisons".
45
   
 
This is an interesting insight.  One of the reasons for the dispersal of troops  
 
throughout India was the hope that any future mutiny could be isolated to one area  
 
and therefore more easily dealt with. The fear was no longer simply of a mutiny in the  
 
Indian Army, but the possibility of revolt amongst the general populace.  Roberts held  
 
this view and “… he expected 'grave unrest' the moment the Russians entered Kabul,  
 
with worse to follow if they advanced any further".
46
   
 
 
The idea of Indian revolt in the event of war with Russia began to gain support  
 
throughout British India and the Russians helped to build this fear.  The Russian  
 
Colonel Terentiev wrote a book 'Russia and England in the struggle for the Markets of  
 
Central Asia', which was translated into English.  "It was designed to make the flesh  
 
creep, with the prophecy that if Russia ever mounted a serious military challenge to  
 




  That this view was widely held amongst the Russians is evidenced by the  
 
testimony of Captain Ralph Cobbold, who was told at a dinner with Russian officers  
 
that "…the Cossack would prove no match for the Sepoy who, when put to the test,  
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would refuse to fight for his rulers".
48




Indian Army's ability, if not necessarily its willingness, to defeat the Russians.  In a  
 
rare instance of agreement, both Lord Wolseley and Lord Roberts concluded that the  
 
Indian Army would struggle against the Russians.  In August 1889 Wolseley wrote in  
 
response to the memorandum from Brackenbury and Newmarch that he had seen a lot  
 
of the Russian Army in 1883, and that to pit 'native troops' against them, "and risk our  
 
hold on India on the issue, would be, according to my notions, a mad crime."
49
  His  
 
arch rival wrote similarly in March 1890:  
 
"I have no hesitation in stating that except the Gurkhas, Dogrras, Sikhs, the 
pick of the Punjabi Muhammadans, Hindustanis of the Jay and Ranghur castes 
(Such as enlist in our Cavalry) and certain classes of Pathans, there are no 
Native soldiers in our service whom we could venture in safety to place in the 
field against the Russian… I should be sorry to find myself in front of a 
European foe unless my forces were composed of as many Europeans as 
Natives".
50
   
 
These comments were all perhaps a little unfair.  The Indian Army had faced the  
 
Afghans and Pathan tribesmen with distinction.  Whilst the Russians might have more  
 
modern equipment they would not match the ferocity of the Indian Army's previous  
 
enemies.  The anxiety remained in India that the Indian Army would need reinforcing  
 
from Britain.  However there was a real possibility that British reinforcements might  
 
not be available.  In 1887 Lord Stanhope, the Secretary of State for War, responded to  
 
a despatch from the Government of India:  
 
"It is evidently far from improbable that the same circumstances which 
necessitated a mobilisation in India might also render it impossible for this 
country to part with any considerable portion of the small number of regular 
troops in the United Kingdom".
51
   
 










There were many supporters of the so called 'forward' school of thought that wanted  
 
to pre-empt any Russian invasion and safeguard India by pushing as far into Central  
 
Asia as possible, a view which Brackenbury said, “is one which my judgement  
 
condemns as thoroughly unsound”.
52
  They wanted Britain to secure Kandahar, Kabul  
 
and even Herat on the Persian border, as fortresses to stop any Russian invasion.   
 
Although not one of the 'forward' school, Brackenbury held the view "that we can  
 
never allow Russian troops to occupy or enter either Kabul or Kandahar, and that we  
 
must defend the Kabul-Kandahar alignment".
53
  Much of his work for a time revolved  
 
around the strengthening of garrisons and communications on the Northwest Frontier.   
 
In particular he was concerned that there must be a sufficiently good road through the  
 




  This would make any response to a Russian invasion much more  
 
efficient and effective, without going to the extreme, and costly option, put forward  
 
by the forward school.  The probability of a speedy British response to any invasion  
 
might again help to deter the Russians. 
 
 
Whilst knowing that it was his job to try and plan for every eventuality, it is clear that  
 
Brackenbury had grave doubts about the prospect of a Russian invasion.  In a  
 
memorandum of August 1889 he wrote, "the Field Force, as distinct from the local or  
 
garrison troops, which Russia now has in Transcaspia and Turkestan, is about 34,000  
 
men, 6,500 horses, and 80 guns". This was hardly an invasion force, even if the  
 
Russians envisaged support from Afghanistan and a popular uprising in India itself,  
 
especially when it is remembered that some of this force would have had to be used to  
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secure the lines of communication, which would have left a field army of  
 
approximately 20,000 men.  Moreover, any force would have to be supplied through  
 
inhospitable country.  Obviously there was the possibility of additional troops but  
 
Brackenbury was not sure of the likelihood of this.  "The numbers by which this army  
 
could be reinforced must necessarily depend upon the attitude of other powers  
 
whenever Russia and Great Britain may find themselves at war".
55
  Almost certainly  
 
as a result of his time as Head of the Intelligence Branch, Brackenbury was able to see  
 
the broader picture that was perhaps not as clear to those in office in India with more  
 
parochial views.  Much had been written on Russia within the Intelligence Branch  
 
whilst he had been its head, in particular 'Russia's power to concentrate troops in  
 
Central Asia', and Captain J. Wolfe Murray's 'Military operations in the event of war  
 
with Russia', although the latter was actually published just a few months after  
 
Brackenbury had left the branch.  Again this shows that although he had never  
 
previously served in India for any length of time, he did have substantial knowledge  
 
of the major issues.  Wolfe Murray's report talked of the inevitability of a war  
 
between Russia and Britain expanding into a much broader conflict.
56
  He noted the  
 
importance of Turkey and discussed the possible scenarios of Turkey being either  
 
friend, foe or neutral. This report also considered the likelihood of French support for  
 
Russia and in a way, foretold the Franco-Russian Military Convention signed two  
 
years later.  This was nothing new to Brackenbury as in August 1886 he had revealed  
 
to the Cabinet the existence of Russian plans to attack India and discussed the  
 
possibility of a Franco-Russian alliance, and its anti-British purpose.
57
   
 
 
This was one of the reasons why Brackenbury supported the view that Indian  
 
preparations for invasion had to concentrate solely on troops already in India.  Even if  
 
troops could be found from the British Army to send to India, there was a real  
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possibility that their arrival could be delayed until the Royal Navy had achieved  
 
supremacy at sea.  Brackenbury knew that if this meant war with the French and  
 
Russian Navy combined it could take some time before such supremacy could be  
 
achieved.  He also wrote, in 1891, of the vital role that the Turkish Empire would play  
 
in any conflict, supporting the view of Wolfe Murray.  Presuming that only Turkey  
 




In that case we should only have to deal with the forces present in Trans-
Caspia and Turkestan. These, inclusive of all local troops, amount to about 
50,000, and, as Russia must guard her Chinese and Persian frontiers, and 
cannot, any more than ourselves, disperse with obligatory garrisons, I estimate 
the forces available for operations in Afghanistan at not more than 30,000; and 
I cannot but think that the 30,000 British and 70,000 Native troops, which the 
Commander-in-Chief admits to be available, would be sufficient to hold the 
lines of communication and the Kabul-Kandahar alignment against such 
portion of these 30,000 men as would (for Russia also would have 
communications to defend) reach that alignment.
58
   
 
 
In fact, on the 27
th
 June 1892, he went further: "…in the event of the war becoming  
 
general, it is, in my opinion, certain that Russia would withdraw, rather than reinforce,  
 
her troops in Central Asia".
59
  Whilst we can never know how accurate Brackenbury  
 
was on these matters, the fact that there was no Russian invasion does lend weight to  
 
his argument.  His knowledge and experience would have also strengthened his case.   
 
There were several periods during this 'cold war' when, if Russia had the ability to  
 
invade, the conditions would have been right to do so.  Perhaps the most obvious  
 
moments would have been after the last Afghan War, the Gordon relief expedition,  
 
and perhaps most notably the South African War.  This has to be seen as one of  
 
Brackenbury's most significant contributions during his time in India.  There were too  
 
many who saw a Russian invasion of India purely in that context, as a straight fight  
 
between the two powers, and were blinded by an Indo-centric view.  Brackenbury  
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brought knowledge of affairs outside of India that was invaluable.  Some in India  
 
would have been aware of potential allies that Britain would have in a war with  
 
Russia but Brackenbury not only knew this but was also aware of the likelihood of  
 
these powers joining Britain in any conflict.  It must be remembered that a much of  
 
Brackenbury's early work at the Intelligence Branch was concerned with the  
 
construction of mobilisation plans and the defence of Great Britain.  Being the  
 
strategist and administrator he was, he will have looked at who these plans were being  
 
prepared against and who were potential allies.  In terms of home defence the greatest  
 
threat was France, and France's strengthening relationship with Russia might cause  
 
further problems for Britain. 
 
 
Whilst Britain had no formal alliances the practicalities of international relations  
 
would mean that they would soon have found some in the event of a Franco-Russian  
 
war against Britain.  Both Brackenbury and Roberts had agreed that the next major  
 
war was likely to be one "in which France and Russia would be engaged on the one  
 
side, and the Triple Alliance and Great Britain on the other side".
60
 Indeed this was  
 
the predominant view in the British Army for many years to come.  In Brackenbury's  
 
own experiences there was evidence to suggest the likelihood of the Triple Alliance  
 
supporting Britain.  Whilst he was at the Intelligence Branch he would have been  
 
aware of the negotiations with Austria, when Britain and Austria joined forces to  
 
prevent an enlarged Bulgaria becoming a puppet state of Russia.
61
  Keeping Russia in  
 
check was not only in Britain's interest.  This may well have played an important part  
 
in leading Brackenbury to the conclusion that the Austro-Hungarian Empire was a  
 
likely ally if Russia invaded India and initiated a wider war.  Their support would  
 
bring with it Italian, and more importantly, German support under the terms of the  
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Triple Alliance.  The writings and thinking of many in the military, and in particular  
 
Brackenbury, over the British position in the European Alliance system are  
 
fascinating, especially in light of what we know happened in 1914.  Whilst Turkey  
 
had its problems with Britain they were also aware that, in their war with Russia in  
 
1877-1878, it had only been the presence of the Royal Navy's Mediterranean Fleet in  
 
the Dardanelles and Disraeli's threat to use it, that had halted the Russian Army on  
 
the outskirts of Constantinople.  If war was fought along these lines then the Russians  
 
would be able to support their troops in Central Asia.  In fact, the opposite was more  
 
likely.  With German and Austro-Hungarian armies on her borders, and a possible  
 
Anglo-Turkish attack through the Black Sea, Russia would want to recall troops from  
 
Central Asia, especially given that these were some of their most experienced  
 
soldiers. Although all this goes beyond Brackenbury‟s role in India that is in itself a  
 
pertinent point. At this time there was no planning for imperial defence, and thus it  
 
was almost inevitable that Indian planning would be devoid of any wider thoughts of  
 
strategy. Indeed, there were no formal links for cooperation between the British and  
 
Indian armies and indeed an air of distrust and suspicion existed between the two.  
 
Whilst Brackenbury‟s responsibility for planning only encompassed India it was  
 
inevitable that his views would be influenced by his wider knowledge, especially that  
 
gained from his time in intelligence. His former colleagues in the Branch were still, of  
 
course, supplying him with material. One such report, received from Grierson, led  
 
him to comment:  
 
What he (Grierson) says as to Russia‟s attention being directed westwards not 
eastwards is quite correct. But I find it difficult to get officers who have 
passed their lives in India to look beyond their own margins. Russia‟s whole 
present aim in the east is to keep us constantly guessing, and to so alarm us by 
her intrigues and her military demonstrations as to make us believe we cannot 
spare a man from India to act against her farther west; and she has effectually 
succeeded.
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Whilst there were many Russian generals who advocated an invasion of India, and  
 
some even drew up plans, these were more often than not just 'war games'.  Even the  
 
highly rated General Alexei Kuropatkin, who later lost some of his reputation in the  
 
Russo-Japanese War, joined in the hysteria and asked for command of the invasion  
 
force.  The practicalities of the scheme were always likely to make it a non-starter.   
 
To have been successful any invasion would have needed support from Afghanistan,  
 
if only the promise of free passage, which was unlikely as the Russians were as  
 
unpopular as the British in that country, together with a popular uprising in India on a  
 
far bigger scale than even the Indian Mutiny.  The Russians would also have needed  
 
the support of the tribes in Russian-held Central Asia, and British Intelligence saw  
 
these as possible British allies.  However despite, the difficulties at the Russian end,  
 
the main concern of the British was whether the Indian Army, and elements of the  
 
British Army stationed in India, could even deal with an invasion of 30,000 men and  
 
the elements of the British Army stationed in India.  With the best of the Indian and  
 
British troops it was likely that the invasion could be dealt with.  Yet one sees in the  
 
writings of those in the Government of India the fear that preoccupied many about  
 
putting 'native' troops up against Europeans.  The British had beaten numerically  
 
superior native armies with fewer than the 30,000 Russian troops that could possibly  
 
have invaded.  Such concerns were rather disparaging to the Indian Army who were  
 
not only trained along European lines, and commanded by European officers, but  
 
many of them came from societies with proud military heritages.  It was also an army  
 
that was as experienced at warfare as any in the world as it had been involved in  
 
almost constant campaigning since the Mutiny.  Whilst these campaigns may have  
 
been against inferior opponents they were not without their value, if only for the  
 
experience of being under fire in combat conditions.  All the evidence suggested that  
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a Russian invasion was unlikely, and in any case would be repulsed, though   
 
Brackenbury believed that an invasion might be attempted if only as part of a much  
 
broader strategy in a conflict against Britain by Russian and France.  He suggested  
 
that such an invasion might be used in the knowledge that it would tie down large  
 
numbers of troops and resources that could otherwise be employed elsewhere.  It  
 
would have meant all of the Indian and British contingents in India staying there and  
 
therefore not being available for any other campaign. 
 
 
Conclusion    
 
In a letter dated 4
th
 May 1895 Brackenbury wrote to his old friend Sir John Ardagh  
 
that: "I have entered upon my last year in India, and shall not be sorry when it is over.   
 
I am nearly worn out".
63
  In similar vein he wrote to Sir Edward Markham: “It is by  
 




 Brackenbury's 'workaholic' nature and his practice of regularly working into  
 
the early hours of the morning made it unsurprising that his four years up to that  
 
point had left him in such a condition.  He had a demanding job, virtually controlling  
 
the entire administrative machine for the Indian Army. It must be remembered that the  
 
climate in the sub-continent was not conducive to the health of the average  
 
'European'.  As early as August 1893 he was complaining to Grierson about the effect  
 
it was having on his health. Whilst in India he experienced gout, sciatica and malaria.  
 




 Brackenbury left India in April 1896, as his appointment was for five  
 
years.  His ability at organisation had quickly been put to good effect.  Fresh from the  
 
drawing up of mobilisation plans at home, he set about reorganising those of the  
 
Indian Army.  In September1891 he wrote that he had been able to make the  
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mobilisation plans more efficient and reduce the cost "….without excluding anything  
 
the absence of which would delay taking the field".
66
  He had also played a key part in  
 
the reorganisation of the command structure which also helped to streamline and  
 
strengthen the Indian Army.  It is not too strong to say that the Indian Army was in  
 
better condition because of the time spent by Brackenbury in India.  The whole  
 
system of supply, transport, communications, disposition and mobilisation had  
 
improved under his administration.  He also brought useful knowledge of the strategic  
 
situation outside of India and his realisation that Russian invasion would be part of a  
 
much wider conflict between the great powers brought some much needed reality to  
 
the concerns of those in power there.  Brackenbury showed that not only were there  
 
numerous problems with a Russian invasion but also that the size of such a force was  
 
not likely to be the horde of Russians streaming over the border that was the common  
 
misconception, and as an ex-head of the Intelligence Branch of the British Army, he  
 




  He wrote at length to Roberts and Lord Lansdowne on the  
 
subject, giving advice that varied from how best to carry out intelligence gathering  
 
missions to the best sort of men for the job.   
 
 
This highlights another interesting facet of Brackenbury's time in India.  Although  
 
having a direct line of communication with the Governor-General, he continually  
 
writes to Roberts, and later Sir George White when he was Commander-in-Chief,  
 
before presenting his ideas to the Governor-General.  Perhaps this is one of the  
 
reasons for the success of the relationship between Commander-in-Chief and Military  
 
Member during these years.  It perhaps reflects his respect for Roberts but may also  
 
be admission of his own relative lack of experience on Indian matters.  The  
 
appointment of Military Member usually went to someone on the basis of their  
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knowledge on Indian issues.  This obviously was not the case with Brackenbury, but  
 
the partnership worked well, as Lansdowne said, because of Roberts's expert  
 
knowledge of India, which made up for Brackenbury‟s limitations in this area, and  
 
Brackenbury's knowledge and experience of military and political matters outside of  
 
India.  Brackenbury's skill as an administrator would have proved invaluable  
 
anywhere and his recent appointments commanding troops in Sudan and being in  
 
charge of the Intelligence Branch meant that he had very useful recent experience that  
 
was put to good effect in India.   
 
 
In light of this his time in India has to be seen as a success.  He returned with an  
 
increased reputation as a man with experience not just in Africa, Britain and the War  
 
Office, but now also India.  There were few who had his all round experience.   
 
Perhaps the only other man in this period who ever achieved this was Lord Roberts  
 
himself.  Brackenbury returned to England in 1896 and took up his new appointment  
 
as President of the Ordnance Committee, which stood him in good stead when, at the  
 
pinnacle of his career, he took on the appointment of director-General of the  
 
Ordnance, at a time when the South African War stretched the department to breaking  
 
point.  There can be little doubt that his experience in the Military Department in  
 
India proved useful. By 1896 Brackenbury had served in two important administrative  
 
appointments. In each he had met with success. More importantly others had  
 
recognised that. As we have seen Lord Lansdowne had praised his work, and they had  
 
developed a close working and personal relationship. This was to prove important for  
 
Brackenbury‟s future prospects. Lansdowne‟s time as Viceroy ended in January 1894  
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Brackenbury was appointed to the position of Director General of Ordnance in  
 
February 1899. As on his arrival at the Intelligence Branch, he was given a reforming  
 
brief. Lord Wolseley, now Commander-in-Chief, had argued with the previous  
 
Director General, Sir Edward Markham, over the necessity of the complete rearming  
 
of all types of artillery. Perhaps surprisingly it was Wolseley and not the artillery  
 
officer who saw the necessity for this. In response to Wolseley‟s pressure Markham  
 
set up a series of trials designed to prove the ability of existing guns.
1
 Wolseley  
 
decided at this point that a new Director General of Ordnance was needed, and with  
 
the support of the Secretary of State for War, Lord Lansdowne, the position was  
 
offered to Brackenbury.  
 
 
The accusation that Wolseley was once again promoting the same of members of the  
 
„ring‟ is not without foundation and it is doubtful that Brackenbury would have been  
 
the first choice of many of the other leading generals of the day. It must be  
 
remembered that by this stage the „ring‟ had all but collapsed. The members of it were  
 
now all so senior that they no longer felt the need for Wolseley‟s patronage, added to  
 
which they had fallen out amongst themselves, as the Gordon Relief expedition had  
 
illustrated. Wolseley had in fact had a major disagreement with Brackenbury,  
 
although it is doubtful that Brackenbury realised this. As we have seen Wolseley had  
 
taken offence at Brackenbury‟s part in the Hartington Commission‟s recommendation  
 
that the office of Commander-in-Chief be abolished and replaced with a Chief-of- 
 
Staff. Wolseley saw this as an attempt by Brackenbury to become the first Chief-of- 
 





where he had become too close to Lord Roberts for Wolseley‟s liking. Again, as we  
 
have seen in the previous chapter, Brackenbury had used his considerable knowledge  
 
to help advance Roberts position in various debates with the home government.  
 
Despite the aforementioned difficulties Wolseley recommended Brackenbury‟s  
 
appointment, which perhaps is further evidence for the reputation Brackenbury had  
 
made for himself. Just as important in Brackenbury‟s appointment was the  
 
relationship he had built with Lord Lansdowne when the latter had been Viceroy  
 
during his time as Military Member. As we saw in the previous chapter, Lansdowne  
 
held him in high regard. That Brackenbury was able to achieve what he did was  
 
thanks to him being in the enviable position of having the full backing and  
 
cooperation, not to mention trust and confidence, of both the Commander-in-Chief  
 
and the Secretary of State.    
 
 
Brackenbury set about a thorough investigation of his department and its  
 




 When war came in South Africa in October 1899 Brackenbury had started  
 
the rearmament of the costal artillery and had nearly finished his assessment of the  
 
department. This chapter will look at the very difficult situation that Brackenbury  
 
faced during the South African War and the way in which he responded to the  
 
strenuous demands of the conflict. A major source is the evidence he gave to the  
 
Royal Commission on the War in South Africa, commonly called the Elgin  
 
Commission after its chairman the Earl of Elgin and Kincardine.
3
 Brackenbury was  
 
in a strong position. He could not reasonably be held responsible for the state the  
 
department was in having only taken over command eight months previously. It was  
 
obvious that the problems went back much further than that. He was also the recipient  
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of much praise for the way he had dealt with the crisis in the department and had  
 
initiated large-scale reforms. His reputation preceded him and as a result the  
 
commission, and in particular one of its leading members Viscount Esher, dealt  
 
with him much more gently than many of the others who came before it.
4
 The result  
 
was that he left a fascinating insight into the working of the Ordnance Department,  
 
and his evidence shows the working of a vital but sometimes ignored part of any  
 
military campaign.          
 
 
The South African War 
 
To know where to begin when explaining the causes of the South African War is  
 
difficult. The clash between Dutch and English in South Africa can be traced back to  
 
the British capture of the Cape in 1793. Although returned to the Dutch in 1802 it was  
 
recaptured by Britain in 1806 and after this the British presence remained. The Dutch  
 
settlers, commonly referred to as Boers, disliked the imposition of British laws and in  
 
1835 this led to an eventual 14,000 Boers leaving British territory in what became  
 
known as the Great Trek in the hope of establishing their own state. One of the  
 
biggest problems facing them was the number of „hostile‟ tribes that surrounded it. By  
 
1877 the Boer settler state of the Transvaal had been annexed by the British as their  
 
influence in Southern Africa expanded. This was not welcomed but largely accepted  
 
by the Boers, and for two reasons. It did much to put the bankrupt Transvaal back on  
 
a sound financial footing; also the British were removing one by one the threat that  
 
the tribes had posed to the Boers. It was no coincidence that the first major Boer  
 
rebellion against British rule came shortly after the defeat of the Zulu nation, the most  
 
powerful of those tribes. The decision to annex the Transvaal had been taken by  
 
Disraeli‟s Conservative government in 1877. Gladstone‟s Liberals vehemently  
 
opposed this; yet Gladstone refused to grant independence when he met a Boer  
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delegation shortly after his return to office in 1880. In December of that year the  
 
Boers rebelled against British rule. 
 
 
A short-lived war commenced in which a severe defeat was inflicted on the British at  
 
Majuba Hill. The Boers were granted independence, but the British retained  
 
„suzerainty‟; a fact later denied by the Boers. The peace was conducted swiftly. This  
 
was partly because Gladstone wanted to get out quickly from what he saw as an  
 
embarrassing „moral‟ problem, knowing that public opinion would now be in favour  
 
of a revenge annexation of the Transvaal. Moreover the Boers were happy to deal on  
 
the right terms as they had achieved a great success and feared the despatch of a more  
 
potent British force. Within the British army feelings were running high. There were  
 
rumours of possible mutiny amongst officers and men who were disgruntled that they  
 
had no chance to „avenge Majuba‟, something which was to become a common cry  
 
during the South African War.
5
 Lord Wolseley, his judgment somewhat clouded by  
 
the death at Majuba of his friend George Colley, never forgave either the Indian Army  
 
or troops from India, who he blamed for the defeat, or Evelyn Wood who took over  
 
from Colley and under instructions from London signed the peace. Wolseley felt that  
 





In the years that followed the importance of the Transvaal grew thanks to the  
 
discovery of large gold deposits there in 1886. This meant that the Transvaal had the  
 
financial means to remain independent. The Transvaal, and the other Boer state, the  
 
Orange Free State, had been allowed to retain independence by the British in the hope  
 
that ultimately financial necessity would draw them into a South African Union.  
 
When this became unlikely the hope was that the thousands of foreign workers,  
 
generally referred to as the Uitlanders, many of whom were British, who had been  
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attracted by the gold, would eventually dominate the Boers who they outnumbered  
 
considerably. Yet this was unrealistic and, more and more, commercial dominance  
 
was moving from the Cape to the Transvaal.  
 
 
In July 1895 Joseph Chamberlain was appointed secretary of State for the Colonies  
 




 He was not alone. Many, although not all, as is often suggested, of the  
 
industrialists, financiers and businessmen, in South Africa shared this view. Most  
 
notable was Cecil Rhodes, the founder of the De Beers Diamond Company and  
 
Consolidated Gold Fields, one of the richest men in the world. Partially motivated by  
 
profit, but largely motivated by economic imperialism, he resolved that British  
 
dominance of the Transvaal must be established. In this he had the unofficial support  
 
of Chamberlain.  
 
 
Under the banner of supporting the rights of foreign workers in the Transvaal to have  
 
equal citizenship, which at present they were being denied, Rhodes private army of  
 




December 1895. It was hoped they would be supported by a Uitlander uprising. The  
 
uprising never materialised and the Boers ambushed the invasion force. Jameson  
 
suffered 65 casualties, 16 of which were dead. The Boers lost one man. The military  
 
disaster was nothing compared to the political one. Rhodes was forced to resign as  
 
Prime Minister of Cape Colony. Awkward questions were asked about whether  
 
Chamberlain had played any part in the matter. The Germans took the opportunity for  
 
some sabre rattling and despatched a cruiser to Delagoa Bay in Portuguese East  
 
Africa. The Kaiser sent a telegram of congratulation to the Boer President Paul  
 
Kruger. A British Committee of Inquiry largely whitewashed over the events. Neither  
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Chamberlain nor Rhodes would attack the other for fear of the damage they could  
 





In the aftermath of these events the British Government despatched a new Governor  
 
of the Cape and High Commissioner of South Africa, Alfred Milner. His mission was  
 
to repair British relations in South Africa and to continue the political struggle against  
 
Kruger and the Transvaal. Though his policies and actions have often been seen as  
 
preparing for the South African War, it has more recently been suggested that he was  
 
merely responding to the actions of the Transvaal.
9
 Yet there is no doubt that his  
 
failure to explain himself to those in South Africa made the situation more difficult. It  
 
deteriorated to the point where that the Transvaal declared war on the 11
th
 October  
 
1899. By this time 10,000 British troops had been dispatched to South Africa and the  
 
former Commander-in-Chief in India, Sir George White, had been sent to command  
 
the forces. The decision was reached on the 7
th
 October to mobilise the 1st Army  
 
Corps for service in South Africa. By the end of November this had been despatched  
 
to South Africa, along with a cavalry division and seven battalions of line of  
 
communication troops, in all 50,000 men.  
 
 
The achievement of mobilising and despatching such a force is often lost in light of  
 
the military defeats that followed. It has also been argued that no other nation in the  
 




 The mobilisation scheme was helped by the fact that the autumn  
 
manoeuvres of 1898 had provided some preparation and a work out for the plans.  
 
Soldiers and reservists reported promptly to their stations and were taken by train to  
 
the ports of embarkation, often before there were ships ready to take them.
11
 This was  
 
particularly impressive as the Admiralty was geared to expansion in time of war,  
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keeping a full register of all merchant ships available and suitable. It is worth  
 
remembering that at the time this was the largest fighting force ever despatched by  
 
Britain, and it had been achieved with ease. This was largely thanks to the fact that the  
 
military side of the War Office and Admiralty had started preparing for war in April  
 
1899. They prepared as much as they could, but there were some things that had to  
 
wait until political approval for the added expenditure was given in late September.  
 
Though rightly criticised for much during the war in terms of the way it was fought,  
 
the accusation that the Army was unready for war was unfair in the extreme. The War  
 
Office had done all it could before the political decision to release the necessary  
 
finance to fund the final preparations. Although there had been modifications to the  
 
mobilisation scheme since Brackenbury had originally introduced it, in particular by  
 
Colonel Ardagh, he had the right to feel proud of what his creation achieved.   
 
 
Whilst the preparation and despatch of the Army was excellent the course of the war  
 
was not. The early set backs could be put down to the fact that fewer than 15,000  
 
British troops confronted about 30,000 Boers.
12
 Matters were not helped by the  
 
decision of General White to allow himself to be besieged in Ladysmith. Debate rages  
 




 Yet it was a strange choice given that he had a field force that was not  
 
prepared for a siege, and White himself owed a debt to the fact that long-range naval  
 
guns were despatched to Ladysmith at the last minute. The setbacks were  
 
understandable, if still surprising, and it was felt that Boer success would be short- 
 
lived once the army corps under General Sir Redvers Buller arrived. Buller was a  
 
brave and fearless leader, but had little idea of command and tactics. Command of an  
 





 It was the series of defeats in what was to be called „Black Week‟  
 
that were inexcusable in the eyes of the British public. This led to the relegation of  
 
Buller to a smaller role whilst Lord Roberts, assisted by the „hero‟ of the Sudan  
 
campaign, Lord Kitchener, were appointed to overall command. By late 1900 the  
 
Boer Army in the field had been defeated and Pretoria their capital had fallen. It was  
 
largely presumed that the war was over and Roberts departed leaving Kitchener to  
 
complete the mopping up operation. However the war carried on for two more costly  
 
years as the Boers embarked on a guerrilla campaign.  
            
 
Controversy still reigns about the distribution of „blame‟ concerning the war. In the  
 
immediate aftermath of the war the press and popular literature criticised the  
 




 Whilst ultimately the failures of the army were the responsibility of  
 
ministers and the cabinet, it is unfair to completely exonerate the soldiers. A large  
 
degree of over confidence was present in the War Office at the outbreak of the war.  
 
Lord Wolseley, once the dynamic driving force of military reform, had largely  
 
resigned himself to the state of things in the War Office, and after his appointment as  
 
Commander-in-Chief had attempted little reform or modernisation. Wolseley was by  
 
this stage old, ill and bitter.
16
 Buller has subsequently taken much of the blame for his  
 
mishandling of the war. It is difficult to argue with this. His evidence to the Royal  
 
Commission and his angry response to criticism made it all the easier for those who  
 
wished to use him as a scapegoat. It had been almost fifteen years since he had been  
 
on active service, the same period of time as Brackenbury. He had never wanted the  
 
command in the first place, perhaps realising his own weaknesses he had said:  
 
I have always considered that I was better as second in a complex military 
affair than as an officer in chief command…. I had never been in a position 





His biggest problem was indecision. His plans were usually right enough but he had  
 
the habit of changing them at the last minute, which probably came from a lack of  
 
confidence in his own ability. He was also apt to send rash signals, such as the one to  
 
White at Ladysmith advising him to fire-off the remainder of his ammunition and  
 
surrender on the best terms he could. This signal was particularly damaging, but he  
 
made things worse by criticising Lansdowne and the War Office, who were able to  
 
contradict him with his own words.
18
 Buller, unsurprisingly given the stress and series  
 
of costly defeats that he suffered, probably had some type of mental breakdown. His  
 
state of mind was not helped by the fact that he saw himself as being surrounded by  
 
enemies on his own side, caused by the presence of „Indians‟. It was true that men  
 
such as Roberts, White and Hamilton, had no love for Buller, and saw him as the  
 







Despite the continuing debate on who was to „blame‟, it cannot be argued that the  
 
South African War was anything other than a severe defeat, albeit a technical victory,  
 
for Britain. It pointed to some weaknesses in the British Army, in terms of equipment,  
 
organisation, administration and training. It also demonstrated the folly of relying  
 
solely on the Royal Navy for the security of Britain and the Empire. The war did  
 
however mean that many of the defects, whilst not all, that were present in the British  
 
Army were remedied in the years leading up to the First World War. Field Marshal  
 
Lord Carver made the point that the Boer War was a blessing in disguise for the  
 





The remainder of this chapter looks at the way in which Brackenbury dealt with the  
 
crisis in the Ordnance Department that the South African War created. The main  
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problem was that the war was to be fought on a scale which neither the War Office  
 
nor the Army had foreseen. Departments and systems of administration that worked  
 
sluggishly during peacetime were barely able to deal with the colonial campaigns that  
 
never involved much above 40,000 men. However, the South African War was on a  
 
completely different level. Almost half a million men were mobilised from Britain  
 
and the Empire. Yet there was no mechanism to increase the scale of administration  
 
of the War Office to manage such a force. It was not just the administration that was  
 
unprepared. The level of reserves of ordnance and stores was again insufficient to deal  
 
with even the size of traditional colonial campaigns. As the forces despatched and  
 
maintained in South Africa continued to expand it quickly became clear that not only  
 
were the reserves quickly used up but that the ordnance factories and the „trade‟ were  
 
unable to meet the demand.   
  
 
Entering the Ordnance Department 
 
Brackenbury had returned from India in 1896 and in May of that year he was  
 
appointed to the post of President of the Ordnance Committee by the Secretary of  
 
State for War Lord Lansdowne who, it will be remembered, Brackenbury had served  
 
under in India. Brackenbury himself whilst giving evidence to the Royal Commission  
 
explained his duties. 
                                 
The Ordnance Committee is a consultative body, which is appointed to take up 
such questions as may be referred to them by the Director General of 
Ordnance. It is not an initiative body; it is a consultative body. It is a body 
which has upon it as President a General of Artillery, the Vice President is an 
Admiral of the Navy, and the members are two Artillery officers, an Engineer 
officer, two Naval officers, a consulting officer from India, two civil 
engineers, Sir Frederick Bramwell, and Sir Benjamin Barker; and the other 
members are members for special purposes, for instance, the chemist of the 
War Department and Dr Dupre, the chemist of the Home Department, and 




It can therefore be seen that alongside his knowledge as a serving artillery officer who  
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had experience of active service Brackenbury also brought to the position knowledge  
 
of the workings of the Ordnance Department through his experience with the  
 
Ordnance Committee.  
 
 
He continued as President of the Ordnance Committee until being offered the position  
 
as Director General of the Ordnance. Whilst Wolseley had pushed for Brackenbury‟s  
 
appointment after his quarrels with Markham, it must be added that his decision had  
 
the full support of Lansdowne. Lansdowne stated that he felt Brackenbury was “head  
 
and shoulders above all competitors” for the position.
22
 In short they were looking for  
 
a repeat of his performance in reforming the Intelligence Department. With the  
 
backing of the Commander-in-Chief and the Secretary of State for War Brackenbury  
 
would have the support he needed to undertake change. However, this was a much  
 
greater challenge than the Intelligence Department, if only because of the size of his  
 
new responsibility. The Ordnance Department was one of the major appointments at  
 
the War Officer, on a par with the Adjutant General and the Quartermaster General. It  
 
had also recently gained added responsibilities.  
 
 
The department that Brackenbury entered had a wider set of responsibilities than the  
 
mere name suggests. Under the Order in Council of the 7
th
 March 1899,                                                                                                                  
 
The Director General of Ordnance is charged with supplying the Army with 
warlike stores, equipment and clothing; with the direction of the Ordnance 
Committee and the manufacturing departments of the Army; with dealing with 
questions of armament, patterns, inventions, and designs; and with the 





Many of these responsibilities were fairly new to the department never mind  
 
Brackenbury. The clothing side had been taken over by the Ordnance Department in  
 
December 1898, and Brackenbury had made it a condition of accepting the position  
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that the ordnance factories were also placed under his command. 
 
 
The Transfer of the Ordnance Factories   
 




 The ordnance factories were the major source of arms and equipment  
 
for the army, but they had been allowed to get into a poor condition. Relations  
 
between the Financial Department of the War Office and the factories were not good  
 
and there was little consultation, nor any mechanism for it. After the transfer of  
 
control the Director of Ordnance Factories was made directly responsible to  
 
Brackenbury. Added to this was the antiquated equipment with which the factories  
 
were working. There were two main reasons for this. Firstly, reasons of economy  
 
meant that new investment had not been undertaken. Secondly, the civilian side of the  
 
War Office seems to have operated a policy of not wanting to step on the toes of „the  
 
trade‟, that is the private arms firms who provided the remainder of the army and  
 
navy munitions. The power of British industry was considered to be such that the  
 
trade could cover any deficiencies in the ordnance factories. This was a bubble that  
 





Brackenbury‟s time as President of the Ordnance Committee, from his return from  
 
India in 1896 until his appointment as Director General of Ordnance, in 1899, had  
 
alerted him to this deficiency and the South African War was to demonstrate further  
 
the antiquated machinery and practices of the ordnance factories. The main problem  
 
that Brackenbury saw was that the factories were under the direction of the Financial  
 
Secretary at the War Office, Mr Powell-Williams, who was a civilian. Brackenbury  
 
told the Royal Commission that, as a result, the management of the factories had  
 
become divorced from the needs and requirements of the army.
26
 Brackenbury‟s  
 
 252 
belief in the necessity of this section being under control of the Director General of  
 
Ordnance was justified by the events of the South African War. As he said before the  
 
Royal Commission:  
 
If the Director General of Ordnance, instead of being able to go direct to his 
head of the factories, and turn him off from his work on to that work, to suit 
the exigencies of the moment, had had to go with his hat in his hand to the 
Financial Secretary and ask that this, that, and the other might be done, I do 




Although Brackenbury made a valid point, it must be pointed out that a large amount  
 
of the material for South Africa, especially clothing and stores still had to be supplied  
 
largely by the „trade‟, but the change undoubtedly made things easier for him.      
 
 
Brackenbury‟s demand that the ordnance factories be placed under his control as a  
 
condition of his acceptance of the position prompted an interesting political debate.  
 
The Financial Secretary of the War Office, who despite Lansdowne‟s assurances to  
 
the contrary, saw the removal as a comment on his abilities, opposed the removal of  
 
the ordnance factories from his control. To an extent he was correct and it was a  
 
comment on his abilities, as Brackenbury and Lansdowne both clashed with him over  
 
matters of inspection and his dealings with the trade. One of St John Broderick‟s first  
 
duties on becoming Secretary of State for War in October 1900 was to remove  
 
Powell-Williams from his job. Arthur Balfour wrote of Powell-Williams that, “He  
 
would never have got even his present place except as the immediate personal friend  
 
and follower of Joe”.
28
 „Joe‟ was Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the  
 
Colonies and as the unofficial leader of the faction that split from the Liberal Party to  
 
join the Conservative Party, a figure of importance. As we have seen already, in  
 
regards to the Jameson Raid, he was also controversial, and the role of companies of  
 
which his brother was chairman and he himself had an interest will be touched on  
 
later. It is unsurprising then that Chamberlain opposed the transfer of control of the  
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 This however missed the point that Lansdowne was also convinced of the  
 
necessity of the change, as was evidenced by his defence of the policy in cabinet. It  
 
may also illustrate that Chamberlain had a personal dislike of Brackenbury, and it will  
 
be remembered that Brackenbury and the Liberal Party had not been on the best of  
 
terms. It is also worth pointing out that Gladstone held a grudge many years after  
 
Brackenbury‟s time in Ireland, so it may not be as unrealistic as it sounds that  
 





In the cabinet debate that followed Powell-Williams produced a seven-page  
 
memorandum supporting the retention of the existing system. This document drew  
 
attention to the poor state that had existed before the present system had been  
 
introduced, and received support from members of the cabinet, including St John  
 
Broderick who had been financial secretary when Stanhope had initially introduced  
 
the present system and could therefore remember better than most the state the  
 
factories had been in before transfer to the financial department. Similarly  
 
unsurprising was the opposition to the transfer of the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir  
 
Michael Hicks-Beech, who was naturally opposed to anything that would weaken  
 
civilian control of military expenditure. The transfer was not without support in  
 
cabinet, the most prominent advocate being George Goschen, First Lord of the  
 
Admiralty. The Royal Navy also relied on the ordnance factories, and was equally  
 
effected by their current poor state. Lord Salisbury also supported the move, but as  
 
Prime Minster he was trying his best to maintain cabinet harmony. His suggestion  
 
was the establishment of a Cabinet Committee, made up of the Duke of Devonshire  
 
(who as Lord Hartington had recommended the transfer of the ordnance factories  
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back to military control as Chairman of the Hartington Commission), Lord  
 
Lansdowne, Hicks-Beech and Goschen, to investigate the matter. The committee was  
 
set up and unsurprisingly, given that three of its members had already announced their  
 
support for the transfer, recommended that Lansdowne‟s plan be introduced.
31
 This  
 
committee can be seen as Salisbury giving his Chancellor an opportunity to state his  
 
case fully, but there can have been little doubt of the outcome. 
 
 
Lansdowne had defended the transfer by saying that he was following the advice of  
 
four separate Commissions that had looked at this matter, and that he was not  
 
advocating a return to the old system, as Powell-Williams had suggested.
32
 Financial  
 
control would still ultimately rest with the Financial Secretary, but the Director  
 
General of Ordnance would draw up proposals and calculations. Lansdowne also took  
 
the opportunity to deny another fear that Powell-Williams had raised, namely that  
 
military control would lead to discrimination against the „trade‟, and to this end  
 




 It was also argued that it was dangerous to have the same person  
 
responsible for both the department and the means of production, as it was felt that  
 
conflicts of interest would be inevitable. Lansdowne pointed out that this could set a  
 
dangerous precedent as the same argument could be applied to the position of the  
 
Secretary of State. In the end the cabinet supported Lansdowne and the transfer was  
 
approved. What this whole episode illustrated was the continuing exertions of  
 
successive governments to establish unequivocally the paramount control of civilian  
 
government over the military. Andrew Page makes the point that no other transfer in  
 
any other department of government would have caused such controversy and  
 
division, nor would it have needed a cabinet committee to settle it.
34
 It was yet  
 




The system that the transfer created was not without problems. The main one  
 
probably was the need for the continual reference by the Director General of  
 
Ordnance to the Financial Secretary, and when war came such problems were  
 
exacerbated. Change was necessary for wartime, and Brackenbury gave an example  
 
of that when, one day early in the war, 138 items had to be costed and proposals  
 
drawn up, necessitating reference to facilities at Woolwich, Pimlico and Weedon to  
 
get the necessary information.
35
 Such a highly bureaucratic system was troublesome  
 
enough in peacetime, but was doomed to failure in war, and particularly with the  
 
unexpectedly large demands that the South African War placed on the Ordnance  
 
Department. Brackenbury was able to obtain verbal, and later written, permission  
 
from Lansdowne that „urgent‟ demands could be ordered before detailed calculations  
 
were given. He subsequently took the view that everything connected with the war  
 
fell into the category of „urgent‟, and thus for the remainder of the war he had near  
 
exclusive control of all financial decisions, although he reported to the Army Board  
 
how much he had spent each week. Sometimes he pushed his wartime authority to the  
 
limit, such as when, on his own authority, he had ten new buildings erected for the  
 





Brackenbury‟s Report on the Ordnance Department     
 
Brackenbury decided that his first task should be to undertake a thorough review of  
 
his department. Partly this was as a means to changes he had been brought in to  
 
undertake, but also because little was known within the department of the new  
 
responsibilities for clothing and the ordnance factories. The completion of his report  
 
was delayed by the start of the South African War, but on the 15
th
 December 1899 he  
 
presented his findings to the Commander-in-Chief.
37
 The major finding was the  
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department‟s total unpreparedness for war and, in particular, the virtually non-existent  
 
reserves of equipment. There was barely enough for the despatch of two army corps  
 
which had been the working standard for the mobilisation scheme since the Stanhope  
 
Memorandum. It must be remembered that although technically part of the reserves,  
 
the stores to equip the two army corps were held separately. The reserves accounted  
 
for the equipment to supply the corps once in the field.  
 
 
Brackenbury‟s report found that there were many deficiencies in the levels of  
 
reserves. In fact his report declared that the only items in which the reserves were  
 
ample were for rifles, carbines, revolvers and lances. By the end of 1899 14,000 rifles,  
 
850 carbines, 1,400 pistols and 500 lances had been despatched to South Africa from  
 
the reserves, and Brackenbury declared that they still had good stocks.
38
 Perhaps this  
 
is not surprising. Lances were used less as the war went on and cavalry were  
 
reluctant to use their carbines, although as the war continued they were forced to  
 
change. The large reserves of revolvers is not surprising as many officers continued  
 




 The reserve of rifles, especially of older patterns, was vital. As demand  
 
grew with the despatch of more soldiers a problem was discovered with the new Lee- 
 
Enfield, which was found to be incorrectly sighted, so that it fired 18 inches to the  
 
right when firing at 500 yards.
40
 In all other areas the reserves were alarmingly below  
 
the authorised number. In many cases this was because the forces in South Africa  
 
grew so rapidly. Difficulties were identified in clothing, infantry accoutrements,  
 
camping equipment, and tents. There were however other items that were insufficient  
 
because of the unconventional nature and conditions of the South Africa War. The  
 
unprecedented need for mounted infantry meant that saddlery reserves were totally  
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insufficient. At the outbreak of the war there were only 500 sets in reserve. By the end  
 
of 1899 Brackenbury had despatched or had on order some 11,525 extra sets. The  
 
same was true of mule harness of which 1,700 were in reserve. The need to transport  
 
supplies along vast distances without the use of the railways meant that mules played  
 
an important role. By the end of 1899 Brackenbury had despatched nearly 25,000  
 
sets. Another problem along similar lines concerned the vehicles of the Army  
 
Service Corps. The majority were unsuited for the harsh terrain of South Africa,  
 
having been designed for use in European conditions. Brackenbury ordered 600  
 
vehicles from the trade in this country and authorised the buying of many more in  
 
South Africa itself.     
 
 
Many of the deficiencies were due to the practice of borrowing from the reserve for  
 
overseas expeditions without any thought being given to replacement. There was also  
 
a belief in the power of British industry to make good any gaps. It was publicly stated  
 
that reserves were kept to the bare minimum in the belief that any force sent overseas  
 
could be maintained by the output of the ordnance factories and the trade.
41
 The key  
 
reason for doing this was for the sake of economy but there was a more legitimate  
 
reason. It was likely that equipment left in the reserve would be of quite old patterns.  
 
To maintain the reserve with the level of equipment of the army corps would require  
 
continual, and expensive, maintenance of a large level of stocks. With belief in the  
 
power of British industry to be able to provide anything at short notice this would  
 
have seemed a much better option. It would mean that any force on active service  
 
would be provided with the very latest equipment straight from the factory. Whilst a  
 
somewhat naïve approach it would have been very appealing to those responsible,  
 






The problem was that the aforementioned practice had denuded the reserves to a level  
 
that was completely inadequate for the size of campaign that followed. It is certain  
 
that even if the reserves had been up to the expected level they would have proved  
 
insufficient to meet the demands of the South African War. The war took the British  
 
Army into a position, in terms of numbers in the field, which they had never been in  
 
before. The fact is that if the reserves had been up to the required level things would  
 
have gone more smoothly for the Ordnance Department and the demands of the  
 
situation could have been met more easily. The problem was that even the basic field  
 
force that had been envisaged in the mobilisation plans did not have the necessary  
 
reserves to bring it up to wartime standard or to keep it at that level for the initially  
 
envisaged six months.  
 
 
Brackenbury found that by the time he had completed his report he had already  
 
despatched the majority of reserves to South Africa, and in most instances he had  
 
already sent double what he had originally had in reserve. The fact that this was only  
 
two months into the war was not lost on him. Nor was the fact that whilst the reserves  
 
were now empty the war was still escalating and the number of troops that had to be  
 
equipped was growing steadily. To meet these demands he had to borrow equipment  
 
from all over the empire and the Royal Navy. In light of this Brackenbury wrote that  
 
his report had:  
 
…disclosed a situation as regards armaments, and reserves of guns, 
ammunition, stores and clothing, and as regards the power of output of 





He therefore urged that the report was acted upon as soon as possible. To assist him in  
 
his attempts at reform he had been given permission by Lansdowne to send papers to  
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him directly rather than through the normal War Office channels, provided that the  
 
papers were also sent to those who would normally have received them. Lansdowne  
 
took the report straight to the cabinet and used it as his main tool in trying to get  
 
increased expenditure for the maintenance of the army during the war.  
 
 
There was a wider, longer term, angle that Brackenbury wanted to pursue. He wanted  
 
change quickly so that in any future conflict his successor would not have to cope  
 
with the same problems that he did. A lot of the modernisation proposals he made  
 
were not particularly designed to fight the present conflict. As his report made clear,  
 
“The following are absolutely necessary to enable us to carry on a war with a  
 
maritime power, in which both Navy and Army might be engaged”.
43
 He took the  
 
opportunity to again emphasise the importance of the rearmament of the costal  
 
defences, probably fearing that the money put aside for this would be transferred to  
 
fund his other proposals. He also pressed for the construction of new ordnance store  
 
buildings, to be completed as soon as possible. It was one thing to press for increased  
 
holdings of reserves but without increased space they could not be stored efficiently.  
 
Part of this was development of the buildings of the army Clothing Department,  
 
which he had found to be ill equipped even for the maintenance of the army in  
 
peacetime. Alongside this came the demand that the ordnance factories be  
 
completely re-equipped with modern labour-saving machinery which in  
 





Brackenbury also took the opportunity to criticise the way in which the War Office  
 
did business in general. He pointed out that the cost of the changes would be  
 
impossible to achieve through the usual route of the Annual Army Estimates. He  
 
criticised the present system:  
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…under which orders cannot be given for any length of time ahead, which 
cripples the power of output of the trade.  They will not, under such a system, 
invest money in buildings or plant, not knowing from year to year whether 




It was a very pertinent point and one that the events of the war would bear out. A  
 
trade that was used to the small annual orders from the War Office could not meet the  
 
large-scale demands that the war created. As profit making concerns they were  
 
unlikely to keep plant in reserve for emergencies; it would not be cost effective.  
 
In such a case it was essential that the ordnance factories were efficient and modern,  
 
so that capability to increase production in time of emergency existed. It also  
 
underlined Brackenbury‟s demand that there should be a reserve of output, in the form  
 
of buildings and machinery, which would only be used in time of war.  
 
 
The word demand is not to strong a word to use when viewing Brackenbury‟s  
 
recommendations in his report, as it was in many ways a series of ultimatums. It is no  
 
exaggeration to say that even Brackenbury was shocked at the situation he found in  
 
the department. The report on its state was a considered view of what Brackenbury  
 
felt was wrong and what needed to be done. No official record exists, but it is known  
 
that he told Lord Roberts he was prepared to resign if the necessary money was not  
 
made available for the reforms his report outlined, saying “I hope and pray they will  
 
be accepted. If not they must find another D.G.O”
46
 Given Brackenbury‟s close  
 
working relationship with Lansdowne it is unlikely that ministers would have had  
 
no idea of Brackenbury‟s threat to resign. He was also following a similar course to  
 
when he was in Ireland, in that he would not go on if, after being asked to come up  
 
with a solution to the problem, his plans were ignored on financial grounds. There  
 
was undoubtedly an element of arrogance in his approach towards the government. In  
 
this case he was the expert and the government should take his word for it when he  
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said that this was necessary. If, as seems likely, the government were aware of his  
 
threat to resign it may well have had a much stronger impact than would normally be  
 
expected. His resignation would have come at a time when the government were  
 
being strongly criticised for its conduct of the war. Questions were being asked in  
 
both parliament and the press about the preparedness of the country. If at this time a  
 
senior member of the War Office, in fact a member of the Army Board, had resigned  
 
because of the government‟s failure to back what would have appeared to be essential  
 
reform, the ramifications could have been considerable. The damage would have been  
 
increased by his reputation as one of the army‟s leading administrators.  
 
 
Brackenbury‟s threat of resignation was made particularly effective because of the  
 
course of the South African War. At any other time his resignation might cause  
 
slight embarrassment to the government but it would not have received the publicity  
 
that his resignation during the war would likely have caused. The same could be said  
 
of the changes that Brackenbury was able to undertake. Whilst there was recognition  
 
that reform was needed, both by soldiers and politicians within the War Office, if the  
 
war had not created the impetus politically the reform would probably have been only  
 
piecemeal. The war highlighted the scale of change that was needed. It opened eyes to  
 
the necessity not only of being able to send a force overseas, which the mobilisation  
 
plans were equipped to accomplish, but also the need to be able to maintain such a  
 
force. In this Britain was fortunate to have the world‟s largest navy, both militarily  
 
and in terms of mercantile shipping. The problem the war highlighted was the  
 
„failure‟ of the trade to be able to supply a force in the field. This was perhaps an  
 
unrealistic aim in the first place, but it was the theory that the War Office entered the  
 
South African War believing. The war showed that there was a need to be able to  
 
supply a force largely out of reserves and the ordnance factories for at least a  
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significant part of any war, so that the trade had time to catch up in terms of finishing  
 
other orders, changing patterns to meet War Office requirements or changing to new  
 
equipment and methods of production to produce what was required.              
 
     
The Mowatt Committee 
 
The reforms that Brackenbury‟s report suggested would necessitate a large one off  
 
payment to cover them. Brackenbury himself gave no estimate of the cost of his  
 
changes, aside from the £1.3 million he asked for new machinery for the ordnance  
 
factories. He felt that a loan of £10 million would be the minimum needed. This  
 
would be used for new buildings and machinery for the ordnance factories and the  
 
Clothing Department, guns and ammunition for the new coastal defences, and to start  
 
establishing a reserve of stores for the future. He realised, and wanted the politicians  
 
to realise, that this in itself would not be enough. “I cannot say whether this may cost  
 
10, 15, or 20 millions sterling. I can only say it is necessary to spend whatever it may  
 
cost to save us from this situation of peril”.
47
 The Mowatt Committee, named after its  
 
chairman, Sir Francis Mowatt the Permanent Under Secretary of the Treasury, was  
 
established to look into the need for these measures.
48
 Apart from Mowatt the  
 
committee comprised two other members, the Parliamentary Under Secretary of State  
 
for War, Mr George Windham M.P, and the Director General of Stores at the India  
 
Office, Mr E Grant Burls. Its terms of reference were to establish the number of guns  
 
needed to form a reserve of 25 per cent for Horse and Field artillery, and for the siege  
 
train, and the amount of ammunition needed to maintain a reserve of 6 months supply  
 
of 1,000 rounds per gun. It also had a wider reference to look at the reserve of stores  
 
needed to maintain three army corps, one cavalry division and line of communication  
 
troops overseas for a period of six months. It was argued that if six months of supply  
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could be found from the reserves this would give time for the ordnance factories and  
 
the trade to change over to the demands of wartime. The committee was also asked to  
 
look at what was needed to complete the number of guns for fortress and coastal  
 
artillery and to provide a satisfactory reserve of ammunition for them. It will be  
 
remembered that this was one of Brackenbury‟s original proposals and, whilst the  
 
government had agreed to the expenditure in principle, it had not been forthcoming.  
 
Thus Brackenbury used the Mowatt Committee to remind the government of this  
 
pressing need. 
     
 
The committee was established largely at the insistence of the Chancellor of the  
 
Exchequer, Sir Michael Hicks Beach. His chief argument was that he objected to  
 




 Hicks Beach no doubt felt that Mowatt, who it could be argued equally had  
 
a vested interest, would share his reluctance to spend the large amount that  
 
Brackenbury had requested. He had good cause to believe this as in the build up to the  
 
war Mowatt had supported Hicks Beach‟s opposition to increased Army spending.  
 
Mowatt probably did share his reluctance, yet it seems that his investigation  
 
persuaded him that the expenditure was necessary. There was also an economic  
 
argument for the one-off expenditure, which Mowatt seems to have grasped but that  
 
Hicks Beach did not. The war had pushed up War Office costs and the current  
 
arrangements were extremely expensive. Overtime was being paid on a constant  
 
basis and the wear and tear on machinery would necessitate complete replacement  
 
before too long. Added to this was the inflated cost that the trade was charging for  
 
wartime supplies. Brackenbury‟s scheme would have increased the capacity of the  
 
ordnance factories by 50 per cent. More important was one of Brackenbury‟s other  
 
suggestions. He had recommended that new buildings and machinery be established  
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which would be for wartime use only.
50
 He had expected that once the reserves had  
 
been used up, the additional buildings at the ordnance factories would be up and  
 
running and able to meet the increased demand. This was a recognition that the trade  
 
could not be so heavily relied upon to do just what the Government wanted suddenly,  
 
and rightly so as they were profit-making organisations. It was unrealistic to ask them  
 
to drop all other orders or to keep reserve capacity purely for time of emergency  
 
under present circumstances.             
 
 
Hicks-Beach obviously regarded Brackenbury with suspicion. If he had ever read or  
 
witnessed the proceedings of the Mowatt Committee he would certainly have had  
 
grounds for feeling that way. Whilst Mowatt was chairman it was undoubtedly  
 
Brackenbury‟s Committee. It sat for nineteen days and examined twenty-five  
 
witnesses. Brackenbury was examined extensively himself but was also there when  
 
those who served under him were examined and was given leave by the chairman to  
 
make comments when he wanted. He was also allowed to cross-examine these  
 
witnesses, and he used the committee to make his case. Mowatt‟s attitude towards  
 
Brackenbury was unusual to say the least. Many of Mowatt‟s questions to  
 
Brackenbury could be construed as „leading‟ questions as they allowed him to make  
 
quite sweeping statements on the state of the department and his remedy for it. The  
 
interviewing was extensive and went beyond those officers within the Ordnance  
 
Department. The Adjutant General, Sir Evelyn Wood, and the Storekeeper-General of  
 
Naval Ordnance, Colonel Thales Pease, were called. So too were the various civil  
 
servants who had responsibility within the War Office. Interestingly enough there was  
 
only one M.P  amongst the witnesses, which is slightly strange given that they were  
 
responsible for the financial and administrative arrangements of the War Office.  
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Perhaps this illustrates a desire on the part of Lord Lansdowne to keep the committee  
 
as one of „experts‟ in an attempt to enhance the case for the expenditure. Eight of the  
 
witnesses represented the trade, many of whom were keen to defend themselves  
 
against the criticism they had received for their role in the war up to that point.
51
   
 
 
The Mowatt Committee ended up agreeing entirely with Brackenbury and its  
 
recommendations were almost exactly the same as those that he had put forward in his  
 
report on the state of his department.
52
 This included agreement with his suggested  
 
levels of reserves for guns and ammunition, more uniformity of dress for wartime and  
 
peacetime, maintaining the amounts of reservists‟ equipment up to the same level as  
 
regulars‟, and his proposed keeping of six months supply of stores to maintain an  
 
army in the field. They also agreed with his suggestion that mobilisation plans should  
 
be based around three army corps, one cavalry division and line of communication  
 
troops. Wolseley, who had become obsessed with a three army corps system,  
 
undoubtedly influenced this. Whilst criticised as insufficient, as it would take a force  
 
larger than this to subdue the Boers never mind defeat a European power, it has been  
 
defended as being the best Wolseley believed he could get out of governments who  
 
feared a large standing army and a society extremely reluctant to accept conscription.  
 
This may well be true but his defence of a three Army Corps system to the Elgin  
 
Commission was on the grounds that this force could match any threat from any  
 
power, which was rather an unusual position to take. The Committee supported  
 
Brackenbury‟s call for increased storage space and new buildings and machinery for  
 
the ordnance factories, adding that they felt no time should be lost in the completion  
 
of this. Much to Brackenbury‟s delight they also criticised the failure to enforce the  
 
penalties for late delivery that were written into every contract with the trade. There  
 
was also support for his scheme of having „reserve‟ factories that would be used only  
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in emergency. Another interesting suggestion was the idea of moving so-called  
 
„danger‟ buildings. The Committee acknowledge Brackenbury as the source of this  
 
idea, despite the fact that he mentioned it neither in his report or his evidence to the  
 
Committee. This once again suggests that he had the chairman‟s ear.
53
 In short the  
 
idea was that the buildings in which explosives were made and used should be moved  
 
from their present location surrounded by other factories and workshops to more  
 
isolated areas. The idea being that any explosion in the current location would cause  
 
serious damage to other factories and could virtually stop production of all stores at  
 
the various ordnance factories.  
 
 
The Mowatt Committee gave detailed costs of all their recommendations. The first  
 
figure they arrived at was £6,482,567. This would cover the reserve of guns and  
 
ammunition of fortress, coastal, siege, horse and field guns, and a 25% reserve of  
 
machine guns and also the reserve of general stores for three army corps, one cavalry  
 
division and line of communications troops and a six-month working stock. This also  
 
covered the removal and rebuilding of the „danger‟ buildings and the additional  
 
storage facilities that had been proposed. In addition to this was £1,586,338 to carry  
 
out existing recommendations for improvements to field and horse artillery, and  
 
£3,552,965 to complete the rearmament of coastal batteries and buildings, which had  
 




 This was to be provided over three years  
 
 
The Mowatt Committee had the backing of the War Office, both civilian and military,  
 
the cabinet, and the trade. Yet despite having called for the committee in the first  
 
place Hicks-Beech refused to accept its findings, despite the fact that the  
 
Permanent Secretary to the Treasury had himself investigated and drawn up the  
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proposed expenditure. Whilst it might be expected that he would oppose such a level  
 
of expenditure the way in which Hicks-Beach did it, without regard for the opinion of  
 
the military, the cabinet and his own Permanent Secretary was quite extraordinary.  
 
He made a counter proposal of a little over £3,000,000 that illustrated his failure to  
 
grasp the seriousness of the situation both politically and materially. He abrasively  
 
stated that even this reduced amount was conditional upon immediate acceptance with  
 
no further claims being made. This was a misjudgement of the strength of the  
 
position of Lansdowne and Brackenbury, especially when supported by the  
 
Permanent Secretary of the Treasury. With the cabinet also supporting them, Hicks- 
 
Beach was forced to take the findings of the Mowatt Committee seriously. The  
 
Chancellor was eventually persuaded to agree to expenditure of £10,500,000, over  
 





Over reliance on „the trade‟       
 
During the war significant sectors of the economy became almost entirely committed  
 
to the production of equipment for South Africa. This was on a larger scale than  
 
anything seen before. The significance of this is often lost in the light of the  
 
subsequent events of the two world wars of the twentieth century. Although the War  
 
Office had its own factories it was never the intention that they should be able to  
 
supply the army by themselves. It was said that:  
 
Their function was seen as providing a model for the trade to work from, to 
check how much items cost to manufacture, to make those items which the 
trade was unable or unwilling to produce, and to give a certain flexibility in 




This was an arrangement that was largely due to financial constraints. The Treasury  
 
would not allow plant or machinery to be kept merely for expansion in time of war.  
 
There was also an element of arrogance about the supposed status of British industry.  
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There was an assumption that British industry could produce anything at any notice,  
 
an assumption that was never investigated. It was this assumption of the strength and  
 
flexibility of British industry that led the War Office to presume that the day-to-day  
 
upkeep of any field force could be maintained by the trade. The South African War  
 
showed that such faith in the trade was misplaced.  
 
 
Army Contracts       
 
Brackenbury soon found much to complain about in the way that firms treated  
 
contracts with the War Office. The Director of Army Contracts drew them up, and  
 
from 1895 Mr Alfred Major had held that position. He was a civilian working under  
 
the Financial Secretary of the War Office with a staff of 27, which was increased to  
 
34 during the war. The title is slightly misleading, as he also had to act for the  
 
Admiralty, the Government of India, the Colonial Office, the Metropolitan Police and  
 
the Post Office. Brackenbury disliked the system, largely because of its overly  
 
bureaucratic nature, and in November 1899 he proposed to the Army Board that for  
 
the duration of the war the system of obtaining everything through the Director of  
 
Army Contracts be abandoned.
57
 The idea had merit as the Director of Army  
 
Contracts would on the whole only deal with companies who were on the approved  
 
list of War Office firms. It led to supply being dominated by a few firms, such as the  
 
Birmingham Small Arms Company and London Small Arms Company who were the  
 
only suppliers of service rifles. Webley had a monopoly on service revolvers,  
 
although officers did purchase others privately. Only seven companies ever supplied  
 
cordite for ammunition, and just three, Kynochs, National Explosives and Noble  
 
Explosives supplied most of it, despite the fact that there were an estimated twenty  
 






With the supply of cordite being a particular problem, so much so that at one point  
 
Brackenbury had to send out a consignment of shells filled with gunpowder, the  
 
Director of Contracts refusal to go outside the seven War Office recognised firms  
 
appears strange. Brackenbury also felt that at a time where demand was outstripping  
 
supply there was much to be gained from approaching foreign manufacturers. Indeed,  
 
as the war went on, more material was purchased overseas. Horses and mules were  
 
brought from all over the world, and horseshoes, largely from Germany and Sweden.  
 
It was found that no firm in Britain was geared up to produce mule shoes and these  
 
inevitably had to be sought abroad.
59
 A major objection to the purchase of overseas  
 
goods, and the one which the Financial Secretary and his department used, was the  
 
fear of reliance on foreign powers for supplies in time of war. Although a valid  
 
concern it overlooked two points. Firstly, the purchase of overseas goods was only  
 
designed to get the army through the war, and many of the items were already being  
 
used as examples for British designs; it was not intended as a long-term solution.  
 
Secondly, a lot of the items purchased were brought with the necessary amount of  
 
supplies and spares to last its lifetime. The obvious example for this is the decision to  
 
purchase four Austrian made 9.4 inch howitzers, which used a special kind of  
 
ammunition. Brackenbury brought sufficient ammunition to last the rather limited  
 
lifetime of the guns.
60
 He was only ever recommending a temporary process of buying  
 
overseas and never contemplated a long-term change. Brackenbury saw it as  
 
something that would help deal with the present demand and get the army through the  
 
current crisis. By the end of the war he hoped to have the necessary reforms underway  
 
to avoid such a crisis in the future. Despite this the Director of Contracts took great  
 
offence at his idea and complained to the Financial Secretary who in turn complained  
 
to the Secretary of State. Lansdowne prevailed upon Brackenbury to apologize, and a  
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veiled apology was made before the Army Board where Brackenbury expressed his  
 







„The Trade‟           
 
The commercial sector as a whole was commonly referred to at the War Office as  
 
„the trade‟. Brackenbury faced constant problems with many suppliers which  
 
stemmed from the casual approach of his predecessors. One of the worst culprits was  
 
the Birmingham firm of Kynochs, who produced shells and small arms ammunition  
 
for the War Office
62
. They were often unable to supply the amounts for  
 
which they had been contracted. For the financial year 1898-1899, for example, they  
 
had been for asked to supply 10 million rounds of small arms ammunition yet  
 
supplied only 6 million.
63
 Brackenbury complained to the Financial Secretary and  
 
demanded that the financial penalties that were in the contract agreement be imposed  
 
in line with War Office procedures. As was noted above, such penalties were rarely  
 
used and this proved to be half the problem as it allowed a situation to develop  
 
whereby firms ignored delivery dates knowing that there would be no consequences.  
 
One of the complications surrounding Kynochs, and probably one of the reasons for  
 
Powell-Williams reluctance to impose financial sanctions, was the fact that Arthur  
 
Chamberlain, the brother of Joseph, was chairman of the firm, having succeeded his  
 
brother in that capacity. Mention has already been made of Arthur Balfour‟s belief  
 
that Powell-Williams owed his job to Chamberlain and their relationship obviously  
 
played a part in his reluctance to impose the fines which were in the contract.  
 
However, this cannot have been the whole reason, as the system of fines was not  
 





It is true that every contract entered into by the Contract Department contains 
a clause by which a penalty is imposed for arrears of delivery, but the penalty 





Brackenbury complained to Lansdowne who decided that a compromise arrangement  
 
should be sought and the following year‟s order was reduced to 6 million rounds.  
 
Brackenbury was not pleased as the amount, added to the 4 million outstanding,  
 
equalled the amount that Kynochs had already proved they were unable to produce.  
 
 
This was not the end of the conflict with the Chamberlains. Brackenbury later wrote  
 
to Arthur Balfour about the failure of the firm in quite aggressive language and  
 
pointedly added that; “You can show the letter to (Joseph) Chamberlain”.
65
 Kynochs  
 
further annoyed Brackenbury when they took on a financially lucrative contract from  
 
the United States, and further delayed deliveries to the War Office that were already  
 
in arrears. Arthur Chamberlain was called to give evidence to the Mowatt Committee,  
 
and his evidence has justly been described as both arrogant and patronising.
66
 There  
 
were also moments when, under quite aggressive questioning from the Chairman,  
 
his evidence appeared to be contradictory. At one point he claimed that with only a  
 
few weeks notice he could have met Brackenbury‟s demands. He later contradicted  
 
this by saying that the reason he could not meet the demands was because of the  
 
United States order, which he felt fully entitled to take because there was no  
 
arrangement by which British orders were to be given greater priority.
67
 His  
 
protestations did little to convince anyone that it was anything other than a matter of  
 
money. In fact it appears to have been quite common that foreign orders were dealt    
 
with first as the delivery of these on time was thought to be especially important.  
 
Something of an attitude of „anything will do‟ for the War Office seems to have  
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existed. He also gave conflicting evidence when asked if the Director of Army  
 
Contracts had approved the order for the United States. He originally answered „Yes‟,  
 





Chamberlain claimed that under Brackenbury‟s predecessors delivery dates were  
 
never taken seriously and were not considered as binding contracts. He felt that  
 
Brackenbury‟s criticism was completely unfair and that the new Director General of  
 
Ordnance did not understand the way business was done. “The Director General of  
 
Ordnance probably did not know that everybody is more or less behindhand; it is  
 
common practice and there has never been any attempt at the War Office to cut out  
 
contractors for being in arrears”. Chamberlain also made a thinly veiled attack on  
 
Brackenbury stating that before war was declared, “We had not become aware of the  
 
existence of Sir Henry Brackenbury”.
69
 He then went on to attack him as a “new  
 
broom” that he held personally responsible for the unreasonable suggestion that a fine  
 
be imposed.  He actually went further and declared that before Brackenbury nobody  
 
cared whether deliveries were on time or not. Saving money for Kynochs, he said,  
 
was more important than “being bound by time”.
70
 Whilst Chamberlain‟s position  
 
was in one sense understandable, after all he was a businessman; it did not go down  
 
well at a time when the country was at war and facing a very real shortage of  
 
ammunition. Kynochs were not alone, but they were by far and away the worst  
 
offender. In fairness it must be added that some firms, most notably Armstrong and  
 
Whitworth Ltd, tried to do all they could to help Brackenbury during this period. At  
 
one point they were able, after a special request, to make limbers and carriages for six  
 
batteries of artillery in a month. Sir Andrew Noble, in evidence, said that he had at  
 
one point proposed a plan for the expansion of their plant for times of emergencies,  
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but that the then Director General of Ordnance, Sir Frederick Bramwell, had shown  
 





Also interesting to note is the evidence of Colonel Sir W.D. Richardson to the Elgin  
 
Commission after the South African War.
72
 Colonel Richardson arrived in South  
 
Africa in early October 1899 and took up the appointment of Deputy Adjutant- 
 
General for Supplies and Transport. Later on in the war he became Director of  
 
Supplies in Cape Town. His evidence showed the stark contrast of American attitudes  
 
towards supplying the British Army. Colonel Richardson told how every two to three  
 
weeks he would be visited by the American Consul-General at Cape Town, Mr  
 
Stowe, who would check to make sure American orders were satisfactory and whether  
 
there was anything else they could do to help. One problem Colonel Richardson had  
 
was the size of tins of meat. Normally such tins would be in 1lb or 2lb sizes, which  
 
could be carried by individual soldiers. During the war, because of the unexpectedly  
 
large demands for meat, much of the meat was sent out in 4lb or 6lb tins. Not only  
 
were these far heavier, but also there was as a consequence large-scale waste, as what  
 
was not eaten had to be thrown away. Colonel Richardson, according to his evidence,  
 
mentioned this problem to the Consul-General and was told that despite the fact that  
 
American firms did not normally produce them in 1lb or 2lb tins they would have no  
 
problem in supplying them. According to Colonel Richardson the Consul-General  
 




 Whilst this perhaps says more about the contemporary business practices  
 
of the United States and Britain, it does serve to illustrate something of the ways in  
 
which parts of British industry could have been more helpful. Many British firms saw  
 
the demands of the South African war as problems that would cost them money,  
 
whereas many U.S firms took the opportunity to make money by meeting the demand  
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of the moment.  
 
 
It is likely that the attitude expressed by many foreign firms was exactly what  
 
Brackenbury wanted from all British firms. The situation in South Africa was after all  
 
being portrayed as a national crisis and Brackenbury‟s attitude towards some of the  
 
firms seems to suggest that he expected them to do their bit for the war effort.  
 
However, with the Financial Secretary unwilling to impose sanctions upon the firms  
 
that failed to meet deadlines there was little else that Brackenbury could do. He  
 
eventually managed to get Lord Lansdowne‟s approval that, rather than fine firms,  
 
they would be charged the difference in the cost that the War Office undertook to  
 
make good the shortfall in their supply. Given that prices in general had risen during  
 
the war this was no little expense. It seems to have had little effect as the practice of  
 
charging the difference to the offending firm became common. 
 
 
It is unlikely that there was any personal agenda in Brackenbury‟s tough attitude  
 
towards Kynochs in particular. They were at that time a major supplier, but also one  
 
of the worst offenders. After his original conflict with the firm Brackenbury was  
 
amazed when next year‟s order was again placed largely with them. He made the  
 
point to the Mowatt Committee that the treatment of Kynochs was unfair on those  
 
suppliers who did meet deadlines. He gave the example of the Birmingham Metal and  
 
Munitions Company which, on the 6
th
 September 1898, had along with Kynochs,  
 
received an order for 10 million rounds of ammunition. By the 31
st
 March 1899 the  
 
B.M.M.C had delivered the entire order, whilst Kynochs had failed to deliver almost  
 
half theirs, some 4,976,974 rounds. Yet in the next set of orders the Director of  
 
Contracts awarded 60% of the order to Kynochs rather than the other Birmingham  
 
firm. The decision was baffling. Admittedly Kynochs were marginally cheaper, but  
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they had already proved that they were unreliable and there were serious doubts about  
 
their quality. Brackenbury felt that the B.M.M.C should have been rewarded for their  
 
performance with an increased order.
74
   
 
 
The whole situation with Kynochs was also caught up in a much wider public debate  
 
about the role of Joseph Chamberlain within the firm, which was the subject of an  
 
attack from the Liberal M.P, and „pro-Boer‟ campaigner, David Lloyd George. He  
 
asked Chamberlain in parliament about his connection with Kynochs. Chamberlain  
 
replied that he was no longer a shareholder or had any control over the management  
 
of the company. Lloyd-George also asked why Kynochs had been awarded a contract  
 




 The only logical reason for accepting the highest tender would be if the  
 
firm were known for their prompt delivery and reliability or the superior quality of  
 
their product and this was obviously not the case. To Brackenbury, that “First rate  
 
man of business”, as Wolseley called him, it seemed incredible that a firm that so  
 
blatantly ignored delivery dates escaped penalty. Brackenbury‟s relationship with the  
 
Chamberlains was not helped by the fact that Lloyd George often quoted from the  
 




 The evidence of the representatives of other firms to the Mowatt  
 
Committee in this context is interesting. Without directly saying so they appear to  
 
have taken the example of Kynochs as a warning. Though some firms had tried their  
 
best before, there were those like Vickers, Hadfields and Firth and sons who were  
 
now trying to meet deadlines. Whilst this is partly due to a sense of patriotism stirred  
 
by war, the example of the way Brackenbury had dealt with Kynochs may have had  
 




Quality and Inspection       
 
There was a much wider problem with the quality of goods provided by the trade, but  
 




 On completion of any order it was returned with an  
 
inspection note stating the pattern and quantity. The goods were then inspected by Lt- 
 
Colonel C.F. Hadden the Chief Inspector Army Ordnance Department, and his staff.  
 
After the goods had been counted and inspected the note was completed and sent to  
 
the Principal Ordnance Officer, Colonel Steevens, who then notified the firms as to  
 
the findings. On receiving the news of the large-scale rejection Kynochs sent one of  
 
their agents, General Arbuthnot, to inquire as to the reason. Arbuthnot inspected the  
 




 The matter seemed to be closed until Arthur Chamberlain came to  
 
see Brackenbury and complained that the reasons for the rejection of his ammunition  
 
were wrong, despite the opinion of his own agent. According to Brackenbury  
 
Chamberlain‟s main concern was the fact that as the ammunition was Mark V they  
 
could not sell it to anyone else and he therefore felt that the War Office „had a duty‟ to  
 
buy it rather than leave his firm out of pocket.
79
   
 
 
Inspection was important but it was sometimes taken too far. At one stage a whole  
 




 Such high demands led to a clash with the Financial Secretary,  
 
Powell-Williams. He believed that a lot of the supply problems that were being faced  
 
could be solved if the inspections were less demanding. He did have a point, as the  
 
previous example illustrates, but there were other more serious shortcomings. For  
 
example Brackenbury demanded straight-grained wood for the spokes on wheels. To  
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Powell-Williams this seemed excessive but as they were to be fitted on artillery and  
 
heavy-laden wagons, their strength was all-important.
81
 It was a basic conflict  
 
between military and civilian viewpoints, with the civilian not understanding the  
 
heavy wear and tear that the equipment would undergo. Another objection that  
 
Powell-Williams raised was Brackenbury‟s rejection of wooden picketing and tent  
 
pegs. Brackenbury explained that the pegs would have to be hammered into the dry  
 
veldt and removed, on average at least twice a day. If they were to break the tents  
 
could become useless, and worse, if a picketing peg went a unit could lose all its  
 
horses. The problem also applied to picks, hammers and entrenching tools that were  
 
made to commercial patterns. Most were designed for gardening in the soft soil of  
 
England not the hard, dry veldt of South Africa. In this point the Commander-in-Chief  
 
in South Africa Lord Roberts supported Brackenbury‟s objections.
82
 Another instance  
 
where the standard mattered was horseshoes. Brackenbury initially issued instructions  
 
to refuse anything that was not of the highest standard, because the majority of horses  
 
were being shod for the first time. Desperation later led him to accept anything that  
 
would not lame the animal.  
 
 
Brackenbury‟s evidence to the Mowatt Committee shows that he felt that Alfred  
 
Major, Director of Army Contracts, and the trade just wanted to give him what was  
 
easiest and cheapest to make. In Major‟s defence it can be said that this was in reality  
 
what was expected of him. At a time when demand was urgent and the cost of the war  
 
was escalating the merit of Major‟s position can be seen. There were undoubtedly  
 
occasions where the inspection process was far too vigorous, and items were refused  
 
that would have been satisfactory. Even despite the rigorous inspections there were  
 
quite celebrated cases of defective items being sent to South Africa. Major for his  
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part, in his evidence to the Mowatt Committee, claimed that his main concern was the  
 
fear that if commercial patterns were not accepted the army would get no material at  
 
all whether, “good, bad or indifferent”.
83
 On this point he undoubtedly acted out of  
 
the best of motives, but once again there was an illustration of the problem of civilian  
 
control not understanding the difficulties of military campaigns. Brackenbury was  
 
prepared to accept material out of necessity that was below the standards that had  
 
been set but he was not prepared to send material that would, as he said, be liable to  
 
“breakdown, simply to please the trade”.
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One of the obvious results of the despatching overseas of the largest force ever to  
 
leave this country up to that point was the unprecedented demand for ammunition.  
 
When General Sir George White asked for 4 million rounds of small arms  
 
ammunition to be sent out to South Africa in October 1899, he was cabled back the  
 
next day to check that the amount was correct!
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 If this seemed excessive to the War  
 
Office it soon became common, as by the end of November 1899 18 million rounds of  
 
ammunition had been sent. This was on top of the ammunition that troops carried with  
 
them to South Africa, which by the end of the year 1899 was calculated at some 30  
 
million rounds in total. By the end of November 1899 the weekly supply that the army  
 
in South Africa needed was 3.7 million rounds.
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 As has been seen the trade could not  
 
be relied upon to deliver on time, or the correct amount, and the ordnance factories  
 
working flat out and including weekends could only produce 1.5 million rounds a  
 
week. The reserves of small arms ammunition were in a better state than most. In  
 
March 1899 the authorised reserve stood at 151 million rounds, but problems arose  
 






The experience of several conflicts, most notably in the Sudanese campaigns and the  
 
Chitral Campaign, on the North West Frontier, had shown that the standard Mark II  
 
rifle ammunition had insufficient stopping power to halt the more „fanatical‟ charges  
 
of some of Britain‟s colonial enemies. Brackenbury, in his evidence to the Elgin  
 
Commission, explained that because of this the decision was taken to develop an  
 
expanding bullet, which had greater stopping power. The basic principle was that the  
 
exit wound was far greater than the entry point and therefore more damage was done  
 
to the victim and a greater amount of blood was lost. In short the bullet „expanded‟  
 
the wound as it travelled through the body. There were various methods of creating  
 
such a bullet. In India what was commonly referred to as the „Dum Dum‟ bullet was  
 
developed, which had no nickel covering on its tip.
88
 In Britain Mark IV ammunition  
 
was produced which had a small hole in the tip of the nickel. Brackenbury told the  
 
Elgin Commission that:  
 
We had every intention of using this bullet and making it, in fact, the bullet for 
the British Army all over the world, and, I think, about 66,000,000 of it up to 
the 31
st





The Hague Convention of 29
th
 July 1899 outlawed the use of such bullets but because  
 
of colonial experiences Britain failed to sign the convention. However there was a  
 
feeling within the government that there was a moral obligation to abide by this when  
 
fighting a civilised „white‟ race like the Boers.  
 
 
After questions were raised in Parliament an official statement was made stating that  
 
the ammunition would not be used, using the moral argument. There was actually a  
 
more practical reason that caused the abandonment of Mark IV ammunition. It was  
 
found that the bullet, in certain circumstances, had a tendency to „strip‟, which is for  
 
the lead to squirt through the hole in the nickel envelope, and leave the nickel behind.  
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In this scenario the next round fired caused a blow back. The particular conditions in  
 
which this occurred were when the barrel of the rifle was dirty and hot. As  
 
Brackenbury stated:  
 
Those two conditions of great heat and a dirty rifle were exactly the conditions 
which were likely to occur in war, and, therefore, it seemed to me, and I so 
advised the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of State, that none of this 
ammunition should be considered serviceable for war, and, consequently, 





Whilst Brackenbury felt that the Hague Convention had a certain moral impact on the  
 
government he maintained that, “The reason why we did not use the expanding bullet  
 
in South Africa was not the Hague Convention, however, but because the Mark IV  
 
ammunition, our expanding ammunition, had proved unfit to be used in war”.
91
 This  
 
perhaps explains the government‟s willingness to hide behind the „moral obligation‟  
 
of the Hague Convention, rather than admit the failure of production. It is difficult not  
 
to attach blame to Brackenbury‟s predecessor as it is obvious that the ammunition  
 
was not tested properly before it was produced on a large scale. It was only during  
 
peacetime exercises that the problem was found and it is difficult to conclude  
 
anything other than the fact that the ammunition cannot have been given sufficient  
 
testing as surely such an obvious fault would have been identified.    
 
 
Artillery in the South African War     
 
Much has been written about the role of artillery during the war.
92
 In many works that  
 
touch briefly on the subject it has been considered sufficiently simply to say that the  
 
more modern guns of the Boers outclassed British artillery. There is an element of  
 
truth in this as the wealth of the Boer states was such that they could afford to buy the  
 
latest French and German weapons. British Artillery on the other hand included a  
 
number of old guns, and patterns, many of which, for reasons of economy had modern  
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technology added to them rather than the purchase of completely new models. Whilst  
 
the debate on the role of artillery in South Africa and the consequences of  
 
modernisation are beyond the scope of this thesis, Brackenbury‟s evidence is of  
 
interest and deserves comment. His responsibility for artillery was limited, his main  
 
task being to make sure that sufficient ammunition was available. Production of  
 
artillery equipment was partly his responsibility but the choice of guns and the  
 
number of them were only partly within his remit. He had no responsibility for  
 
training and tactics, that being the role of the Director of Artillery and the Adjutant- 
 
General. He was of course interested as an artilleryman himself and one who had  
 
experienced his fair share of combat.   
 
 
One of the key advantages that Boer Artillery had was that it could fire at longer  
 
range than British guns. This was a general fault found with British weapons but  
 
never before had it been a problem. Even when firing at such distances had been  
 
contemplated, it was difficult to practice anywhere in Britain. The conditions of South  
 
Africa made such training essential as climatic and geographical conditions made  
 
long-range firing a workable concept. Brackenbury felt that the implication of this  
 
was singular because it meant that British troops came under fire long before they  
 
could respond and thus morale was weakened. In his evidence to the Elgin  
 
Commission he made it quite clear that to the best of his knowledge no engagement  
 
was won or any attack repulsed because of the longer range and quicker firing guns  
 
possessed by the Boers. Brackenbury‟s view was that heavy artillery, both Boer and  
 
the naval guns of the British, did little serious harm to the enemy during the war, and  
 
that the main benefit was that of morale. He told the Elgin Commission that, “Nothing  
 
was so astonishing to me, and I think to many others among us, as the extraordinary  
 





 He also informed them that they had already started experimenting with  
 
heavy artillery such as field guns, which could fire a 60lbs shell in excess of 10,000  
 
yards. For Brackenbury the effect on morale was the main reason for the development  
 
of such guns at the time but he did not rule out the fact that as technology  
 
progressed they would become more effective, as the First World War proved. 
 
 
Much of Brackenbury‟s evidence is unsurprisingly little more than a defence of his  
 
own branch of the army. He went into a long explanation of the principles with which  
 
the field artillery took the field in South Africa. The key reason why Boer guns  
 
outranged British was because the former were generally guns of „position‟, which  
 
had been made mobile, whereas the latter had been designed to move with the army.  
 
The key reason for this was that British Artillery was seen largely as being available  
 
for a European conflict.
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 Whilst artillery did serve in any number of colonial  
 
campaigns, it was never in large numbers and, as Brackenbury‟s evidence showed, the  
 
tactics and equipment were designed for battle in Europe, or more accurately to fight  
 
European opposition. He stressed that British artillery tactics were based largely on  
 
the lessons of the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War and the Russo- 
 
Turkish War. He reminded the Commission that Britain had not fought a major  
 
campaign with breach loading guns, and thus such conflicts were the best guide for  
 
the British. These conflicts had proved, in the view of those in authority in the army,  
 
that guns needed to be pushed forward and fired as closely as possible to maximise  
 
their effect. In short they needed to be mobile. This was the way the Prussians had  
 
been successful in their conflicts, and when the Russians had tried to use their guns at  
 
long range they had found that their infantry got little or no support as a consequence.  
 
A wider point must be made that British battle tactics in general saw the engagement  
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ending in an infantry charge. Guns and cavalry were largely there to make this  
 
possible and to finish off an enemy once the bayonet charge had won the battle, not to  
 
win the battle on their own. As a result the British Army‟s Artillery Drill Book of  
 
1896 stated that the range for „distant‟ fire was 3,500 to 2,500 yards. The Infantry  
 
Drill book of 1896 laid down that despite the claims of artillery officers that their  
 
guns were effective beyond 3,000 yards; there was no need to practice this as it was  
 
beyond the range of support for the infantry. Even the German Field Service  
 
Regulations of 1900 stated that 3,300 yards was the range that artillery fire became  
 
effective and thus fire beyond that range was unnecessary.
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 It was believed that the  
 
physical effect would be small and not worth the wastage of ammunition. Again there  
 
was the geographical point that in Europe conditions would rarely allow guns to be  
 
used at such distances, except in sieges for which purpose a siege train was  
 
maintained. However in the veldt such conditions existed.  
 
 
Brackenbury continually emphasised in his evidence that the only major effect of  
 
long-range fire was on morale.  
 
In spite of the peculiar features of the Boer gun and of the country, it cannot 
be said that long range artillery fire was proved to be effective. It did not 
secure the success of any attack that was seriously resisted; it never repulsed 
any determined advance. The moderate range-fire of our guns did both, and 
those who have studied numbers of reports from South Africa can have no 




Brackenbury was trying to defend British tactics against knee-jerk reactions to the  
 
peculiar and unique conditions of South Africa, and appreciate the value of long- 
 
range fire. He refused to enter into any further debate about tactics used by the  
 
artillery in South Africa. He correctly pointed out to the Commission that tactics, in  
 
the form of the Drill Book, was the responsibility of the Adjutant-General‟s  
 
Department. One of the key reasons for the Boer success with artillery was their use  
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of indirect fire, that is firing from concealed position or at least from positions where  
 
they could not see the target. The British stuck to the principle of direct fire and  
 
placed their guns in the open, which with the accurate long range rifle fire of the Boer  
 
Mauser rifles proved devastating, most notably at the battle of Colenso. Boer success  
 
with artillery was in fact short-lived. Even in the early days of the war they were  
 
outnumbered three to one, and British numbers continued to grow whilst the Boers  
 
could not replace their guns. 
 
 
Brackenbury had tried to take action to reform and improve the artillery during the  
 
war. As early as November 1899 he had directed the Ordnance Committee to, in his  
 
words, “push on with the question of obtaining a satisfactory time fuse effective up to  
 
longer ranges than those then in service”.
97
 By January 1900 4,000 of these fuses  
 
were ready for despatch to South Africa. They had a twenty-one second fuse, which  
 
would cover 6,400 yards before the explosion. The other thing that Brackenbury  
 
wanted to obtain was an efficient quick-firing gun for the field artillery. The simple  
 
definition of a quick firer was a gun where there was a system in place to „absorb‟ the  
 
recoil, and thus avoid having to relay after each round was fired. In achieving this he  
 
was helped by the fact that the majority of artillery officers who had gained  
 
experience in South Africa were amongst the first to return home, as their presence  
 
was not deemed necessary for the „guerrilla‟ phase of the war.  
 
 
This was something that he had been interested in when President of the Ordnance  
 
Board, but acting only in an advisory capacity he had only been able to look at the  
 
designs that were sent to him. None of them proved acceptable. A stopgap measure  
 
was introduced whereby an axle spade was added to the gun, but this only checked the  
 
recoil. It did not make the gun a true quick firer, but it certainly made it considerably  
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quicker in terms of rate of fire. The system was fitted to all the guns that were sent to  
 
South Africa. The Boer guns were capable of firing 10 or 12 rounds a minute,  
 
although Brackenbury felt that only 6 or 8 would be possible with aimed fire.
98
 The  
 
average of the British guns in trials at Okehampton was only 4 rounds of aimed fire. It  
 
must be added that there is no evidence to suggest that rapidity of fire had any  
 
significant influence in any engagement during the war but had the Boers possessed  
 





Brackenbury attempted to find designs amongst British manufacturers that were  
 
satisfactory, but he could not find one complete system to meet his standards. He then  
 
took the slightly controversial step of gaining government permission to obtain a  
 
quick firing gun from Germany. The deal was kept secret for a variety of reasons. We  
 
have already seen that there was concern over the dependence of the army on overseas  
 
equipment. Added to this was the fact that Germany was increasingly starting to look  
 
like a potential enemy. It would also have been a blow to British prestige to admit that  
 
British industry was not up to the task of supplying modern equipment to the army. A  
 
government that was already under pressure over the conduct of the war and the state  
 
of the army would not want questions raised about the „might‟ of British industry. The  
 
Germans were also keen to keep the deal secret as there was growing anti-British  
 
feeling in Germany which was being fuelled by the South African War. The War  
 
Office placed an order with Rheinische Metallwaaren und Maschinenfabrik of  
 
Dusseldorf for 108 guns, limbers and ammunition wagons.
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 The company had until  
 
that point been unknown as gun manufacturers, yet they produced a gun where the top  
 
carriage took up the recoil, so that the wheels remained stationary and thus the gun  
 
did not need to be relayed. Brackenbury wrote that the recoil was taken up so well  
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that during firing a coin could be placed on the wheel and not be knocked off by the  
 
action of the gun. The new gun never served in South Africa but it equipped the army  
 
at Aldershot and meant that invasion fears were alleviated a little by the knowledge  
 
that the very latest modern guns were in service, but it had many problems and  
 
because it was completely unlike anything the artillery had seen before it took them  
 
some time to get used to it. This gun was never meant for long-term service, but it  
 
made Britain one of the few nations at that time to have genuine quick-firing field  
 
artillery. It also gave the British manufacturers something to work from.  
 
 
Lord Roberts wrote that the German built guns had “advanced us by five if not ten  
 
years in our knowledge of what field guns might do”.
100
 It was from the trials with  
 
this gun that Brackenbury, in July 1901, drew up the conditions to be met for the new  
 
quick-firing gun for the Horse and Field artillery, which envisaged a gun firing an  
 
18lb shell at up to 6,000 yards with a 16-degree elevation. Brackenbury listed in  
 
order of importance the features that were needed for the new gun with priority being  
 
given to shell power, ballistics and rapidity of aimed firepower.
101
 There were delays  
 
with the rearmament and the order was finally placed in December 1904 only after a  
 
sustained campaign in the press. Again this illustrates the effect the war had. It gave  
 
motivation to the process of rearmament that would have been lacking otherwise, but  
 
more than this it had led to a public and press outcry that it had not yet taken place  
 
only four years after the first quick-firing guns had been received.
102
 Such a campaign  
 
on behalf of the Army would never have happened before the war. It showed not just  
 
what an impact the war had on the image and popularity of the Army, but also the  
 




Conclusion              
 
The course and conduct of the war was such that demands were made on the military  
 
machine that had never been seriously considered prior to 1899. It is not the purpose  
 
of this study to look at why this was so, but to look at Brackenbury‟s role in how  
 
these demands were met dealt with. A key area was that of ammunition. Mention has  
 
already been made of the incredulity with which the War Office replied to Sir George  
 
White‟s request for 4 million rounds in October 1899, yet orders far beyond this were  
 
later received. At its height some 3.7 million rounds a week were needed to maintain  
 
the army in South Africa. In such a situation reserves were quickly exhausted as the  
 
ordnance factories and the trade were struggling to meet the demands. In fact, it was  
 
only after the expansion of the new plant at the ordnance factories that the situation  
 
was brought under control. It was not simply a fault of the supply system. The trade  
 
quickly proved that they could not be relied upon, because commercial interests were  
 
quite understandably driving the large majority of them, and the ordnance factories  
 
could only produce 1.5 million rounds a week working flat out including weekends.  
 
In such a situation the reserves were quickly used up, and Brackenbury took steps to  
 
try and cope with this. He stopped the shipping of ammunition to all other commands  
 
and raided the supplies of overseas garrisons. Gibraltar and Malta supplied about 8  
 
million round between them. The situation deteriorated to the extent that the General  
 
Officer Commanding in Malta was ordered by Lord Lansdowne to disarm the garrison  
 





By March 1900 the reserves held in Britain had run out and, according to  
 




Fortunately that was as bad as it got. The new plant at Woolwich and the borrowing  
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of ammunition from all over the Empire had given the trade time to catch up, a delay  
 
which was caused largely by their need to retool to produce the new pattern of  
 
ammunition. Saying that it was the excessive demand that was the biggest problem  
 
sums up the basic ammunition situation. The orders received were far beyond that  
 
which had been considered possible before-hand.  
 
 
All this was not without consequences for the ordnance factories. The wear and tear  
 
caused by the increased production made Brackenbury‟s proposed replacement of  
 
plant not only desirable but also essential. By the end of 1899 things were at breaking  
 
point for both men and machines and had it not been for Brackenbury‟s persuasion of  
 
a reluctant Army Board to close the factories for five days over Christmas, there  
 
might have been a total collapse.
105
 The work of the ordnance factories was excellent  
 
and they did all they could under the circumstances. The irony was that the trade was  
 
meant to cover up for the deficiencies in the ordnance factories, but it ended up the  
 
other way around. The factories were worked hard, and plant increased, because of  
 
the unreliability of large sectors of the trade. The change in control of the ordnance  
 
factories was vindicated by the South African War, where Brackenbury‟s overall  
 
control, and more to the point the de facto control of spending he was given,  
 
prevented the large scale collapse in supply which would inevitably have come if he  
 
had had to work through the procedures and rigours of the highly bureaucratic War  
 
Office purchasing system. In time of war the Financial Secretary was an unnecessary  
 
intermediary who did nothing but delay purchase of equipment. The system of  
 
reporting expenditure as soon as possible to the Army Board and then following it up  
 
with the necessary paperwork at a later stage, that Brackenbury adopted, with the  
 
permission of the Secretary of State for War, was vital in maintaining the supply of  
 
the army in South Africa. It will be remembered that without this burden Brackenbury  
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was only just able to keep the Army supplied; with the added bureaucracy, and more  
 
to the point the added time that this entailed, it is doubtful it could have been  
 
achieved. There was only one accounting system, with no provision being made for  
 
the rigours and immediate demands of war. In the early days of the war the  
 
department attempted to carry on with this system, and it has been suggested that this  
 
attempt may account for the number of nervous breakdowns that were suffered  
 
amongst the staff of the department.
106
 Brackenbury also had to contend with the fact  
 
that no plans existed for the expansion of the factories in time of war because of the  
 
belief in the ability of the trade to produce anything at any notice. He soon found that  
 
this was not realistic and as a result the ordnance factories had to be expanded and  
 
foreign suppliers, of which his department had no prior knowledge or experience, had  
 
to be used. 
 
 
Artillery ammunition was also subject to unprecedented demands during the war.  
 
Before the war the total reserve of 15pdr shells in Natal was 5,000 but in the early  
 
engagements an estimated 1,000 shells were fired in a day. Brackenbury  
 
underestimated the weekly demand for shells and General Buller asked for almost  
 
double what Brackenbury had planned to send out.
107
 Two things come out of this.  
 
First that Brackenbury, his department, and the War Office in general were into  
 
uncharted territory, and second that Brackenbury‟s experience as an artillery officer  
 
probably meant that he was better able to envisage such demands than a non-gunner.  
 
Very few, if any, artillery officers would have contemplated engagements where  
 
batteries were firing 1,000 shells a day. Brackenbury did his best to keep the level of  
 
supply maintained. The demands were such that it was calculated that the reserve  
 
would be used up in two months. Brackenbury took shells from wherever he could  
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find them. Batteries still in the British Isles had their stocks raided to the extent that in  
 
February 1900 the only field gun ammunition still in Britain were the remaining  
 
rounds in the limbers of the batteries.
108
 Brackenbury deliberately sent out guns to  
 
South Africa that he knew could be supplied from Royal Navy stocks but he saw the  
 
danger of such a move. It was undoubtedly his evidence to the Mowatt Committee  
 
that led that body to conclude that:  
 
The time might come when the country would find itself simultaneously 
engaged in a great war by sea and by land, during which India and the Navy so 










There were many problems in supplying the troops but despite this the quality of the  
 
equipment supplied was remarkably good. Andrew Page concluded that:  
                                                                                                                    
The quality of the stores provided is difficult to assess. However apart from 
swords lances and pistols, most items had more defenders than detractors. It is 
easy and entertaining to amass a list of absurdities (helmets and saddles that 
disintegrated in the rain, caps so inadequate that dozens of troops could get 
sunstroke on Salisbury plain, rifles where the butt fell off if it got too hot, and 
so on) but to do so is misleading. Most stores, including most headgear, 
saddles and rifles, were perfectly serviceable. Occasions where there was a 
shortage of stores, or those provided were of poor quality, were publicised by 
those expecting, perhaps subconsciously hoping for, another example of 




In a memorandum of January 1904 Brackenbury, soon to leave the War Office, wrote  
 
that much of the reserve had been established.
111
 He was 250 guns short of the  
 
required reserve but 78 were on order and another 100 had been budgeted for in the  
 
army estimates of 1904-05. He also reported that 233,000 rifles were missing from the  
 
reserve. This was accounted for by an unprecedented demand from India, due to the  
 
reorganisation that Lord Kitchener was undertaking and the fact that the department  
 
was still recovering from the war. The fact that the reserve had not been completed  
 291 
 
two years after the end of the South African War should not be regarded too harshly  
 
as such success as there was had been due only to Brackenbury persuading the cabinet  
 
to re-equip over three years as opposed to the usual ten. He could also point to the fact  
 
that the amount of small arms ammunition in reserve was over the authorised figure. 
 
 
The South African War took a considerable toll on the health of Sir Henry  
 
Brackenbury and it will be remembered that by the end of the war he was sixty-four.  
 
His department had to deal with supplying an army ten times the size of that for which  
 
it had been set up. Page best sums up his achievements:  
 
...He insisted on the change in control of the factories, did his best to ensure 
that contracts were adhered to, first recommended a general policy of buying 
abroad, expanded the Ordnance Factories as far as he was allowed and 
overrode the paralysing delays of War Office accounting. Neither he nor 
anyone could create in a moment productive capacity to meet any demand, 





There was no repeat of the collapse of supplies to South Africa as there had been in  
 
the Crimean War. In fact the main supply problems were in South Africa itself,  
 
especially after Kitchener‟s attempt to centralise all transport had failed. Brackenbury  
 
and his department, whilst trying to undertake a series of reforms and changes and  
 
cope with the series of committees that were set up, managed to keep up the supply  
 
and maintenance of the largest army that Britain had ever had up to that point. The  
 
strain on Brackenbury and his department was enormous and on the 15
th
 December  
 
1902 he offered his resignation on the grounds of ill-health saying, “I had become  
 
sleepless and nervous, and was no longer fit to carry on responsible work”.
113
  He  
 
informed the Commander-in-Chief, now Lord Roberts, and the Secretary of State for  
 
War, Mr St John Brodrick, that he intended to resign from the 1
st
 January 1903. It is  
 
worth observing that by now the war was over, but the reforms continued.  
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I have a great longing for rest, but on the other hand I have a strong desire 
myself to see through the work begun in 1899. By the end of March 1904, the 
modern armament of our fortresses should be complete, and we should have 
everything ready in the ordnance stores and clothing to equip an army of 
135,000 men for service abroad, and maintain them in the field for 6 months. 
You will understand that I want to see this through, lest anything should slip 




Brackenbury was persuaded, largely by Broderick, to stay on until the end of his five- 
 
year term in 1904. He agreed, but was ordered to go on leave until February in an  
 
attempt to recover. It has been said of Brackenbury that: 
 
His contribution to the successful prosecution of the war, and the placing of 






Brackenbury was left out of the honours that followed the war, although when he  
 
retired he was appointed a Privy Councillor. The reason for his omission is claimed to  
 
be because the King feared that awarding an honour to a Head of Department during  
 
the war would cheapen the honours system. The Secretary of State for War, by this  
 
time H.O. Arnold-Forster, felt Brackenbury deserved an award, but Arnold-Forster  
 
wrote “I acquiesce (to the King) having no option”. Arnold-Forster had written to  
 
the Prime Minister Balfour, who had succeeded Salisbury in 1902, about Brackenbury  
 
saying that:  
 
He has done the state splendid service. I should like him to receive a 
distinguished mark of favour. He has no children and in my opinion a peerage 




Arnold-Forster was a great admirer of Brackenbury‟s skill and also wrote to Balfour  
 
that, “Brackenbury to my great regret is leaving us in a few weeks”.
117
 No doubt  
 
Brackenbury also regretted the fact that he was leaving just as secretaries of state were  
 
coming along with mandates to carry out so many of the reforms that he had  
 
championed during his career. Only a matter of months after he left the army in  
 
1904 the office of Commander-in-Chief was abolished and replaced by a Chief of  
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Staff. Arnold-Forster wrote to Brackenbury on the occasion of his retirement:  
 
“I am permitted to inform you that the King proposes to mark the conclusion 
of your great career by summoning you to the Privy Council. I am told that 
under the circumstances this honour is exceptional, to which I can only reply 





It is easy to condemn the lack of foresight within the army but no one in the War  
 
Office had any experience of a conflict on such a scale. Even the Crimean War is not  
 
a fair comparison in size. The South African War was a „wake up call‟ for the army  
 
and politicians alike. It made many realise the demands of modern warfare. Whilst  
 
there were still great failures of the military machine in the First World War, the  
 
army took the field in far better shape because of the South African experiences. It  
 
can be argued that the problems of the First World War came about largely after the  
 
conflict had changed in size again. Before South Africa, the Army had prepared for  
 
conflicts using tens of thousands of troops at most. South Africa brought about the  
 
realisation that it needed to be prepared for hundreds of thousands of troops at the  
 
very least. The supply problems of the First World War came when it had changed yet  
 
again to million of troops. 
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As we have shown, Henry Brackenbury had a long and varied career. Although he  
 
would have liked to have reached the position of Chief of Staff, it can be said that in  
 
many ways he had reached the peak of his profession by the end of his career. He  
 
followed a common route into the army, being a younger son of a minor landowning  
 
family with something of a military tradition. However the career that followed was  
 
far from conventional. His administrative, literary and active service achievements  
 
would have stood out individually. In conclusion we will look at his achievements and  
 
his impact on the late Victorian army.  
 
 
His education was a common enough path for a young officer, Tonbridge, Eton and  
 
then Woolwich. However, between Eton and Woolwich Brackenbury had an  
 
experience which undoubtedly affected his approach to his future career. The almost  
 
two years that Brackenbury spent in a notary‟s office in Quebec had a profound effect  
 
on him. That period immersed in a business, indeed professional, atmosphere gave  
 
him an experience that few of his contemporaries had. Most officers went straight  
 
from education to the army. Brackenbury had a wider experience. Not only had he  
 
travelled to part of the empire, he had worked in a profession. He had knowledge of  
 
the wider world, and was not blinkered to simply the life of the „gentry‟ or soldiering.  
 
Although his time there was brief it obviously went a long way to explaining his  
 
professional approach to work, and study.  
 
 
Given this early professional experience, which obviously held some interest for him,  
 
it could be considered somewhat surprising that he entered upon a career in the army.  
 
It was not the obvious port of call for a young man with a professional approach. It is  
 
likely that the reason for his decision was very much linked to his family history. As  
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he wrote, in 1899, “In three generations sprang from my grandfather, who was  
 




This was an obvious family link. Both his father and uncle had been soldiers in the  
 
Peninsular War. He can have had little memory of his father, given that he died when  
 
Henry was only six years old, but perhaps the little he knew about him concerned his  
 
military career. Indeed almost every reference that Henry makes to his father in his  
 
literary work is followed by the observation that he was a Peninsular War veteran. An  
 
attempt to emulate his father, and uncle, was perhaps part of his motivation for joining  
 
the army. Perhaps more relevant was the recent commissioning of his brother  
 
Charles into the Royal Artillery. This not only influenced his decision to join the  
 
army, but also undoubtedly influenced his choice of the Royal Artillery. It is recorded  
 
that Henry visited his brother on several occasions after Charles‟ entry into the army.  
 
It is extremely likely that Henry saw something in the life that appealed to him on the  
 
strength of these visits. There was also a friendly rivalry between them and there  
 
appears to be a pattern in their careers. Charles‟s active service in the Crimea was a  
 
key influence in Henry‟s desire to see action in India during the mutiny. It also  
 
influenced his desire to witness the Franco-Prussian war at first hand. The influence  
 
of his brother in this direction is clear: 
 
My brother Captain (afterwards Major-General) Charles Brackenbury, had 
acted as a military correspondent for „The Times‟ in the war of 1866. At the 
battle of Koeniggratz he had ridden with Benedek into the thick of the fire at 
Chlum. He had gone on to Italy, and described the naval battle of Lissa and 
the handing over of Venetia. He had become a personage of some importance, 
and I was fired with emulation.
2
   
 
This statement illustrates another important point. He had seen his brother rise in  
 
importance through journalism, and through witnessing a continental war. Indeed it  
 




articles appearing in 1866. Whilst the other reasons for embarking on a literary career  
 
have already been examined, such as using his spare time constructively, and financial  
 
gain, the fact that he had seen his brother rise in importance due to his career was also  
 
an appeal. It must have played a role in his desire to see the Franco-Prussian War at  
 
first hand. Initially he witnessed it as a „tourist‟, then he wrote about it from London,  
 
including the „Diary of the War‟, and finally he was right at the front working for the  
 
National Aid Society. There were obviously other motivates behind his work, such as  
 
patriotism, the chance to enhance his administrative credentials, but there was also a  
 
clear desire to help his own career advancement.  
 
 
This brings us to the nature of Brackenbury‟s ambition. It is hard to see exactly what  
 
his ambition was. This is where the lack of private papers is a problem, as we get no  
 
clear picture of whether he initially embarked upon his military career as a means to  
 
an end. In short did he intend to make his reputation in the army and then make his  
 
„fortune‟ elsewhere. This was a common enough occurrence during this period. If that  
 
was the original plan it is interesting that he did not leave the army on the occasions  
 
that his career appeared to have stalled. If we therefore presume that he always  
 
intended to remain in the army and if, as he said, his “heart was in the army” then  
 
what was his ambition?
3
 It is clear that from day one he is attempting to advance his  
 
career. His desire, indeed desperation, to see active service should be seen in this  
 
light. It was in the field that reputations were made, and the system of promoting  
 
officers to high office as a reward for service in the field was to continue for many  
 
years. His own career would illustrate this as it was only after his success as a field  
 
commander in the Sudan that he was finally appointed to the War Office staff. His  
 
literary career was also an attempt to advance his career, and was another way he  
 




Wolseley would later accuse Brackenbury of self-interest and a lack of loyalty and  
 
gratitude concerning his military career. There was undoubtedly truth behind this.  
 
Wolseley remained convinced that those who had been part of the „ring‟ owed him an  
 
undying debt of gratitude. However all of them to a lesser or greater extent had made  
 
their own careers after his initial help. Wolseley had equal right to be grateful to those  
 
members of his ring who had helped to make his name by their supported of his  
 
campaigns, and Brackenbury had played a key role in making sure that his campaigns  
 
had run smoothly and successfully. Brackenbury was never afraid to use whatever  
 
influence he could to help his career along. Active service and writing were all means  
 
to an end. In the same way he used his relationship Wolseley, and with Roberts, to  
 
help in this process.  
 
 
Brackenbury also made great use of his political connections. There were several  
 
occasions when he used such links to try and obtain future employment in the army.  
 
His three key administrative appointments were very much the result of political  
 
influence rather than military. His appointment at the Intelligence Branch owed a  
 
great deal to the intervention of W.H. Smith the newly appointed, but short-lived,  
 
Secretary of State for War. On returning from the Sudan he had found himself  
 
promoted to Major General, but unemployed. Brackenbury had used his friendship  
 
with the future Lord Egerton, at that time Conservative M.P for Mid-Cheshire, to  
 
canvas the support of W.H. Smith for employment at the War Office. Brackenbury  
 
recorded that W.H. Smith had said that he “had his eye on Brackenbury” and was  
 
keen to employ him at the War Office.
4
 At the same time he was trying to use military  
 
contacts to find employment, but without success. Wolseley had tried to have him  
 
appointed Deputy Adjutant General and Lord Roberts had been keen to employ him  
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in India. Neither had been successful. It was also political influence, at Brackenbury‟s  
 
prompting, that obtained his appointment as Military Member in India. He had  
 
become concerned that his recent activities, particularly on the Hartington  
 
Commission had alienated him from much of the army, particularly Wolseley and the  
 
Duke of Cambridge. Brackenbury believed, somewhat justifiably, that his career was  
 
over, and that he would simply be reduced to half-pay and not employed again. One  
 
can see through his correspondence with Stanhope that he was using all his political  
 
contacts to obtain future employment. Knowing that the appointment in India would  
 
soon be vacant he wrote to Lord Salisbury, W.H. Smith, Stanhope and Lord  
 




 It is perhaps a mark of his standing by this point that some of the  
 
most powerful men in the government were all prepared to write on his behalf,  
 
including the Prime Minister. This again leads weight to the argument that it was the  
 
politicians who truly appreciated his skills and achievements. Even his final  
 
appointment as Director General of Ordnance owed a great deal to political support.  
 
The relationship he had built up with Lord Lansdowne, when the latter was Viceroy  
 
of India, played a key part in the decision to appoint Brackenbury.  
 
 
His use of such contacts and influence does suggest a somewhat „pushy‟ individual.  
 
This was perhaps true, but it could be argued that he did not really have an alternative.  
 
He had no power, or influence of his own. He was not a Wolseley or Roberts with a  
 
great reputation gained on the battlefield, nor did he have the connections and  
 
background of either the Duke of Cambridge or the Duke of Connaught. He was in a  
 
difficult position. His real skill lay away from the battlefield. Even his active service  
 
career illustrates this. The key work he did was before the battle, it might even be  
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argued before the campaign, in making sure that the preparation had been done and  
 
that the army took the field in the best condition. Even when he commanded the River  
 
Column in the Sudan it helped him that it was more a logistical battle than anything  
 
else. This was a vital part of a campaign, and indeed soldiering in general, but it was  
 
often ignored.  
 
 
His ideal appointment would have been Chief of Staff. As head of a General Staff he  
 
could have planned for future operations, sorted out the administrative system of the  
 
army, improved the staff system and generally improved the efficiency of the army.  
 
When one sees the improvements in the Intelligence Branch, the Indian Army, and the  
 
Ordnance Department, he was able to achieve it can be considered a tragedy that he  
 
had not been appointed Chief of Staff in 1891, in line with the Hartington  
 
Commission‟s recommendation, and given the chance in the next eight years before  
 
the South African War to have put right much of what was to cause the army and the  
 
nation such distress and loss of life in South Africa. To this end it is worth repeating  
 
the words of the Esher Committee of 1904 that:  
 
We unhesitatingly assert that if the recommendations of the majority of the 
Hartington Commission had not been ignored, the country would have been 
saved the loss of many thousands of lives, and of many millions of pounds, 
subsequently sacrificed in the South African War… Upon many material 
points we have done no more than adopt and develop the principles laid down 
by the Hartington Commission, especially as regards the creation of the branch 
of a Chief of the General Staff.
6
   
  
 
Brackenbury was an intellectually gifted officer. His administrative skills were just  
 
one part of this. His ability, and more importantly his willingness, to think and study  
 
his profession make him stand out in an era when this was not generally the case. The  
 
work of Brian Bond and Gwyn Harries Jenkins illustrate just how unusual this was  
 
and the work of Edward Spiers has illustrated that even the more gifted officers turned  
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to the army as a last resort, having failed to enter the civil service, at home or in India,  
 
or university or even the legal profession.
7
 However this was an era of change, albeit  
 
gradual. The rise of such organisations as the United Service Institute illustrated that  
 
there was a growth in study. Yet Brackenbury‟s hope that the officer would study his  
 





In Brackenbury it can be argued that we see something of a new style of officer. He  
 
was the first officer of truly intellectual leanings to reach high office. Whilst Wolseley  
 
recognised the importance of study, he was more inclined to have others do it for him,  
 
hence that men like Maurice and Brackenbury were sometimes referred to as „the pen  
 
of Wolseley‟. Certainly no one had ever achieved such high officer who had written  
 
so much concerning his profession. More than this Brackenbury‟s administrative  
 
abilities meant that he was also able to but his ideas into practice when in positions of  
 
power. In this way his time at the Intelligence Branch is key. The emphasis was on,  
 
study, hard work and professionalism. By doing this he was able to produce an end  
 
product that, as we have seen, was on a par with that of their German counterpart,  
 
despite the latter‟s greater manpower and money. Key in this was his appointment of  
 
equally professional individuals. It is important to emphasise the role Brackenbury  
 
played in the early careers of many of the future leaders of the army. It was he who  
 
gave the likes of Robertson, Wilson, Gleichen, Wolfe-Murray, Grierson and others  
 
their first chance to really prove themselves at the War Office. From reading their  
 
accounts of him you can see that they admired and looked up to him. In many ways he  
 
had developed his own „ring‟, handpicking his own staff out of those best suited for  
 




The fact that Brackenbury, or a member of his family, failed to write an  
 
autobiography dealing with his military career mean that most of his own thoughts  
 
have been lost. It would have been intriguing to have read his account of the work he  
 
did at the Intelligence Branch, in India and as Director General of Ordnance. The  
 
problem of this is that to a large extent we have to go on the accounts left by others.  
 
Had he himself recorded it the achievements of his career would have been read,  
 
analysed and criticised by historians. Too often his point of view is lost and has been  
 
replaced in the historiography by another persons view about him. Despite the fact  
 
that his final appointment at the War Office meant that his career had reached par  
 
with Evelyn Wood or Redvers Buller, in that he was a member of the army Council  
 





The reforms he had put in place in the Intelligence Branch and Ordnance Department,  
 
paid dividends during the South African War. Indeed, the few areas of the army that  
 
came out of the war with any credit attached to them owed it largely to Brackenbury.  
 
The mobilisations scheme worked extremely well, and the ease and efficiency of it  
 
was a surprise to all. Whilst Ardagh deserved credit for the work he had done in  
 
fine-tuning the scheme, it was essentially Brackenbury‟s scheme that allowed the  
 
army to mobilise and deploy to South Africa with such relative ease. It was his  
 
perseverance with the scheme, despite many problems, that had brought it to fruition.  
 
Although strongly criticised at the time the Royal Commissions into the war  
 
exonerated the Intelligence Branch. They found that the Intelligence provided had  
 
been extremely accurate and that it was a failure higher up the chain of command that  
 
was to blame. The accuracy of their reports was credit to the reforms and system of  
 




Even his work at the Ordnance Department was a successful part of the war. Given all  
 
the problems faced it is remarkable that the department, and the supply system in  
 
general, did not collapse under the strain of the conflict. That it worked as well as it  
 
did was down to the reforms that Brackenbury was able to introduce during the war  
 
itself. As Wolseley recorded: 
 
Had he never accomplished anything else for the State than the great service 
he rendered England throughout our recent and curiously prolonged war in 
South Africa, he might indeed be well satisfied with what he had done for his 
country. I do not know an officer who could have performed equally well the 
heavy and responsible duties which fell to his lot at the War Office during the 
last three years.
8
                     
 
He was helped by two factors. Firstly, Lansdowne‟s willingness to give him licence to  
 
do as he wished. This was undoubtedly helped by Lansdowne‟s experience at first  
 
hand of Brackenbury‟s administrative ability in India. Had Brackenbury not been  
 
given the free role he enjoyed under Lansdowne it is likely he would have been  
 
unable to achieve what he did. Secondly, the fact that he was appointed only a matter  
 
of months before war broke out meant that he was free from blame for the state his  
 
department was in. To this end he was again thankful to Lansdowne who made it clear  
 
to the Elgin Commission that Brackenbury had been brought in to completely reform  
 







In looking at the life and military career of Henry Brackenbury it is quite clear that  
 
here was a man of great intelligence, brilliant administrative skill and with an  
 
understanding of tactical, technical and scientific military matters that was beyond  
 
many of his contemporaries. Even within the group of bright young officers that  
 
formed the „Wolseley ring‟ his ability stood out. His literary career was extraordinary,  
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and the amount of material he produced was almost akin to that of a professional  
 
journalist. Indeed there were times when his writing seemed to take up more of his  
 
time than his military work. Yet his literary output should not be viewed as the  
 
product of a lifetime. Indeed his literary career only began in 1865 and by 1878 he  
 
was no longer writing regularly. After that year he only contributed occasional articles  
 
and books. The value of his literary career to both his financial security and career  
 
advancement cannot be ignored. As Brackenbury wrote “I attribute to a great extent  
 
whatever measure of success I had in my profession to it”.
10
 It was his literary work  
 
that led to his being asked to work for the National Aid Society, and this and his  
 
literary work brought him to the attention of Wolseley. As a consequence he enjoyed  
 
a considerable active service career that would have been the envy of many of his  
 
contemporaries. This in turn led to his opportunity to undertake key administrative  
 
positions in the War Office and India.  
 
 
The career of Henry Brackenbury illustrates the period of change that the army was  
 
undertaking. Had he been in the army a generation before he would have found it  
 
almost impossible to reach the heights he did. Had he been born a generation later he  
 
would have played a key role in the development of the army up to World War One.  
 
A generation later and his abilities might have been more greatly appreciated. Men of  
 
a similar style, such as Wilson, Grierson, Gleichen, Callwell and Robertson are an  
 
example of this. Also he would undoubtedly have been Chief of the General Staff.  
 
This was the ideal appointment for him. His championing of the creation of such a  
 
position was obviously, and naturally, partly motivated by a desire to fill such a post.  
 
However to say this was the sole reason for his campaigning would be to do him an  
 
injustice and would also ignored the fact that it was in the best interest of the army to  
 
have one. Britain was the last major power to create a General Staff, even though the  
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need had been visible for some time. It took the South African War to finally prove  
 
the necessity of such a body. It was indeed ironic that the office of Commander-in- 
 
Chief was abolished and a Chief of Staff created in its place only a matter of months  
 
after Brackenbury retired from the army.  
 
 
There are two areas that have been touched upon during this thesis that warrant  
 
further study. Indeed two areas could, and to an extant have, merited a thesis in their  
 
own right. Firstly, Brackenbury‟s service for the National Aid Society, which to an  
 
extent is beyond the scope of a thesis concentrating on his military career, could  
 
provide an interesting study into this forerunner of the British Red Cross and the more  
 
general topic of the rise of humanitarianism in the late nineteenth century. Such a  
 
study would complement the work done by Bertrand Taithe that has looked  
 
predominantly at this through the continental experience. Secondly, a much wider  
 
study of the War Office‟s struggle to deal with the demands of the South African War,  
 
in particular within the Ordnance Department, would make a useful addition to the  
 
historiography of the period. It is some years since Andrew Page wrote his thesis on,  
 
„The Supply services of the British Army in the South African War‟ and in that time  
 
historical views on the South African War have altered.      
 
 
In 1904 Brackenbury retired from the army at the age of sixty-six. By this stage the  
 
years of hard work and the strain of the South African War had taken their toll on  
 
him. Indeed the breakdown of health he had suffered in recent years with the strain of  
 
war meant that had he not retired in 1904 it is likely he would have died soon. On  
 
retirement he moved to Nice, France. As it was, despite ill health, he lived for another  
 





By the death of General Right Hon. Sir Henry Brackenbury, P.C., G.C.B., 
K.C.B., K.C.S.I., formerly Director-General of Ordnance and Colonel 
Commandant of the Regiment of Royal Artillery, which occurred in Nice 
yesterday, the Army loses the services of one of the most able of its officers of 
senior rank.
11
          
 
Indeed it was right that he should be called one of the ablest officers of senior rank,  
 
and it illustrated now far he had come. The Intelligence Branch had taken his profile  
 
to another level. His time in India was such a success that his name was being  
 
mentioned, although not by him, as a possible Commander-in-Chief in India. He had  
 
received high praise for his role in the South African War. Much of what he had  
 
campaigned for in military reform had been vindicated by the South African War.  
 
There was now a mandate to carry out such reform.  
 
 
His achievements were recognised at the time, but years of neglect by historians mean  
 
that his role has largely been forgotten. Indeed he had been relegated to just one of the  
 
„Wolseley ring‟. This thesis has illustrated that he was far more than that and should  
 
be recognised as such. His importance to the army and the state was above his  
 
connection with Wolseley. Brackenbury was a man who became important in his own  
 
right, and had a career that stands out on its own merit. Had he become Chief of Staff  
 
it is certain that he would be extremely well known to historians. He might even have  
 
been an English Von Moltke or Von Schlieffen. However we shall never know. His  
 
administrative skills would have been put to great use had he been Chief of Staff in  
 
the years leading up to the South African War and World War One.  
 
 
More than anything else Brackenbury‟s career illustrated that it was possible for a  
 
man of high intellect, learning and limited financial means to achieve high office in  
 
the late Victorian British army. To say he was a trailblazer is perhaps a slight  
 
exaggeration but the vital role in encourage young officers of a similar leaning, and  
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proving that they could reach the heights of the army should not be underestimated.  
 
Many of those young officers who served under him praised his example. It is  
 
disappointing that neither Ardagh or Grierson wrote autobiographies as the two men  
 
were closer to Brackenbury than any other office, and could in a way be called his  
 
protégés. Their insights into Brackenbury would have been another interesting source  
 
to examine.  
 
 
On mere length of service alone, some forty-eight years, Henry Brackenbury‟s career  
 
is worthy of note and despite the many problems with undertaking such a study, it is  
 
still slightly surprising that no work about his military career and life has, until now,  
 
been written. This is especially so when one considers the many, and varied, areas in  
 
which he served and the significant events for both the army and the state in which he  
 
was closely involved. That Brackenbury held such a career, given his modest private  
 
means and the fact that he supplemented his pay through considerable literary work,  
 
again makes his life all the more interesting and significant. This, added to his ability  
 
to write, and to write well, his zeal for his work, both literary and military and the  
 
careful study of his profession make it no surprise that he was in many ways‟ The  
 
Thinking Man‟s Soldier‟      
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Timeline of the Career of General Sir Henry Brackenbury* 
 
1837 - Born on 1
st
 September at Bolingbroke Hall, Lincolnshire. Fourth son of  
 William and Maria Brackenbury. 
 
1838 - Family move to Usselby Hall, Lincolnshire. 
 
1842 - Henry’s father is left paralysed by a stroke.  
 
1843 - Family move to Ahascreagh, Ireland.  
 
1844 - William Brackenbury dies. 
 
1846-1849  - Henry attends Tonbridge School. 
 
1850-1852  - Attends Eton. 
 
1852-1854 - Training in under Her Majesty’s Notary in Quebec, Mr Archibald  
 Campbell.  
 
1853 - Commission as Ensign in the Seventh battalion of the Quebec Militia.  
 
1854 - Sits exam for Royal Military Academy, Woolwich. Passes with fifth highest  
 score. 
 
1854 - Joins as gentleman cadet and is appointed senior under officer.    
 
1856 - Commission Lieutenant in the Royal Artillery. Appointed to garrison artillery I 
 in Plymouth.  
 
1857 - Sails for India in August as part of force to suppress the Indian Mutiny. 
 
1858 - Sees first action at Battle of Banda. Invalided home later that year. 
 
1860 - Appointed Adjutant of Royal Artillery in the western district. 
 
1861 - Married Emila Morley (died 1905). 
 
1862 - Appointed Lieutenant of Company of gentleman cadets at Royal Military  
 Academy Woolwich.  
 
1864 - Appointed Assistant Instructor in Artillery at Royal Military Academy,  
 Woolwich.  
 
1866 - Promoted to Captain in August. 
 




1869 - Promoted to Major in April. 
1870- 1871 - Service for the National Aid Society during Franco-Prussian War.  
 
1873-1874 - Served in Ashanti Campaign as Military Secretary to Wolseley.  
 
1874 - Garrison Artillery at Sheerness. 
 
1875 - Went to Natal serving as Military Secretary to Wolseley as Governor and High  
 Commissioner.  
 
1875 - Returns to England. Promoted to brevet Lieutenant Colonel and placed in  
 command of depot at Woolwich.  
 
1877 - Given command of garrison battery at Dover. 
 
1878 - In May 1878 moved with his battery to Newhaven.  
 
 1878 - In July goes to Cyprus with Wolseley. Brackenbury appointed Assistant  
 Adjutant and Quartermaster of force. In August appointed Chief Commandant of  
 Police and inspector of Prisons.  
 
1879 - Appointed Military Secretary to Wolseley as the latter travels to take command  
 in Zulu War. In September as Chief of Staff plans campaign against Chief Sekukuni.  
 Made a Brevet Colonel. 
 
1880 - Appointed Private Secretary to Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton. Continued in  
 this appointment until August of that year. 
 
1881 - Appointed Military Attaché in Paris.  
 
1882 - Arrives in Ireland to take over command of Police, with exact title still  
 unknown. Later given position of Assistant Under Secretary for Police and Crime.  
 Position ends badly and is placed on half-pay, and returned to regiment with rank of  
 Major. 
 
1883 - Appointed to command of garrison artillery in Gibraltar. 
 
1884-1885 - Serves in Gordon Relief Expedition, eventually commanding the River  
 Column. Acting Brigadier-General.  
 
1885 - Returns from Sudan and promoted to Major General.    
 
1886-1891 - Director of Military Intelligence at the War Office. Promote Lieutenant  
 General in April 1888. 
  
1891-1896 - Military Member of the Council of the Viceroy of India.  
 
1896-1899 - President of the Ordnance Board. 
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1899-1904 - Director General of the Ordnance. Acting General confirmed in 1902.  
 
1904 - Retires from the army and is made a Privy Councillor. 
 
1905 - Marriage to Edith Desanges and moves to Nice, France. 
 
1914 - Dies in Nice, France.  
 
 







List of books and articles by Sir Henry Brackenbury  
Any such list can never be complete. Largely this is due to the fact that many of the 
articles he wrote were anonymous due to their controversial nature and his position as 
an officer of the Crown. It is only where Brackenbury or someone else has claimed 
credit for him that they can be recorded. Hence some of these articles do not appear 
on list such as the Wellesley Index or P.C.I Full Text, but are claimed by Brackenbury 
in ‘Some Memories of My Spare Time’ or are confirmed by the private letters of the 
Blackwood’s. Also it is unknown how much he contributed to ‘The Times of Natal’. 
Brackenbury, Colley and Butler took it in turn to write the leading article for the 





The Last Campaign of Hanover (1870)  
 
Les Marechaux de France, Etude de leur Conduite de la Guerre en 1870 (Paris:   




The Ashanti War: A Narrative prepared from the Official Documents 2 volumes  
 (London: Blackwoods, 1874).    
 
The River Column: A Narrative of the Advance of the River Column of The Nile 
 Expeditionary Force (London: Blackwoods, 1885). 
 
Some Memories of my Spare Time’ (1909) William Blackwood & Sons, London.  
 
The Nearest Guard: The History of His Majesty’s Body Guard of the Honourable  




‘Ancient Cannon in Europe’ Part I 1865. 
 




‘Operations against Charleston’ Fraser’s Magazine Volume 74 (July 1866). 
 
‘Military Reform’ Part I to IV Fraser’s Magazine Volume 74-75, (December 1866 to  
 June 1867). 
 
‘Warfare in the Middle Ages’ The Gentleman’s Magazine, December 1866. 
 
‘The Military Armaments of the Five Great Powers’ Saint Paul’s: A Monthly 
Magazine, Volume I (November 1867). 
 
‘Our Army as it is, and as it should be’ Saint Paul’s: A Monthly Magazine, Volume I  
 (February 1868). 
 








‘Army Reform’ The Athenaeum, (February 1869).  
 
‘The Influence of Modern Improvements Upon Strategy’ Saint Paul’s: A Monthly 
Magazine, Volume III (March 1869). 
 




‘The Tactics of the Three Arms as modified to meet the requirements of the Present  
 Day’ Royal United Service Institute Journal, (1873).  
 
‘Fanti and Ashanti: Three papers read on board the S.S Ambriz on the voyage to the  
 Gold Coast’ (London: Blackwood & Sons, (1873). 
 
‘Philanthropy in War’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 119 (February 1877). 
 
‘Crete’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 121 (April 1877). 
 
‘The South African Question’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 124 (July 1878).  
 
‘The Troubles of a Scots Traveller’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 124 (October  
 1878). 
 
‘Shadwell’s Life of Lord Clyde’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 129 (April 1881).  
 
 ‘Midsummer in the Soudan’ Fortnightly Review Volume 44, (August 1885). 
 
‘Life Insurance for Officers of the Army’ United Service Journal, (October 1891). 
 
‘Stonewall Jackson’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 164 (December 1898). 
 
‘A Letter about the Family of Brackenbury to William Blackwood Esq.’ Blackwood’s 
Magazine (2
nd
 January 1899).  
 
‘A Letter from Salamanca’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 165 (March 1899). 
 
‘Sir George Pomeroy-Colley: Some Personal Recollections’ Blackwood’s Magazine,  
 (March 1899). 
 
‘The Transvaal Twenty Years Ago’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 166 (November  
 1899). 
 
‘Lord Wantage, V.C, K.C.B’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 183 (February 1908). 
 
‘The Ashanti Campaign’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 185 (March 1909). 
 
‘Lord Lytton’s Indian Administration’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 166  
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 (December 1899). 
 
‘Military Attaché in Paris’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 185 (April 1909). 
 
‘Prince Napoleon’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 185 (April 1909). 
 
‘Sir John Ardagh’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 185 (May 1909).   
 
‘James Douglas, M.D. Surgeon Venturer’ Blackwood’s Magazine Volume 191   
 (January 1912). 
   




He wrote far more for the daily press than is known. Much was either deliberately 
anonymous or credit was not given.  
 
Leading article on Corporal Punishment in the army The Standard 18
th
 March 1867. 
A second article on the same subject was published in The Standard’s sister paper The 
Morning Herald on 30
th
 March 1867.  
 
‘Help for the Sick and Wounded’ The Standard (January 1868). Two articles.  
 
‘A Tour in the Cockpit of Europe’ The Standard (14
th
 September 1868). 
 






‘The Armies of France, Prussia and Spain’ The Standard (12
th
 July 1870). 
 
‘French and Prussian Tactics’ The Standard (14
th
 July 1870). 
  
‘Diary of the War’ The Standard (6
th
 August 1870). This continued every day until 1
st
 
September 1870, when he left to start his work for the National Aid Society.  
 
‘The Paris Commune’ The Times (17
th
 April 1871). 
 
‘Russia at Constantinople’ The Daily Telegraph (18
th
 November 1876).  
 
‘Diplomatic Parallels’ The Daily Telegraph (20
th
 November 1876). 
 









‘Five French Plays and a Moral’ The World 14
th
 March 1877.  
 
‘England’s Threatened Interests’ The Daily Telegraph April 1877. * 
 
‘Why do we hesitate?’ The Daily Telegraph April 1877. * 
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‘The Russian Advance Through Roumania’ The Daily Telegraph April 1877. * 
 
‘The Passage of the Danube’ The Daily Telegraph May 1877. * 
 





Brande’s Dictionary of Literature, Science, and Art (London: Messrs Longmans, 
Green & Co, 1866). Brackenbury contributed the military articles for this edition.    
 
Smith, Major-General Michael. W. Drill and Manoeuvres of Cavalry combined with 
Horse Artillery (London: Longman’s, 1865). At the request of Mr Longman 
Brackenbury edited the book.  
                                                 
1
 Some people regard ‘The Tactics of the Three Arms’ as a book, as Mitchells of London first 
published it as a pamphlet in 1873. It was originally a lecture to the Royal United Service Institute, and 
subsequently published in their Journal. If one is to count this as a book it would be necessary to count 
a letter from Salamanca in the same vein, as this was published in the way format by Blackwoods at a 
later date. It has been decided here to count neither as a book and include them as Journal articles for 
the sake of clarity and simplicity.   
2
 This is the book that Brackenbury had suppressed before publication for fear that it might prejudice 
the trial of Marshal Bazaine. Only five copies survived, one with the Emperor Napoleon III, one with 
Marshal Canrobert, one with Sir Lintorn Simmons, one with the Staff College Library and one to the 
French Journal ‘Republique Francaise’.  
3
 It has already been mentioned that this was meant to be a series of three articles, but his archival 
research was lost in a fire, and he had neither the time nor inclination to start again. The Original 
handwritten copies of the first two articles survive in the archives of the Royal Artillery Museum at 
Woolwich. 
4
 The two articles on Army Reform, whilst linked, are not entitled part I & II, so they have been listed 
individually.   
5
 In Some memories of My Spare Time Brackenbury claims to have written this article anonymously  
6
 There articles were written during one of his vacation tours of the continents battlefields which he 
undertook whilst Professor of Military History at Woolwich. He undertook a similar tour in 1869, but 
no record of the articles he wrote exists.   
7
 These articles were written under the signature of ‘Anglophile’. Any articles marked * are written 
under that pseudonym. There nature was highly politicised. Reading between the lines it can be 
suggested that they might have been written with the collusion of Lord Hartington. See Brackenbury, 
Henry Some Memories of My Spare Time (London: William Blackwood and Sons, 1909), pp.247-248.   
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                                          Pictures of Sir Henry Brackenbury 
 



















3. Brackenbury on his appointment to the Privy Council in 1904. 
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Reports from the Select Committee on Army and Navy Estimates; together with the 
proceedings of the committee, and minutes of evidence. (1887)  
 
Report of the Royal Commission appointed to inquire into the system under which 
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